



PHOENIX

The Rise of Citizens Voices
for a Greener Europe

Participation in **H**olistic **EN**vironmental/Ecological **I**nnovations

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Summary

In the perspective of the European Green Deal (EGD), the deliverable “Sound Practices of Democratic Innovations” has achieved a comprehensive collective study that give the basis for the further development of the PHOENIX project. The two figures below describe the general project sequence and the role of this deliverable within it.

It provides a critical analysis of the basic concepts of the PHOENIX research (Part 1). This Part begins with the six challenges at the core of our proposal: time frame; complexity; scale, cooperation between stakeholders; conflict and deliberation; and trust (Section 1.1.). It further discusses the four democratic goods that were at the core of our proposal in the grant agreement: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency (Section 1.2.). It clarifies the idea of a tangram as a participatory and deliberative system, that is a system in which different methodologies and tools are coordinated in order to improve participation in a specific context with the EGD in mind (see Section 1.3.). A specific development has tackled the issue of societies and nature interdependencies in democratic innovations that aim to foster the ecological transition (Section 1.4.). Another specific development focusses on the issue of RRI (Section 1.5.).

The deliverable also provides a critical analysis of four main participatory and deliberative methodologies which had been already developed by practitioners (initially mostly in isolation from one another) (Part 2), in four sections: Participatory budgeting (2.1.), citizens’ assemblies (2.2), public debate (2.3), mixed councils and assemblies (2.4).

In addition, it presents some of the tools that will constitute basic elements of the tangrams (Part 3). A tool refers to different devices within a consolidated methodology or a participatory experience. Three of these tools are presented in more depth in three Sections: trust (3.1.), ICT (3.2.), and mapping (3.3).

Last but not least, the analysis of the case studies tackles a number of tools, challenges, and democratic goods in specific contexts (Part 4), ordered in four sections corresponding to the four methodologies: Participatory budgeting (4.1.), citizens’ assemblies (4.2), public debate (4.3), mixed councils and assemblies (4.4).




Figure 1. Description of the PHOENIX pathway




Figure 2: Description of the Interrelations between tasks within the PHOENIX project

Executive summary

The deliverable “Sound Practices of Democratic Innovations” has provided a critical analysis of four main participatory and deliberative methodologies which had been already developed by practitioners (initially mostly in isolation from one another). A methodology is understood as a set of methods, protocols and rules, which means a particular procedure with a specific sequence of steps, or a set of procedures. Participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, public debate, mixed councils and assemblies are defined as consolidated methodologies. Each of them has its own efficiency, particular limits, but also a specific legitimacy which to some extent is in tension with the legitimacy of the others (and with the one of electoral democracy), especially for the realization of the European Green Deal (EGD). Our research has studied how to deal with these conflicts and how to maximize citizens’ and institutional involvement for a Green Deal (see general analysis in Part 2 and cases studies in Part 4). This maximization is the main criteria according to which we consider practices of democratic innovation “sound” (in another language, we could speak of “best practices”). In order to deepen the notion of maximization, we put it in relation with the four democratic goods which are at the core of our research (see below).

To a lesser extent, this deliverable **presents some of the tools that will constitute basic elements of the tangrams**. A tool refers to different devices within a consolidated methodology or a participatory experience. Three of these tools are presented in more depth in Part 3: trust, ICT, and mapping, that can improve participatory and deliberative innovation in different ways. Trust is a key tool and must be involved in the exploration of democratic innovations, as it is crucial for citizens to accept and support environmental policies. ICT have gained significant importance in recent years and are used in democratic innovations to enhance participation, access and understanding of deliberative and participatory models. Participatory mapping is an important and increasingly popular process of mapmaking that seeks to make visible the connection between different communities by using the commonly recognized language of cartography. These three tools can make democratic innovation more accessible, participatory, and efficient. In Part 4, the analysis of the case studies also tackles a number of tools, in specific contexts.

In order to normatively evaluate the four methodologies and the tools, and to provide a critical standpoint for designing the tangrams, the deliverable has also provided a **critical analysis of six challenges which were at the core of our proposal** in the grant agreement

(see Section 1). The first set of challenges, which concerns the organizational of democratic innovation, includes the issues of **(1) time frame; (2) complexity; and (3) scale**. The second set of challenges, which concerns the communication among actors and the negotiations among their expectation and interests for improved cooperation, includes the issues of **(4) cooperation between stakeholders; (5) conflict and deliberation; and (6) trust**. Two of these challenges have been analyzed more at length: scale (Section 1.1.2.) and complexity (Section 1.1.3.). The research has shown that the second set of challenges could be seen as problematical, as it relies mainly on a top-down and very consensual vision that does not sufficiently take into account the conflicts and power asymmetries which structure our society and which constitute huge obstacles to any democratic innovation for the EGD. : During the research period, a large series of theoretical and methodological seminars among the consortium's members highlighted the need to rethink, cluster and integrate some challenges – also in the light of new theoretical perspectives and case studies proposed by participants. However, reframing the 6 original challenges, and consequently part of PHOENIX's theoretical perspective, proved difficult in this phase, due to the complexity of the project and the interdependence it creates among partners. In fact, moving such an important piece of the puzzle would have endangered the other tasks and WPs that had started collecting their materials at the same time or with slightly different deadlines. Therefore, the consortium opted for a more modest solution: to explain the reflections and critiques that had been raised, and to go on with the 6 initial challenges in the whole research in order to test their heuristic interest, while remaining conscious of their limits, and the possibility of highlighting new complementary dimensions for future works.

The normative criteria for the evaluation of the methodologies and the tools, and for designing the tangrams, also imply **a critical analysis of four democratic goods that were at the core of our proposal in the grant agreement: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency** (see Section 1.2.). These democratic goods had been inspired by a typology of Graham Smith. Our research has analyzed the discussions in the literature about the definition of a democratic good. It has also tackled the reasons why these four democratic goods were selected, which can be viewed in line with the perspective of deliberative democracy more than with the perspective of radical democracy. Here again, we have decided not to modify this frame and to test its heuristic interest in the rest of the research. However, we have critically questioned these democratic goods and the very concept of democratic good on two issues: on the one hand, in relation to the crisis of democracy and representation; and on the other hand, in relation to the risk of marginalization.

A specific development **has tackled the issue of societies and nature interdependencies in democratic innovations** that aim to foster the ecological transition (see Section 1.4.). The interdependencies among all species, including humans, are undeniable. Therefore, democratic innovation towards an ecological transition should not restrict the participation to humans. New participatory processes should be grounded on the moral recognition of the entire 'web of life'. Non-human may not directly participate in deliberative processes, but this does not mean that their needs and interests cannot be represented. Humans' citizens are responsible for representing non-humans' rights. This must be one of the cores of the democratic innovations that ecological transition needs.

Another specific development has tackled the issue of RRIs (See Section 15.), by identifying a set of projects funded by the EC (concluded or running) whose outputs are relevant to PHOENIX activities. The objective is to use these results in the PHOENIX future activities.

An important part of the research has been to **analyze in depth a number of case studies**, mainly fitting within the four cornerstone methodologies (see Part 4.). Our methodology to select and analyze them has been mostly qualitative. We have short-listed the cases to include around 70 cases. On this basis, we decided to choose around 20 of them for a deeper analysis, each being presented in Part 4, and to list the further 50 ones (see Annex IV). The criteria to constitute these two lists have been: mostly cases related to the four cornerstone typologies; mostly cases which have taken place in Europe; a reasonable balance between the different regions and countries in Europe; at least two-thirds of the cases include a strong dimension on ecological issues, at most one-third chosen because of their procedural importance; cases which can be at least to a certain extent considered as best-practices and cases for which we could get enough trustful information, knowledge, and expertise in order the analyze to be serious. For each case study, we have underlined how the practices are able (or are not able) to face our six challenges; how they incorporate (or do not) the four democratic goods; to what extent they cross-fertilize, and to what extent they can enter in a deliberative and participatory system—in brief, what are their strengths and limitations. The different elements that have been assessed in these case studies will later on be important in the construction of the tangram.

Last but not least, we have **clarified the idea of a tangram as a participatory and deliberative system**, that is a system in which different methodologies and tools are coordinated in order to improve participation in a specific context with the EGD in mind (see Section 1.3.). A participatory and deliberative system has to be understood as a kind of checks and balances: tensions between the different methodologies and tools, as well as

between the different actors, are inevitable and must be dealt with, but the deliberative and participatory system aims at fostering cooperation and a kind of division of labor between participants. Nevertheless, a tangram always functions in the context of a political system which has to be analyzed as a kind of ecosystem: In fragile equilibrium, with predators and prey, and invasive species. DIs can be conceived as invasive species which face strong adversaries, especially when the ecological challenge is at stake. They enter in agonistic relationships in which deliberation and institutional participation are only part of the story. All stakeholders are not (or they cannot be) equal and cooperative. Conflicts cannot melt into deliberation. A tangram, when institutionalized, aims to make governance more participatory. The objective is also to reduce the asymmetrical relations of power within governance, and to force the lobbies which oppose the ecological transition to accept it, one way or another.

For the future steps: We have decided to retain the six original challenges and the four democratic goods that were already mentioned in the Grant Agreement, as well as our initial theoretical framing, in order to test their heuristic interest. Nevertheless, this first step of the research leads us to recommend that the further steps keep in mind the agonistic dimensions and the power relations that condition the democratic innovations which aim at fostering the European Green deal; and to take this context into account when designing tangrams and trying to implement them. In particular, this deliverable provides two main crucial inputs for WP3 create the methodological design for each pilot. On the one hand, especially with the detailed panorama of the case studies, it will make easier as it will be used by the WP3 for the TCCD to better think about the potential methodologies and tools at their disposal. On the other hand, the more theoretical reflections (especially concerning the challenges that the four methodologies that could maximize citizen participation to the European Green Deal have to face, the democratic good at stake and the concept of the Tangram) will help the TCCD to take a critical standpoint and better define what sound practices in their territory could be.

Introduction

The deliverable “Sound Practices of Democratic Innovations” provides a critical analysis of the four main macro-typologies of participatory and deliberative processes, and some of their most interesting implementation experiences, in order to adapt them to environmental issues. It will support the work in WP3 to design the PHOENIX pilots’ methodologies. The criteria according to which we consider practices of democratic innovation “sound” (in another language, we could speak of “best practices”), relates to the fact that they maximize citizens’ and institutional involvement for a Green Deal. In order to deepen the notion of maximization, we put it in relation with the four democratic goods which are at the core of our research: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency.

This deliverable (leader: CNRS) corresponds to the task 2.1: “Good practices of Democratic Innovations” (Leader: CNRS. Participants: CES, UNIFI, TGL, CSIC, SOTON, eGA, ONE, UC, UoI). This task was described in the following way in the PHOENIX application:

It consists of desk research (literature review and documental analysis) on the (i) four main typologies of Democratic Innovations selected, (ii) consolidated methodologies and tools applied in different contexts and administrative levels, with special attention given to ICT tools and AI and (iii) methodologies and tools applied to good participatory and deliberative practices, in the field of environmental issues.

More in detail: we will (i) analyze the four selected cornerstone-typologies in each typology by using the six main challenging dimensions, which will be pivotal for the success of EGD-related topics in section 1.3.1. This will enable the consortium to identify complementary and dissonant features that could be put to work for the next stages of PHOENIX. The results of this phase will be used in Task 3.1 to create cross-fertilization between typologies and examples; (ii) we will analyze consolidated methodologies and tools which have successfully experimented with the four macro-typologies and we will identify concrete experiences (both sound practices and average practices with failures and incoherence) of implementation. In the analysis, we will also focus on experiences from RRI projects such as RRI Tools, TeRRIFICA, TeRRitoria, SeeRRI, and ONLINE-S according to how they promoted the inclusion of vulnerable groups and gender equality, ensured the involvement of deniers and other difficult-to-reach stakeholders, achieved the interaction with larger audiences through online platforms and the use of AI tools; eventually faced the debate on environmental and ecological topics and produced clear sets of accessible data and other significative dimensions of their organizational architecture and outputs.

The results will be used in Task 3.2 to design the methodologies and in Task 3.3 to design the tools (iii) we will analyze participatory and deliberative processes carried out

specifically to face environmental issues and identify methodologies and tools used to deal with the six challenging dimensions.

In order to conduct the research and produce the deliverable, the CNRS and its PHOENIX partners have developed a threefold activity: first, a discussion on the theoretical perspectives which underline the PHOENIX research project; second, an in-depth analysis of the four cornerstone methodologies upon which PHOENIX focuses, and of a few tools with which some of the PHOENIX partners have a specific expertise and which could be developed within the project; and thirdly, the selection of a number of case studies particularly interesting for the PHOENIX project (21 in total).

In this perspective, the CNRS has organized a series of online meetings with its partners in spring and summer 2022. An in-person meeting has taken place in the frame of the in-person meeting kick-off conference organized in Lisbon Coimbra in June April 2022. A large international conference, co-organized with a number of other institutions, entitled ‘Citizens’ assemblies for the climate: a political or technocratic response to the ecological challenge?’, was convened in Oxford in September 2022 in order to specifically discuss the citizens’ climate assemblies (see Annex II). In fall 2022, a weekly online seminar, ‘Participation, deliberation and the European Green Deal’, was presented. Following this we gained a deeper understanding of citizens’ assemblies, which allowed for discussion of the methodologies and tools which helped us to select the 21 case studies for the PHOENIX project (see Annex I). The deliverable itself has been written under the responsibility of the CNRS and Paris 8, and has included a number of contributions by different PHOENIX partners, most of them after having been presented in the seminar. The names and institutions of the partners have been mentioned (see table ‘Contributions of task partners’ on page 3). Two internal feedbacks have been given to the first draft of the deliverable, through an online feedback seminar with all partners involved and an in-depth review by the project leader.

In the course of the first year of research, a number of critical questions emerged in relation to the initial framing. The main catalyzing spaces for such self-reflection were the large series of online theoretical/methodological meetings organized in the frame of Task 2.1 (see Annex I), the Lisbon Seminar and the Oxford conference (see Annex II), which gave to PHOENIX partners the opportunity to dialogue with a network of prominent researchers with large expertise on participatory methodologies, and especially on those related to climatic and ecological challenges. From such discussions, the original framing of the six challenges and of the four democratic goods of PHOENIX emerged as a proposal that would benefit of a review, to complement the listed dimensions with other that several partners

recognized as worth of a more attentive consideration. The choice that the consortium had to face was the following: either changing part of the initial framing, or keeping with it as it was initially written, mentioning the potential critiques and questions, and seeing how productive it could be. Due to the complexity of the whole PHOENIX project and the interdependence it requires among parallel research by different partners, we have opted for the second alternative. We realized that any significant change in the theoretical framing would have delayed too much the work done in parallel on other tasks and deliverables, and would have endangered this first part of the project. However, we jointly decided that it was worth to mentioned in different places of our common work which are the main recurrent critics and questions that have been raised during this first year, and whose attentive consideration must be valued in the next steps of the project, due to the potential added value that it represents for the future tasks and the piloting of participatory exercises.

In the following pages, we will first develop our theoretical perspectives (Part 1), analyzing the challenges (1.1) and the democratic good (1.2), and developing to specific dimensions relating to the relation nature-society in the ecological transition (1.3) and the RRI projects (1.4). In the second part, we will analyze in depth the four deliberative and participatory methodologies: participatory budgeting (2.1), citizens' assemblies (2.2), mixed councils and conferences on public policies (2.3), and public debate (2.4). The third part will present three specific tools: those related to trust (3.1), ICT tools (3.2), and mapping (3.3). The fourth part will describe the 21 case studies, related to participatory budgeting (4.1), citizens' assemblies (4.2), mixed councils and conferences on public policies (4.3), and public debate (4.4). After a general conclusion, the Annexes will include the programs of the 'Participation, Deliberation and the European Green Deal' (Annex I), and of the conference 'Citizens' assemblies for the climate: a political or technocratic response to the ecological challenge?' (Annex II), a more developed description of the advanced tools for e-participation (Annex III), and a list of 50 potential further case studies (Annex IV).

1. Theoretical Perspectives

1.1. Six challenges

1.1.1. The six challenges: rational and critical questions

Societies and especially their political systems evolve sometimes by chance, due to unplanned events, sometimes by inertia and mere path-dependency, but also often when trying to respond to challenges they face. The latter is especially important for democratic innovations, as these innovations require a number of actors who are convinced enough to go beyond business as usual, strong enough to overcome obstacles and adversaries, and imaginative enough to propose and implement alternatives to the status quo. This is why our research project gives great importance to the challenges democratic innovations for the EGD have to face.

In the original proposal, six challenges have been individuated, each corresponding to critical knots, to specific questions, and grouped in two main domains: the organizational architecture of democratic innovation on the one hand, and the communication among actors and the negotiations among their expectation and interests for improved cooperation on the other hand (see Table 1).

MAIN CRITICAL ASPECTS	MAIN QUESTIONS	CHALLENGES
Difficulty engaging in debates whose objectives / topics refer to broad time-frame horizons or appear 'out of focus'	SCOPE How to make DIs for EGD adequate to policy frameworks?	CHALLENGE 1 Setting adequate time-frame horizons for the policy / topics at stake
The complexity of environmental topics prevents engagement of nonprofessional actors and tends to delegate solutions to expertise-lead mechanisms	COMPLEXITY How to make DIs for EGD accessible to all citizens?	CHALLENGE 2 Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations
Environmental topics often spread outside single administrative borders. Difficulties in transcalar cooperation weaken citizen engagement	MANAGEMENT How to make DIs for EGD embedded in multilevel governance?	CHALLENGE 3 Optimising synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and inter-scalar perspective
The inertia of many actors to undergo behavioural changes that can make them play an active part in policy transformation	CONSTITUTION OF PUBLIC How to make DIs for EGD fully inclusive?	CHALLENGE 4 Favouring behavioural changes of actors to increase their active partnership
When dealing with environmental topics, conflicts tend to multiply and fragment in different territories	CONFLICT How to make DIs for EGD responsive to all?	CHALLENGE 5 Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD
Widespread mutual distrust among actors (citizens, institutions and techno-scientific experts) undermines consensus on policies and cooperation	TRUST How to make DIs for EGD generators of healthy relationships?	CHALLENGE 6 Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

Table 1: the six main challenges of the PHOENIX Project

During the research and the series of theoretical/methodological seminars (see Annex 1), a number of discussions have been raised regarding these 6 challenges. Some observations referred to the understanding and the details of each of them, other were more fundamentally targeting the absence of other relevant dimensions, that the first year of research proved worth of future consideration. In the light of such discussions, the partial rethinking of the challenges' list referred mostly to the second set of challenges. The main reason is that this second cluster can be seen as problematical, as it mainly implies a perspective that some of the colleagues involved in the discussion considered "top-down" and "too much consensual", as it that does not sufficiently take into account the conflicts

and power asymmetries that structure our society and that constitute huge obstacles to any democratic innovation for the European Green Deal. Two potential solutions were imagined as possible in order to integrate such observations. The first one would have been to reframe the challenges and to some extent, to consequently reframe PHOENIX' overall theoretical perspective. This solution, although attractive because of its intellectual ambition, has been discarded as unlikely to be applicable in the timeframe provided by the GANTT timeline of the Consortium Agreement. Considerations were raised by several members of the consortium about the fact that PHOENIX's complexity – in terms of interactions between different partners and interdependency among parallel tasks done at the same time – could have generated risks of delays in case of reshaping such an important piece of the puzzle. This is why we opted for a more modest solution: to explain the reflections and critiques that had been raised, to especially develop two important challenges, scale and complexity (see 1.1.2. and 1.1.3.), on which some partners had specific expertise, and to go on with the six initial challenges in the whole research in order to test their heuristic interest, while remaining conscious of their limits. In this section, we will only briefly present the different challenges of the first set, and develop more at length the critiques which were raised regarding the second set.

The first set of challenges: the organizational architecture of democratic innovation

Time frame: a challenge for electoral politics. The first challenge comes from electoral politics when facing the ecological transition. Elections focus on the short term, and contribute indirectly at best to the long term. This is an important reason why Western democratic societies have had difficulties facing the ecological challenge, the strong influence of lobbies on electoral politics being crucial in this respect. After all, the most powerful Western democracy, the USA, is also one of the countries which proportionally to their demography produce the most CO₂, and the American way of life is not universalizable and a major danger for the whole humanity and the earth. To a lesser extent, this is also true for Europe. In the Global South, the Indian democracy makes much worse than authoritarian China in terms of ecological turn. The gap between the commitments of electoral democracies to drastically reduce CO₂ emissions and the reality of their quite modest ecological transition is a consequence of this situation. Traditionally, non-participatory devices have been developed for facing the problem: state planning and administrative agencies have been a counter-power aim to balance the short-termism of electoral politics. New tools have been developed, especially the inclusion of a safe environment and future generations in the constitutions and the law. The most famous pioneer example has been the UN Stockholm Declaration, in 1972: “Man has the

fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”

This challenge has another dimension, very salient among politicians and civil servants but probably less important when participation and deliberative methodologies are well conceived. It is related to the difficulty for common citizens to easily understand mid- and long-term time-frames and scenarios. Therefore, Phoenix has to integrate in the Tangrams an operative dimension (to make people happier and motivate them) with methodologies of scenario visioning and planning that requires long time-frames.

In any case, the challenge for democratic innovation is to avoid the shortcuts of electoral politics and some participatory methodologies concerning the time frame and take advantage of the innovations in the legal and constitutional frame to better address the ecological challenge. The Local Agenda 21 has been an example of such democratic innovation (see 4.3.5). But this has not been the case for all democratic innovations. The problem of participatory budgeting has for example been its focus on short term investments. Its contribution to the long-term has only been indirect (see 2.1. and 4.1). Mini-publics have done much better, as shown by the example of the climate citizens' assemblies, but the problem remains the uncertain implementation of their recommendations (see 2.2 and 4.2). Mixed councils, conferences and assemblies are potentially more relevant in this respect, because all relevant actors can be involved: implementation remains a problem, but to a more limited extent (see 2.3 and 4.3.). The public debate is much better than the 'business as usual' of electoral politics, but also has limits (see 2.4. and 4.4). For example, a few years ago, the most radical activists refused to participate in the public debate on genetically modified organisms in France, claiming that the power relations and the way the public debate was framed made the zero option they were advocating impossible.


Complexity. Complexity is a huge challenge of human action, which is studied in various social sciences, including psychology (see 1.1.3). Contrary to what is often said, participatory and democratic innovations are no more a danger when taking into account the complexity of the ecological transition than electoral politics. Quite the opposite. Citizens' knowledge can add valuable dialogue to the conversation. The citizens' ordinary knowledge, based on common sense and user knowledge, is of great importance when the participatory and deliberative devices are well conceived. As John Dewey wrote in *The Public and Its problem*, “the man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be

remedied. A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all.” The diffuse professional knowledge that permeates societies which are always more educated can add a lot to the professional knowledge of civil servants, especially at the local level. Citizens develop a political knowledge in participatory processes that allow them to better understand the decision-making process.

The literature in political theory, political history and political sociology has underlined the wisdom of the many and further developed Dewey’s statement with the theory of epistemic democracy. The basic ideas are that the many, when discussing within a good frame, are more intelligent than just one person; that the diversity of the social experience which is represented in the group makes the deliberation more reasonable than when it takes place among a set of persons pertaining to the same social group; and that a good procedure is required to capitalize on this potential.

However, the theory of epistemic democracy does not solve per se the relation between citizens’ knowledge and experts’ knowledge. Once DIs are implemented, citizens can develop their conversation in a frame previously defined by experts; they can co-produce the frame, or even develop a counter-expertise, especially when NGOs and other CSOs are incorporated in the DIs. In any case, the relation between citizens’ knowledge and experts’ and corporations’ knowledge remains an important challenge. This can be illustrated by the example of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) stakeholders’ committee, which is dominated by corporations and in which citizens’ representatives play a secondary role (see Figure 2): how can DIs transform this panorama?

Figure 1: the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) stakeholders committee



Scale. The challenge of scale is a general one in democratic theory (see 1.1.2.). It is different for each of our four cornerstone methodologies, as PB is more limited for scaling-up than the three others. In any case, a general challenge for DIs is to constitute a participatory and deliberative system with a transcalar perspective (see 1.1.2. and 1.3).

The second set of challenges: the communication among actors and the negotiations among their expectations and interests for improved cooperation

During the first year of research, discussions and case studies highlighted some limits concerning the second set of challenges listed in the PHOENIX original proposal. The question whether the different methodologies constitute a system, which is a challenge in itself, is not raised (see 1.3). In addition, the discussions highlighted that this cluster of challenges has a limited reference to power, and cooperation, deliberation and trust appear as prevalent dimensions unilaterally stressed as more significant. The imbalance of such framing (as proved by many of the case studies jointly selected by the consortium members) engenders the risk of a perspective that could be considered naïve or (from another perspective) too “managerial”. In any case, such visions look partly biased by the prevalence of a “top-down” perspective, which anchors to governments rather than valuing a citizens-based approach. At theoretical level, this partly corresponds to a purely deliberativist (vs. radical) democratic theory.

As explained previously, we have decided to keep the initial setting, but with a self-reflective eye. We have therefore added a critical development in this section, which balances the power struggles and asymmetries on the one hand, cooperation and trust on the other hand; and a section on system and tangram (see 1.3.)

Reconnect or reset?

The common keyword of these three challenges could be ‘reconnect’. The historical and political context of the framing is the following: liberal democracy is the gold standard, but it presently faces dangers: ‘democracy is under stress’, ‘illiberal democracy’ is developing, ‘the authoritarian China model’ is a dangerous alternative, and the ‘democratic deficit’ has increased inside the EU countries and EU itself. For those who realize the deepness of the crisis, in order to reconnect, the necessity of democratic innovations is clear—participation and deliberation are needed to give a new momentum to the European democracy, especially for the EGD. Inclusiveness and partnership, dialogue and trust have to be

developed, and this is precisely the aim that DIs have to pursue and the challenges they have to face.


The way of framing these challenges is not far from the vocabulary of governance: “Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regime empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). To a large extent, participatory governance consists of introducing citizens in the process.

Is it enough? After all, the liberal-democratic model that stabilized over a few decades in Western Europe, Northern America, and a couple of other countries elsewhere was quite a peculiar experiment. It was an exclusive club, has not demonstrated that it could be universalized, and is now in decline in the post-colonial world order. Should not one try to historicize it, a bit as one does with classical Athens, as a precious but historically limited experience? The new world order, social media, the end of mass political parties, globalized capitalism, the ecological challenge: all these factors make much probable that politics in the 21st century will be quite different from politics in the 20th century. The risk of democratic innovations is to remain trapped within the liberal-democratic imaginary, when its empirical normality in much of the countries of the Global South is in fact a “Government of the elite, by the elite, for the elite”—and when a majority of EU citizens tend to think that this is also becoming true in their country. Perhaps one has to go beyond the keyword ‘reconnect’. Why couldn’t one be more empirically realistic and more normatively ambitious, with the keyword ‘reset’? This would imply a radical-democratic perspective, and lead to a series of other challenges.

Constitution of a public, inclusiveness and partnership. The initial framing was: “How to make the system fully inclusive, how to favor behavioral changes to increase active partnerships also in the implementation phase of co-designed policies?”. We can agree with the objective of inclusiveness. However, there is a danger. As George Orwell wrote in *The Animal Farm*, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. One needs to promote active participation, and not only inclusion, in order to give the same power to outsiders who are usually powerless and voiceless. The problem is not only behavioral, it is political and structural. To underline the necessity of a partnership in the implementation phase of co-designed policies is a potentially strong objective, beyond mere consultation (see Figure 3). However, one should not forget the conception phase. Is the only objective that once the policy is decided, citizens have to be involved in order to

make it successful? More substantially, can power relationships melt within the active partnerships? How is it possible to reach a real synthesis? Is this synthesis a consensus or a compromise?

Figure 2. Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation



Conflict and Deliberation. The initial framing was: “Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the transition pathway”. However, deliberation, negotiation and cooperation are not one and the same thing. As Jon Elster claimed, arguing is not the same as bargaining. Where do DIs stand? If they stand on the arguing and cooperative side, how are they able to impact the bargaining and negotiation side? How are they affected by the latter? The recognition of the conflict cannot be reduced to a conflict conflicting among visions: What about interests, power situations, and so on? It is true that the transition pathway needs some kind of common action, but is it reducible to deliberation? And what is the relation between deliberation in small settings (mini-publics, PB, and so on) and deliberation in the wider public sphere? In the COP, for example, one could argue that deliberation is secondary and bargaining crucial. Actual deliberation takes place in a largely unjust, only partly democratic, and not ecological society. It can only be one part of the story—negotiations, power struggles, civil disobedience, secession, insurgent politics are also important. How can DIs relate to them?

Trust. The initial framing was: “Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants involved in the codesign of the transition pathway”. This challenge is not simple to address. A lesson drawn by Talpin et. al. (in Della Porta, Font and Sintomer ed., *Democracy in Southern Europe: Causes, Characteristics, and Consequences*) is that, on average, citizens are more distrustful of the political system after engaging in participatory

processes than they were before, due to the low quality and the limited impact of the average participatory devices. Therefore, deliberation and participation have to be taken seriously and not be mere tokens.

In addition, why is trust useful, and for whom? Would increasing the trust in an unjust system or in a system which destroys environment be positive? Trust and radical changes have to be coupled in order to be democratic and ecological—and this is not a simple task. However, one needs to be pragmatic. Small steps are at least partly useful and can be a first step forward. The issue is to make these small steps a springboard and not a trap. To use a metaphor, participation can be made on housing, building, and painting, i.e., on crucial matters, on important but secondary issues, or on small details. And too often, one may implement participatory and deliberative methodologies on the details in order to distract from more important issues behind the scene...

1.1.2. Scale and democratic theory: limits and possibilities of democratic innovations

From classical Greece to the present day, numerous reflections on government systems, or on democracy in particular, have addressed the 'problem of scale'. In other words, they have tried to answer the question about what extension of territory, what number of inhabitants or what administrative levels were adequate to implement certain political systems (Dahl/Tufte, 1973). The discussion on democracy has accompanied these reflections in such a way that a specific relationship has been built between democracy of high or low intensity and greater or lesser scale. If we ask ourselves what are the key elements of the relationship between government systems (especially democracy) and scale that have been pointed out historically, we can identify three clearly differentiated stages in the construction of this relationship:

- A first stage featuring the reflections of Plato (1952) and Aristotle (1951) and, fundamentally, Montesquieu (1951) and Rousseau (1992). In all cases, small scales are defended, but this defense is not necessarily accompanied by the valorization of democratic regimes.
- A second stage where the centrality of small scales is abandoned as the optimal level for good governance. This stage, marked by the English, North American and French revolutions of the 18th century, had as its key moment the ratification debate between federalists and anti-federalists in the United States. In this case, the authors more prone to larger scales (the federalists) confronted the defenders of smaller scales (anti-federalists), about the consequences regarding the appropriate representative model for a republic (Hamilton/Jay/Madison.,1988; Storing, 1981).
- A third stage consolidated in the second half of the 20th century where the problem of scale was addressed from the representative solution and the establishment of the hegemonic model of democracy (Santos/Avritzer, 2004; Dahl/Tufte, 1973; Sartori, 2001; Bobbio; Schumpeter, 1942; Przeworski, 2010).

In these three phases, the vision of an inverse relationship between democratic intensity, forms of political inclusion and scale was consolidated. In other words, on a larger scale, less democratic intensity and vice versa, it is possible to develop certain democratic innovations, or forms of direct democracy, in small territories, with a small population or in the administrative levels closest to the citizens (local, municipal). The four elements on which this relationship is based follow:

- The impact problem. The influence of the citizenry decreases if the scale, the size of the territory and the number of participants increase. The impact of participation acquires a numerical consideration that relates it to the percentage of impact that individuals have on the final result, with their proportion in the direct impact, with the specific weight of each citizen in the decision or with the same causal impact. In this way, the

negative formulations of the inverse relationship between the number of participants and the effectiveness of the participation (understood as the consideration of their influence in the final decisions) of individuals in the construction of the general interest, the exercise of self-government, etc. are insisted on.

- The epistemic problem. The shared principle is the citizens inability to govern or participate directly in government. Therefore, there is a basis for establishing the division of labor between those who govern and those who are governed, referring to the knowledge of the citizenry. This division of labor based on 'citizen incompetence' expands with the increase in scale and the complexity of political tasks, the development of bureaucracies and the promotion of technocratic decision-making mechanisms. 'Citizen incompetence' expands as the scale grows, more specifically it grows as the administrative level rises. Here we find—in addition to the principle that national problems present a high degree of complexity and abstraction, making it difficult for the majority of the inhabitants of a country to understand them—a recognition of the competences of citizenship. Citizens will be more apt to participate in decision-making when they are closest to the levels of administration, at the smallest sizes. It is here where the problems are more accessible and consistent with the capabilities of the majority of the population. It is an affirmation in which the authors framed within competitive elitism (Schumpeter, 1942), pluralism (Dahl, 2012) and the minimum definitions of democracy (Bobbio, 2001) agree.
- The problem of the efficiency of the system. From the first to the third phase, we find an important change in the relationship between size and efficiency of the system. While at first the existence of city-states or small states was defended, the second phase, especially with the triumph of the perspective defended by the Federalists, larger scales and sizes were decided upon for the new states, which thus also assumed greater complexity. Regarding the possibilities of citizen involvement, in the third phase, a clear contradiction between the effectiveness of participation and the effectiveness of the political system was consolidated. The larger the size and the greater the administrative complexity (as well as in the higher scales of government), the more effective the system is in the ability to respond to the needs of citizens in the sense proposed by Dahl and Tufte (1973). In this sphere of maximum effectiveness, there are fewer possibilities of implementing effective forms of participation.
- The community ties problem. Especially in the first phase outlined above, it was emphasized that strong social bonds were indispensable for deliberation among citizens. The knowledge of the citizens and the identification with the specific political community (and, therefore, with its general interest), were fundamental for the success of the deliberative spaces. Beyond this particularity, a certain positive assessment of social homogeneity on small scales is shared (in all three phases).

We can speak of a next phase (fourth phase) in which different criticisms of the hegemonic model of democracy are articulated, seeking to broaden the meaning of the idea of democracy and the actors that could participate in it more directly (Santos/Avritzer, 2002). The question we want to answer from now on is whether the development of counter-hegemonic models of democracy has meant a change in the way of interpreting the relationship between democracy and scale.

If we pay attention to certain works that are recognized as founders of the tradition of participatory democracy, especially the works of Pateman (1999), Macpherson (1985), Barber (1984) or the SDS (1962), we can see how the closest local space (from neighborhoods to industries) was considered as the privileged environment for its implementation. That is, we found a framework with important similarities with the hegemonic tradition of democracy.

In fact, we can group the reasons to defend this relationship from elements very similar to those previously indicated. We can start with the reasons related to the interests or the knowledge used in the participatory processes. Pateman considered that the citizenry was always going to show more interest in matters close to home than in others with more distant scales; he even noted that, at this level, “one can agree with Schumpeter and his followers” (1999: 110). Barber (1984), MacPherson (1985) and Pateman (1999) shared a perspective according to which the knowledge that serves as the basis for participation is derived from direct experience, so that these are not as operational for participation at higher scales.

For these authors, participation was linked to issues that ‘closely touch’ individuals, understanding by this closeness the correspondence with the space of daily life, which was the most important factor of socialization and political awareness. For Pateman (1999), on large scales, the influence of citizens is minimal, there is a very small connection between the act of participating and the final result. In his justification for participation in industry, MacPherson (1985) pointed out that when people can directly see the results of their action in matters in which they have a specific interest, there is no separation from the results of the participation and they will get involved in problems that are close to them.

Finally, regarding link building, Barber understood that participation has to be developed at the local level, since that is the scale where there are more possibilities to establish community ties. In fact, citizens are not merely attached to legal conditions (as in weak representative democracy), but are considered ‘neighbors’ (Barber, 1984: 218-219). The consideration of participation as a mechanism for rebuilding community ties was also

central to the SDS. The reform of the way of doing politics would have among its objectives “to collectively create an acceptable field of social relations [or] to lead people from isolation to community” (SDS, 1962).

The reflections of these authors or groups (such as the SDS) constituted the beginnings of the tradition of participatory democracies. Later developments insisted on this same theoretical framework. Criticism of democracies, which called into question many of the foundations inherited from the most hegemonic tradition, did not address one of its most important elements: the idea that smaller scales were better for putting forms of participation into practice.

Purcell (2006) and Purcell and Brown (2005) have called this continuity ‘the local trap’. This trap “involves the tendency to think that the local scale is preferable to other scales ... it is assumed to be inherently more democratic than the rest” (2006: 1921-1923). The local trap considers not only that the conditions to launch participation processes are better in local spaces, but also assumes that “on this scale the products will be fairer or more sustainable” (Brown/Purcell, 2005: 608). The foundations of this local trap are:

- Epistemic reasons. We find a movement that goes from devaluation to recognition. It is the moment in which this local knowledge is valued, where participation linked to the demands of daily life is defended. This knowledge is related to tangible or close issues, where the impacts can be quickly perceived. Citizens have a greater capacity to solve everyday problems related to their daily lives; these are the types of knowledge that participatory processes must mobilize (Fung, 2003).
- Communitarian reasons. The local scale is where participation processes can be developed because it is a space of belonging and connections from which it is necessary to start in order to implement these practices. It also refers to the bonds that are built, especially the attempt to restore the social link between citizens and also between citizens and political representatives (Le Bart and Lefebvre, 2005; Rosanvallon, 2010). In other words, the possibility or capacity to build a community fabric is just one of the reasons why participatory democracy must have a local base.
- Administrative reasons. Local scales are the ones that can best respond to the interests of citizens to participate (interests of daily life) and to modify their policies, directing them to more transversal forms of organization. Local administrations have more capacity to promote inclusive processes. The local scale is the most appropriate to meet the agenda of public policies with citizen participation (sustainability, social justice, inclusion).

In the same way that we find examples within the participatory and deliberative theories that consolidate the inverse relationship between scale and democracy; we can find some recent turns that allow us to imagine ways to go beyond that relationship. In this sense, we are going to talk about four turns to which correspond four possibilities to overcome the local trap as it has been defined in the thinking about democracies.

- **Epistemic turn.** We start from the verification that the classic perspective of the epistemic legitimacy of deliberation has to do with the ‘search for truth’, with placing an idea of ‘truth’ –a particularly controversial item– in the foreground (Cohen, 1983; List/Goodin, 2001; Landemore, 2014). Faced with this conception of the epistemic legitimacy of deliberation, we favor the pure epistemic proceduralism: “of public deliberation among members of a democratic community under conditions of political equality and epistemic equity” (Peter, 2009: 132). The appeal to epistemic equity leads us to resort to the concept of epistemic injustice “on the wrong done to someone in his capacity to know” as defined by Fricker (2009:1). We must ask how democratic processes, as practices of knowledge production, can face the “serious cognitive disadvantages derived from a gap or a failure in the collective hermeneutic resource” (ibid. 151). The problem, then, is how democratic innovations can be reconfigured under the parameters of epistemic democracy, understood as “universal participation in terms of equity of those who know” (Anderson, 2012: 172). This turn leads us to think of a possibility:
- **Epistemic possibility.** The typology of knowledge present in participation processes is not limited to knowledge of use or knowledge derived from daily experience in a defined territory (Sintomer, 2009). The cognitive diversity present, whether in spaces of deliberation or in participatory spaces, is much broader, going beyond the narrow framework of knowledge of use. Therefore, citizens can participate or deliberate through knowledge that is not limited to their knowledge of use, so it is not necessary to limit participatory or deliberative processes to local scales, being able to intervene for different themes of a more concrete or abstract nature and located at different levels. On the other hand, it is necessary that those knowledges interact in conditions of epistemic justice. That is, in contexts where the diversity of knowledge, its interaction and the absence of hierarchies between them are favored.
- **Systemic turn.** This turn begins with the works of Mansbridge (2009), Goodin (2005), or Hendriks (2006). These authors begin to point out the need to abandon the centrality of mini-publics as exclusive spaces for the development of deliberation. They seek to include a greater number of arenas (spheres), where deliberative practices can be developed, to observe the presence and distribution of deliberative virtues in different spheres that can interact and to diversify the modes of action within these systems. Dryzek (2010) and Mansbridge, Parkinson et al. (2012) have so far elaborated the most developed versions of this turn. The first defines the following components: public

space (of communication), empowered space (of decision and incidence), transmission (which communicates these spaces), accountability (to account for an expanded public sphere), meta deliberation (referring to the discussion on the very rules of deliberation) and decision-making capacity. Mansbridge, Parkinson et al. (2012) identify the idea of a system as “a set of distinguishable, differentiable and in a certain sense, interdependent parts, frequently with distributed functions and division of tasks, connected in such a way that they form a whole” (ibid. 6). Likewise, they point out three functions of said system: epistemic (referring to the development of options and decisions), ethical (focused on the relationships between actors) and democratic (valuing the inclusion of actors and the diversity of forms of action). This turn leads us to think of a possibility:

- **Systemic possibility.** The first characteristic of this effectiveness is that beyond focusing its attention on a specific space or forum, it directs its gaze to the interaction between different spheres involved in the subject matter. Participatory and deliberative spaces of different natures and with specific communicative characteristics interact with each other and with the socio-institutional framework that encompasses them. This indicates a need to analyze the forms of relationship of these forums with both civil society and the different levels of the state or of the public administrations that will be affected. This systemic approach, which pays attention to the created system and the relationships between different spaces/spheres, offers new possibilities to face the scaling up of deliberative and/or participatory processes. This perspective also attends to the way in which capacities are distributed—whether deliberative or participatory functions between the different moments of the cycle or between the spaces that make up the system. For example, different elements of the representative or epistemic turn may appear in the system as a whole, but not within the same space or forum.
- **Representative turn.** Classical participatory theory presents a clear distinction between participation and representation. To this we must add that, within participatory theory, representation is analyzed as a phenomenon of exclusion, with which inclusion can only take place “outside representation, even against it, through participatory devices, social movements...” (Hayat, 2013: 116). But in recent years, this critical relationship is being reviewed through two similar processes that accompany the development of participatory and deliberative proposals and that we can call pluralization of representation and representation beyond elections, (Avritzer, 2012; Almeida, 2013). Both processes seek to (a) overcome the apparent contradiction between participatory and representative processes, taking up Plotke’s premise that states “the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention ... representation is crucial to build democratic practices” (1997: 19); b) abandon the idea of the identification between representation and representative government, opening the possibility of new representative mediations that understand that there are forms of ‘democratic representation’ that go

beyond 'representative democracy' (Saward, 2010). This turn allows us to think of a possibility:

- Representative possibility. Participation, deliberation and representation can be linked, despite the fact that different theoretical approaches have tried to separate them. The effectiveness of representation is directly linked to its pluralization and the recognition that these categories (participation, deliberation and representation) can be linked. The representative possibility is intended to make representation a mechanism of inclusion and not exclusion. Finally, the possibilities of going beyond local scales, linking representation and the systemic turn, have to do with the quality of representation as a mechanism for relating spaces, actors and different temporalities in a participatory system.
- Institutional turn. This last turn is not a very recent change within the deliberative and participatory theories, but it allows us to group elements of criticism of the first phases of the relationship between democracy and scale. It refers to the development of institutions or processes in which the elements indicated by the deliberative or participatory perspectives were put into practice through processes such as participatory budgets or mini-publics (Avritzer, 2002; Smith, 2009). This turn means abandoning the understanding of the impact of citizen participation as having equal weight to affect the final result and leads us to focus on the impact of the process on public policies and the conditions of its design. This turn allows us to think of the following:
- Participatory-deliberative possibility. First of all, referring to the design and operation of the process, to its inclusiveness—the opening of the process to the equitable participation of citizens and the quality of the debates and the opportunity to participate in equal conditions. Regarding the impacts, the jump in scale, which already has empirical experiences that show that its development is possible, represents an important expansion of the agenda. This means that the possibilities of redistribution or social justice are greater. On the other hand, it invites us to analyze how different public administrations can be influenced, that is, if the process is carried out at different administrative levels and has a direct relationship with each of them, as well as with the communication itself between these administrative levels.

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1.1.3. The challenge of complexity

Complexity is addressed in PHOENIX as a core challenge. The definition of complexity is not consensual and there is no agreed upon definition in the literature. In fact, different types of approaches and definitions adopting different perspectives co-exist (Érdi, 2008; Manson, 2002; Mitchel, 2009). In general, complexity relates to characteristics associated with complex systems, in relation to which there is more significant agreement (Boulton, Allen & Bowman, 2015; Byrne & Callaghan, 2013; Cilliers, 1999; Ladyman & Wiesner, 2020; Preiser, 2019; Wells, 2013). The definition of something that is complex is widely recognized as distinct from something that is complicated (Holland, 2014; Poli, 2013; Grabowski & Strzalka, 2008). This distinction is not trivial as these terms are sometimes used interchangeably in everyday discourse although their definitions bring forth important implications. A key distinction is that complex systems show emergent behavior (Goldstein, 1999) that is dependent on and stems from the interaction of its parts, albeit not linearly reduced to them. On the other hand, a complicated system may be difficult to tackle but its decomposition and reduction to smaller components may eventually lead to better understanding of the system. Complex systems cannot be easily modelled or grasped by a simple model of approach; their behavior tends to be dynamic and, often, adaptive. While they may have many parts (as complicated systems do) it is the nature of the interactions between the parts that is critical to understanding the behavior of the system as a whole.

There is often a distinction between complex systems and complex adaptive systems the latter being more often associated with living and social systems whose behavior is adaptive and evolves as a function of their relationship with their context and to the effects of their own emergent patterns, through processes of top-down causation (Arthur, 1999; Holland, 2014; Mitchel, 2009).

In general, complex systems are recognized as being composed of multiple interacting parts which, through non-linear feedback processes, self-organize (without central control), giving rise to new patterns, functions or behaviors of the system (Boulton, Allen & Bowman, 2015; Byrne & Callaghan, 2013; Cilliers, 1999; Ladyman & Wiesner, 2020; Preiser, 2019; Wells, 2013). The behavior of the system, as a whole, cannot be understood or reduced to a description of the behavior of its parts. Complex systems tend to have memory and be characterized by path-dependency and even sensitivity to initial conditions which means that the unfolding behavior is dependent on its own developmental pathway (Cilliers, 1999; Érdi, 2008). Despite the differences that may exist in different types of complex systems—and the many approaches, languages and models that are used to tackle them—there are key themes and properties that support the characterization of complex systems and that may guide actions and interventions. Preiser and collaborators (2019; Preiser et al., 2018) have identified six key themes: (1) that they are constituted relationally; (2) that they have adaptive capacities; (3) that they are organized by dynamic processes; (4)

that they are ‘radically’ open; (5) that they are context dependent, and (6) that they are organized by principles of complex circular causality.

A complexity-informed approach to complex environmental challenges and to democratic participation and innovation may relate to complexity from different angles, namely considering,

- the target systems-problems (e.g., environmental challenges; European Green Deal’s objectives) are of a complex nature in the conceptualization of the system and the design of interventions;
- the target democratic systems as well as intervention systems that target them (e.g., participative interventions) present features of complex systems that need to be attended to in the design of the interventions;
- both of the above require sufficient and commensurately complex modes of thinking and approaches in order for positive and effective results to be achieved (Melo & Caves, 2018; Melo, 2020; Morin, 1992, 2005, 2007).

Complex thinking is particularly important when considering the challenge of supporting citizens to make deliberations in ways that address the complexity of the target problems. Albeit the concept is often used in a relatively undefined way or interchangeably with complexity thinking, together they encompass both the extent to which complexity is addressed as a content of the thinking and to the way that the thinking is organized and the extent to which it is congruent with the principles of complex thinking (Melo et al., 2020; Melo, 2020). The extent to which both the conceptualization of the target systems, as mentioned above, attends to key features of the complexity of such systems and the extent to which the thinking underlying the design of interventions—namely interventions in participative democracy—is itself, organized in congruent ways, may determine the outcomes of the intervention. Therefore, the relation between complexity, socio-environmental challenges and participative democratic interventions and innovations is of critical importance. While the conceptualization of socio-environmental issues from a complex systems perspective may be more salient and somehow explored (Audouin/Preisner/Nienaber/Downsborough, 2013; Preisner/Biggs/De Vos/Folke, 2018; Wells, 2013), it is not clear to what extent these conceptualizations are integrated in the domain of participative democracies and practices targeting these or other subjects or contents.

To clarify this question, we have conducted a preliminary literature review to explore the extent to which notions of complexity, complexity thinking and complex systems appeared coupled to notions related to participative democracies and democratic practices. This

exploration can provide some insights into modes of addressing complexity in this context but also point towards areas that need further research and development.

A series of searches were performed on the full collection database of the Web of Science. The themes guiding the search, the search terms and the number of bibliographic items retrieved are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Search themes, terms and number of items retrieved

Theme	Search terms (Boolean search)	Number of items
COMPLEXITY AND DEMOCRACY	((ALL=(Complexity AND democracy)) OR ALL=(Complexity AND democrac*)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX SYSTEM* AND DEMOCRACY)	2136
COMPLEX/COMPLEXITY THINKING AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES/ PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES/ PARTICIPATION/ DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION	(((((ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND DEMOCRACY)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND PARTICIPATION)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING AND DEMOCRACY)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING AND PARTICIPATION)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION)	1730
COMPLEX/COMPLEXITY THINKING AND PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRACY	((ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING AND PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRACY)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING AND PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRACY)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THOUGHT AND PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRACY)	3
COMPLEX THOUGHT/COMPLEX THINKING/COMPLEXITY THINKING AND PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES	((ALL=(COMPLEX THOUGHT PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES)) OR ALL=(COMPLEX THINKING PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES)) OR ALL=(COMPLEXITY THINKING PARTICIPATIVE PRACTICES)	19
SYSTEMS THINKING/DEMOCRACY*/PARTICIPATION*	ALL=(systems thinking AND democra* AND participati*)	195
PARTICIPATORY SYSTEMS MAPPING/DEMOCRACY*/ENVIRONMENT/GOVERNANCE/DELIBERATION	((ALL=(systems thinking AND democra* AND participati*)) OR ALL=(PARTICIPATORY SYSTEMS MAPPING AND DEMOCRAC*)) OR ALL=(PARTICIPATORY SYSTEMS MAPPING AND ENVIRONMENT)) AND ALL=(PARTICIPATORY SYSTEMS MAPPING AND GOVERNANCE)	112

The number of bibliographic items including terms related to complexity and democracy was considerable and the same also when considering complex thinking and democratic practices. However, when the search is narrowed in order to come closer to themes relating to interventions in democratic systems through participative practices the number of references mentioning complex thinking and participative practices is notably very reduced. Although the notion of complex thinking could clearly guide the design of interventions, the evidence suggests this kind of conceptualization has not been explored in the literature. However, the literature pertaining to systems interventions such as participatory systems mapping and systems thinking clearly has a greater expression in the context of deliberative and participative practices. This suggests (1) that there might be a need to deepen the contributions of a complexity and a complex/complexity thinking frame or reference in the design and evaluation of interventions in participative democracy, and (2) that the literature on systems thinking could already provide some important contributions. To the extent that complex and complexity thinking have some overlaps with systems thinking this may well be an important area of the literature to explore. This constitutes a preliminary contribution towards exploring the problem of complexity in interventions in participative democracies tackling complex socio-ecological problems.

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1.2. Four democratic goods

1.2.1. What are democratic goods?

Graham Smith's analytical framework and concept of democratic goods introduced in his book "Democratic Innovations. Designing institutions for citizen participation" (2009) is based on the premise that the legitimacy of each democratic innovation rests –at least in part– on the way in which it realizes a convincing combination of democratic goods. Each democratic innovation weighs and prioritizes different democratic goods in different ways. Smith urges us to analyze democratic innovations according to what democratic goods they contribute to. It is not only interesting to see which individual good is realized in which democratic innovation, but also to see in which combination they are realized and also whether there might be particularly interesting combinations.

These goods are supposed to cover aspects of both input and output legitimacy. 'Input-oriented legitimacy' refers to the opportunities of individual citizens to participate in political decision-making processes whether directly or indirectly (procedural consideration). 'Output-oriented legitimacy' highlights the substantive quality of decisions to "effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question" (Scharpf 1999: 6). That means the ability to produce effective outcomes.

More recently, scholars have introduced a third way for a political system to obtain legitimacy: 'Throughput legitimacy' concerns the quality of the (internal) governance processes of the institutions and actors involved in policy-making. This type of legitimacy can be enhanced, for example, by high-quality deliberation in decision-making bodies. Throughput legitimacy "thus focuses on what goes on inside the 'black box' between the input and the output from a political system" (Schmidt, 2013: 5).

Smith differentiates between four democratic goods: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment, and transparency.

Adopted from Smith (2009)

Democratic Good	Description
Inclusiveness	The possibility for citizens across different social groups to participate in democratic innovations (DI's); refers both to the mode of selection of citizens (presence) and the extent to which citizens can contribute to proceedings (voice)
Popular control	The degree to which citizens have influence and control over the decision-making process (at different stages in the process): problem definition, option analysis, option selection and implementation
Considered judgment	The ability of citizens to make well informed and reflective judgments, including understanding the technical aspects of the issue in question and reflecting on other citizens perspectives
Transparency	The extent to which participants are made aware of the conditions under which they are participating (internal transparency) and the extent to which the wider public is made aware about the existence and functioning of the DI and its role in the decision-making process (external transparency)

Smith's framework has been further developed and, following Candel, we propose to conceive of the realization of democratic goods in the institutions of democratic innovation as follows.

A modified version of Candel (2022)

Democratic Good	Their institutional embodiment in democratic innovations
Inclusiveness	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Selection mechanisms 2. Social Groups that were largely included or excluded 3. Existence of institutional and structural incentives to involve citizens from different groups, including traditionally under-represented or marginalised groups (potentially oversampling, specific mobilisation strategies, remuneration, expenses, paid childcare or eldercare etc.) 4. Existence of specific tools to ensure marginalised voices are heard (e. g., facilitation, gamification, training, etc.)
Popular control	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agenda-setting 2. Policy formulation 3. Decision-making 4. Implementation 5. Policy evaluation
Considered judgment	Types of knowledge, information and visual imagery considered Process and quality of deliberation
Transparency	Efforts taken to fully inform participants about the rules and norms of the DI and its role in the decision-making process Efforts taken to inform the wider public about the DI and its role in the decision-making process

The political theorist Michael Saward (2003) reminds us that all principles or goods of democracy can be contested in one way or another. It is important to recognize the contingency and dynamic nature of the meaning of democratic principles. There can be no stable or static set of democratic goods; rather, the principles of democracy must be constantly revised because there can be no final end, no fundamental version of an indisputable principle that ends all legitimate contestation.

For our analysis of case studies, this involves looking for more than four democratic goods and also identifying other goods that, in combination with these four goods, can contribute to a more democratic or desirable outcome.

Saward emphasizes that the combination of democratic innovations can lead to a strengthening of democratic principles: “the single most important question when thinking through the new possibilities for democracy is this: which devices, singly and in combination, enact desired interpretations of democratic principles within and across the different stages of the decision-making process?” (Saward, 2003b: 168).

For the PHOENIX project and the construction of the tangram, this means that we must identify how and what different methods can be combined to maximize democratic outcomes (goods) or, in Saward's language, "create new styles of democracy" (p. 169). This is compelling because combining democratic innovations can help realize democratic goods would otherwise not be possible if individual democratic innovations were used in isolation.

The next two contributions critically question democratic goods, on the one hand in relation to the crisis of democracy and representation and on the other hand in relation to the risk of marginalization.

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1.2.2. Democratic goods and the ‘crisis of democracy’

Democratic innovations are often presented as if with them tools were provided to deal with the current ‘crisis of democracy’. Of course, the question of what this exactly crisis is depends on the approach. Most commonly the crisis of democracy is reconstructed as a crisis of representation (Landemore, 2020; Van Reybrouk, 2016), often as a result of the rise of populism (Müller, 2016; Tomey, 2019). With approach liberal-democratic systems have become corrupt in the sense that the public cannot assume that their representatives will act for the common good. It is more likely, is that they will be dependent on other interests and tend to serve them for their private good.

But the crisis has other reconstructions—and perhaps other dimensions as well. One is the lack of finality of democratic decisions (Urbinati, 2019; Talisse, 2021). Polarization of political identities reduces mutual respect. A democratically elected government may find it perfectly acceptable to overturn most or all of what a previous majority decided (Urbinati, 2019; Talisse 2021). Consequently, there is lack of continuity, a lack of democratic transparency long term and an overabundance of political capriciousness which undermines public institutions. A third kind of crisis emerges in the increased appetite for authoritarianism and its denial of political opportunity (Levitsky/Way, 2002). In a society where democratic values are gradually sinking the ranking of priorities, opportunity to compete for positions is no longer considered fundamental since rights are not fundamental. Rather it is just one good among many.

Furthermore, in political discourse one can detect growing doubt about procedural legitimacy. Institutional structures are frequently presented as elite-driven and focused on maintaining the power of a political and financial elite in populist discourse. Finally (although of course this is not a finite list) we can see the crisis as a crisis of problem-solving where doubt increases around the ability of democratic authorities to identify, outline and deal with major problems such as climate change. This can be caused by their alleged corruption, but it can also be seen as the very nature of democratic choice, especially where there is considerable polarization of opinion (Hanusch, 2018; Lindvall, 2021).

In addition to the different reconstructions of the crisis of democracy it is also frequently argued that the crisis should change our understanding of the post-war history of liberal democracy. While it was widely believed during the last two decades of the 20th century that democracy would continue to be strengthened within a liberal framework simply because of its qualities, and that given the trend toward open and global commerce, future problems would be dealt with within this framework—they would not threaten or undermine the framework itself. This view has now been fundamentally shaken and with it the entrenchment of liberal values themselves (Fukuyama, 2022). The plurality and polarization of outlook across the political spectrum suggests that the hegemonies which

came to be established after the Second World War ensured stability and continuity in the liberal democratic world rather than a general trend toward an irreversible belief in liberal and democratic values.

Some of these reconstructions of crisis are motivated by populist criticisms of liberal democracy—some by the concerns of the democratically minded that the democratic order might deteriorate and give way to a system of government where individual rights are discarded. Thus, the lack of finality is a consequence of populist resentment and crisis of competition a result of the corresponding willingness to embrace undemocratic outlooks and methods. Doubts about democracy's ability to solve problems on a global scale reflect doubts about liberal democracy as such and its dependence on capitalism and the corporate world as well as its reliance on political competition. One of the main contributions of democratic innovations is to suggest and test types of democratic engagement other than participation in the election of candidates for office. Roughly speaking, democratic innovations are about connecting the people in a more direct manner to the policy- and decision-making processes, and thereby strengthening and enabling the goods that we associate with democracy.

There is no finite list of democratic goods, but Graham Smith's view, in a discussion widely shared, identifies them as inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement, and transparency (Smith, 2009). But we could add for example, social justice and political equality to that list as well as liberal values such as individual rights. One consequence of bringing up democratic goods in this way is the instrumental view of democracy it entails. While we may certainly see democracy as intrinsically good, an evaluation in terms of the goods it provides for human society is crucial for its success as a system of political communication and government.

Whatever reconstruction of crisis we choose, trust in democracy as a reliable and fair system of government is clearly reduced. As a result, democratic systems fail to cut across power struggles and cannot even fulfill the minimal demand of being a framework of peaceful decision-making based on a legitimate mandate. Democracy further fails to sideline power asymmetries and inequalities which may explain both a populist desire for authoritarianism and the doubts harbored by responsibilist concern about the capacity of democratic government to deal with the most important problems humanity faces.

The question of democratic goods—their maintenance and generation—is therefore a key aspect of the evaluation of democratic innovations: How and to what extent can innovative methods of arranging democratic choice address the crisis of democracy? Is the addition of

direct participation in policy making, the use of mini-publics and other alternative deliberative forums or participatory budgeting likely to strengthen democratic goods thereby also renewing faith in democratic government? For example, sortition and democratic design is precisely what practitioners and theoreticians set their hopes on (Gastil/Wright 2019).

It must be emphasized that democratic innovations do not necessarily present a radical change to democracy. Rather they are for the most part organized to provide partial solutions to systemic problems. They are non-traditional ways to address particular (if sometimes big) problems creating a wider ownership in and legitimacy of decisions than ordinary representative approaches could allow (Fishkin 2018). Therefore, democratic innovations are frequently considered to be experiments or pilot projects with the purpose of not only providing fresh solutions but also showing the way for a wide application of whatever approach that particular innovation entails (Aitamurto/Landemore, 2016; Aitamurto, 2012; Smith 2019). Democratic innovations also inspire great hopes and expectations since the success of participatory and deliberative projects indicates the existence (or emergence) of a deliberative/participatory ‘system’. They further appeal to theorists and the academic community in general, since as experiments they present an epistemic approach to policy- and decision-making where democracy can be seen as not only bringing empowerment or as a source of political equality but actually as a superior decision-making method (Landemore, 2012). It follows that replication becomes an important aspect of innovation. If results can be achieved systematically the robustness of the method can be relied upon. Repeating and perfecting democratic innovations is then both evidence for their value and a way to train practitioners of all kinds in using innovative methods (Mulvad/Popp-Madsen, 2021).

The crisis of democracy puts inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement, transparency and other ‘goods’ of democracy at risk. Democratic innovations can be evaluated from the point of view of whether and how well they restore them, and how well they balance e.g., problem solving with principles of social justice. Democratic goods are not only valuable as aspects of decision-making and choice. Their relationship to democracy is dynamic since their presence also helps systematize democratic innovations– i.e, helps embed particular methods in a wider system of democracy (a deliberative and participatory system). The expectation is that innovative pilots and democratic experiments (1) help addressing particular decision- or policy-making problems and (2) promote democratic goods which strengthen democratic control (as opposed to arbitrary control).

Can it be concluded that democratic innovations are likely to strengthen democratic goods? It is necessary to bear in mind that democratic innovations carry risks as well as promises. If unsuccessful they may reduce public confidence in democracy even more. Even if they are seen as successful exercises much also depends on what strategies are both employed to institute them and to follow up on them. Thus, there are both ‘upstream’ risks and ‘down-stream’ risks: First, the organizational parameters must evoke confidence, e.g., they must be visibly inclusive. Randomly selected mini publics may be seen as not to fulfilling the requirement of inclusion if there is a failure to take extra measures to ensure that voices of marginalized groups are included. They must also be meaningfully independent from government showing that they are not simply instruments of elected policy makers to pretend to be consulting the public. Even if what is addressed resonates with the greater public it may fail to gain public support and increase public ‘ownership’ if remains unempowered, i.e., without the ability to determine priorities at least somewhat. Also, the results must affect the policy-making that follows, it does not go without saying that further innovations are met with irony.

Democratic innovations are further put in doubt by critics of deliberative and epistemic democracy. Chantal Mouffe in her “Democratic Paradox” claims that there is no underlying moral agreement in political discourse although from the point of view of deliberative democracy this is often assumed. Mouffe argues that the assumption of conversion toward basic moral values distorts the political nature of ideological disagreement (Mouffe 2000). Consequently, the idea of non-coercive, inclusive consensus is rejected—which leads to a more limited idea of ‘considered judgement’. The political remains a space of conflict and disagreement which can be managed and contained—as well as commonly understood without the idea of rational consensus. Even if Mouffe’s criticism, which is directed primarily against Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, only partially holds as a criticism of deliberative democracy it has a sting which cannot be ignored. The ideal of rational consensus—even if not seen as reachable—is never entirely abandoned in deliberative democracy in the sense of ‘the better argument’ having a special status untainted by other interests—or emotions.

Nadia Urbinati addresses and criticizes the idea that public deliberation should be “the terrain of competent knowledge” (Urbinati 2014, p. 46). For her, political discourse and ideological debate are not resolved by figuring out the best solution or about dealing with a political problem as if it were a knowledge problem. Instead, it should be about opinion and will which remain locked in a ‘diarchic’ relationship. Policy-making and policy debates should allow for a non-perfectionist challenge of opinions, where the dialogue is never pure or simple and where room is made for different forces. One could further argue that Urbinati remains committed to a Schumpeterian view of democratic choice as being about selecting

elites, whereas democratic control—the containment of elites—cannot be formalized or institutionalized in the same way. Consequently, her position holds serious doubts that democratic innovations are meaningful for democracy at all, even though they may help making democratic governance more transparent.

Democratic innovations however are usually introduced and carried out as if they presented new and greater ambitions of democracy—preparing the ground for richer public control of policies and creating venues through which public engagement both increases political equality and epistemic robustness of democratic decision making (Fishkin, 2009).

In fact, however, democratic innovations are contextual rather than universal. They are organized around particular problems and therefore tend to have a clear problem-solving aspect which means that the ideal of ‘not leaving any voice or viewpoint behind’ may become unrealistic. There arises a tension between different aspirations namely the inclusive and the epistemic. It is inevitable that in a problem-solving context, voices promoting rejection of sound knowledge and evidence-based judgement must be excluded. If a randomly selected assembly for example is given the task of outlining climate policies to a certain extent, it will simply be a waste of time to have a debate that takes all viewpoints into account, including the views of those who deny that global warming is caused by human activity. It follows that it may be more useful to think of democratic innovations in terms of inclusion and public support in addressing large and difficult policy issues where there is at least an assumed consensus about the problem to be addressed. This understanding also rests on seeing democratic innovations as having a supportive role, rather than as bringing some revolutionary change to democracy itself.

There is also a populist side to democratic innovations which may cast even more doubt on them as some sort of a democratic watershed (Urbinati, 2014). For the most part democratic innovations are presented by those who aim for a deeper, more diverse, and therefore epistemically stronger and possibly more radical kind of policy making (Sintomer 2019). But anti-establishment rhetoric tends toward the populist rather than toward the radical, and therefore from a populist point of view democratic innovations may serve to bring in ordinary people to counter the power of elites. The ‘ordinariness’ of innovative deliberation can then be seen as inherently superior to elite discourse leading to a populist version of popular control (Ólafsson, 2019).

Given the doubts, concerns and worries about democratic innovations outlined here it is fair to ask what democratic purpose they can and should serve. First the idea that democratic innovations as such carry results or authority that will affect decision-making

in representative democracy. When the typical politician asks (sometimes rhetorically) about examples where democratic innovations ‘have actually worked’–the answer is simple: it works when government, elected representatives and agents of democratic innovations coordinate expectations, work and outcomes. The examples are few: democratic innovations need sufficient support (quite a lot) from the political establishment.

But this is not the key success that promoters of democratic innovations would like to see–there should also be a gradual effect where democratic innovations become a more ingrained part of how democratic institutions work and will serve to increase trust in them.

There may also be a more indirect agent of change embedded in the way democratic innovations can bring new kinds of people and new kinds of thinking into institutional structure effectively infiltrating them with a new crowd. Such a democratic innovation strategy–infiltrating policy-making structures–means scaling down the independent ambition behind deliberation. But it need not diminish the ambition for democratic goods that such innovations may strengthen or produce.

Furthermore, some kinds of problems might be a better fit to democratic innovations than others. Problems to be solved where no clear policy conflict is present, has already been mentioned. Many examples indicate that problem-solving might be the most promising business of democratic innovations. Another kind of question might have to do with a controversy that in some sense represents a traditional question around which a long-standing elite-elite controversy exists. For example, an issue that has for a long time divided the political left and right. Abortion might be such issue: there is a very clear tendency on the left to connect abortion to one’s right over one’s own body, whereas more conservative political parties will be inclined to so see this as secondary to certain other considerations. However, some experiences indicate that the public is not divided along the same lines as conservative and progressive politics tend to be and therefore participatory approaches may serve to break down old dogmas and reorient policy.

Another kind of controversy or conflict–which may also speak more directly to populist aspirations–is the public-elite (rather than elite-elite) controversy. This typically revolves around issues such as corruption, or in a more focused way, on controlling the scope of action and influence by the establishment–or by officials. This can also be about issues that lack the clear left/right dimension such as exploitation of natural resources or climate issues. This may prove a more difficult terrain for democratic innovations since it brings with it a confrontation between the public (as represented by, e.g., a randomly selected

mini-public) and the political elites. Therefore, policy proposals may appear that go against the desires of elected representative—who of course have the power. This leads to an innovation–establishment collusion which is a recipe for failure.

To conclude this section: the democratic innovation discourse has tended toward the ambitious–quasi replacement rhetoric. Innovation success has been much more modest than the rhetoric often suggests; it has also been more limited. Even when innovations lead to policy success it does not necessarily lead to a shift in terms of democratic methods per se.

The question then is whether we should be content with seeking an ancillary role for new forms of democratic policy- and decision-making. PHOENIX, with its numerous pilots clearly speaks to the greater ambition of democratic innovations and aims to provide a register of success stories which can then be drawn upon for further democratic innovation efforts perhaps in a PR-like manner with organized advocacy, dissemination and publishing for the general audience (see Adi, 2019). But awareness of the ancillary role is important here. Democratic goods are contingent upon democratic alertness which philosophers such as Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and Nadia Urbinati see as the essential function of the democratic mind–critical awareness of and engagement with politics. Insofar as democratic innovations are aligned with this democratic awareness, they may play a very important role in making citizens better aware of empowerment strategies that go beyond the usual power struggles in democracies which are typically centered on gaining public support. Other strategies (non-democratic) are also important for empowerment: the successful use/manipulation of procedure, legality, cultural and social capital, fundraising (funding, wealth). Should the use of democratic innovations be focused on placing limits on non-democratic strategies–replacing the typical support–seeking democratic rhetoric with alternative forms of participation? In this sense democratic innovations can be seen as ancillary to representative democracy but also as creating a civic democratic force which may strengthen and empower the public voice, without becoming a form of populism.

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1.2.3 Democratic goods and the risk of marginalization

The concept of ‘democratic goods’ introduced by Graham Smith, is a response to a gap he identifies in the work of democratic theorists. There is a wide range of literature developing normative arguments for the extension of rights and opportunities for political participation, and there is also a large corpus of empirical research on people’s political behavior, although most of it focuses on elections. What is missing are systematic comparisons and evaluations of democratic innovations, understood as institutionalized forms of political participation. Insofar as there is literature on this, it mostly upholds what Smith, following Michael Saward, calls the ‘deductive approach’ ... “a search for institutions that best ‘fit’ or express the basic principles of a particular theoretical model of democracy” (ibid.: 9). By introducing the concept of ‘democratic goods’ Smith aims to sidestep the theoretical debate about competing models of democracy. He calls this approach ‘ecumenical’ as opposed to ‘deductive’ integrating “the concerns of a number of different positions in democratic theory” (ibid.: 12).

The benefits to the use of the concept of ‘democratic goods’ follow from Smith’s analysis. First, the analytical framework of democratic goods enables us to compare and contrast qualitatively different types of democratic innovations. Second, and related to this, it allows us to present different instruments such as mini-publics and referendums as potentially complementary rather than competing. Third and finally, it makes it possible to construct arguments on how to further develop and improve individual participation instruments or the participatory system as a whole.

Despite these benefits, there are important risks to be bear in mind. Even though Smith’s ‘democratic goods’ have limited ‘theoretical baggage’ so to speak, they make up an analytical model nonetheless. As such, the critique of ideal theory ought to be considered. According to Charles Mills, “what distinguishes ideal theory [from non-ideal theory] is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual ... ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it” (Mills, 2005: 172).

The analytical framework of democratic goods belongs to the latter category of ideal theory. Even if proponents of the use of democratic goods argue that the analysis of the way existing democratic innovations are implemented in the real, non-ideal world are what matters most, they nonetheless believe that a ‘systematic approach’ is necessary or at least beneficial in order to determine what needs to be done in order to improve existing democratic innovations. This perceived need for a ‘systematic approach’ is part of what Patricia Hill Collins describes as a ‘top-down managerial ethos’ to participatory democracy (2017: 37). Collins states: “taking on the perspective of elites who enjoy far more access to

and control over the state can unwittingly recast participatory democracy as a technical problem to be solved by the state rather than a political project that aims to empower subordinated groups” (ibid.: 21).

The problem with ideal theory, according to Mills, is that it is “really an ideology, a distortional complex of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population—middle-to-upper-class white males—who are hugely over-represented in the professional philosophical population” (Mills, 2005: 168). Perceived from the analytical framework of Smith’s democratic goods, ‘inclusiveness’ is only one ‘good’ among others. Additionally, the historical and present-day processes that explain the lack of political equality are treated as background variables only, if they are at all considered. Seen from this perspective, it is easy to imagine how concerns related to inclusiveness may be marginalized in debates on how to reform democratic innovations. Furthermore, the level of abstraction that comes with the systematic comparisons enabled by the analytical framework of democratic goods may easily seduce people into endorsing ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions, disregarding specific local contexts and global power imbalances. If, instead, we follow Collins in understanding participatory democracy as a “political project that aims to empower subordinated groups” then it becomes crucial to make a correct analysis of present-day inequalities, the related systems of oppression and the way in which these are historically rooted, not just within a particular territory but globally. Furthermore, the perspectives of those most marginalized then become critical in the evaluation of existing democratic innovations, and how to improve them. As stated by Kimberlé Crenshaw, “when they [marginalized groups] enter, we all enter” (Crenshaw, 1989: 167).

This leaves us with the question: is there a way of ‘using’ the concept of ‘democratic goods’, as well as the four specific goods identified by Smith, while keeping in mind the critique of ideal theory and the managerial ethos as outlined here? A number of actions may be recommended. First, using the analytical framework of democratic goods does not absolve one from making a proper problem-analysis: understanding how to better involve affected communities in political decision-making must start with a historical and political analysis of the systems of oppression that lie at the root of political inequalities and social and political problems. Second, when we evaluate the performance of a particular democratic innovation, we must always specify our own positionality: inclusive in the eyes of whom? Considered, empowered or transparent in the eyes of whom? Successful in the eyes of whom? Third and last, we should make sure that those most marginalized in society are at the very center of our evaluation and reform processes. They should be adequately

included in the teams of people leading evaluation processes, as well as in processes aimed at co-designing improvements in democratic innovations.

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1.3. Tangram as a deliberative and participatory system

The notion of tangram is one of the original contributions of PHOENIX. The grant agreement states that for PHOENIX, the Tangram very clearly visualizes the possibility of imagining a set of tools and different participatory and deliberative methodologies (the colored tans) that can be carefully combined and aggregated—in different localities and at different administrative levels—in order to design diverse forms of enriched democratic innovations (the shapes) that can better help address EGD challenges in different contexts. Under this perspective, the Tangram metaphor serves as a guide to visualize a systemic approach to participation and deliberation, where (1) the ‘subsystem’ of institutionalized forms of social dialogue (the frame), built associating different tools and methodologies (the tans) and on which organizers have a high degree of control, must constantly confront (2) a larger situated ‘surrounding environment’—that works almost as a natural ecosystem—formed by forces (social, institutional, market-based, etc.) on which it can only exert indirect influence (see Figure 1). The main goal of this systemic adaptation will be that of gathering the maximum consensus possible—in every specific situation—around the Green Deal challenges and its transition measures and at the same time providing an effective networking environment that can stimulate and optimize the cooperation among different practices and stakeholders and their capacity of mutual learning.

Hence, a PHOENIX’s Tangram has to be seen as a DI system whose main output is to provide measurable evidence on how to maximize (for different and asymmetric territorial context in Europe) the capacity of: consolidated techniques and methodologies of social dialogue to face the EGD’s specific challenges, the responsibilities of a large and varied range of actors on cooperative action in the incremental improvement of the EGD’s vision, as well as in its concrete gradual implementation. Each specific context, scale or topic will define a different shape of the PHOENIX Tangram. The balance between the treatment of unique conditions, common problems and shareable challenges will be fostered by PHOENIX through a variable geometry of different deployments and combinations of tools and methodologies that can enrich the democratic innovations of each locality.

Figure 1. The tangram as a system




Fig. 1 - The Tangram concept: a “system” that relates the Democratic Innovation and its context

The WP3 will mostly deal with the design of tangrams. However, it is important to reflect theoretically on the idea of a systemic approach. The aim of this section is to clarify to what extent the tangram can be understood as a participatory and/or deliberative system, and what could be the conceptual meaning of the latter.

Towards a participatory and deliberative system?

The notion of a *participatory system* is not widespread among practitioners. The most well-known example has been the Brazilian state Rio Grande do Sul, whose capital city is Porto Alegre. In 2012, the state government said it will develop a state participatory system in order to put together the different participatory methodologies and the different scales on which citizens could contribute to the elaboration of public policies. However, this attempt was not really convincing and as the political majority changed in the following elections, the project was abandoned.

In the literature, instead, the notion of a *deliberative system* has received growing attention.

From deliberative democracy to deliberative mini-publics, from deliberative mini-publics to deliberative systems.

Until the 2000s, most of the literature and the experiments in participatory and deliberative democratic innovation focused on a particular methodology: participatory budgeting,

Agenda 21, citizen juries, deliberative polls, citizen conferences, the public debate, etc. In particular, when the literature on participatory democracy or participatory local governance was especially concerned with participatory budgeting, the one on deliberative democracy was using mini-publics randomly selected by lot as the main focus of its empirical interest, and the one on participatory global governance was mainly discussing the association of NGOs and civil society to the decision-making process.

The literature on deliberative democracy developed when the previous work of philosophers such as Habermas and, to a lesser extent, Rawls, were used by political scientists in order to discuss in a semi-empirical and semi-theoretical way the public sphere, the democratic institutions and the potential of democratic innovations. Initially, Habermas and his followers did not pay great attention to DIs and ignored sortition altogether. In a second moment, a contingent encounter between deliberative democrats and sortition advocates took place, and the deliberative democrats increasingly shifted their attention towards deliberative mini-publics and the almost ideal deliberation that lay citizens supposedly to make possible.

However, this focus had the disadvantage of setting aside the wider public sphere and the relation between the mini-publics and the maxi-public. Consequently, authors such as Simone Chambers and Cristina Lafont criticized this focus, and opposed democratic deliberation (based on mini-publics) and deliberative democracy (based on the wider public sphere). Others, like Leonardo Avritzer, insisted on the fact that the mere advisory nature of most mini-publics made them less interesting for democratizing democracy than less ideal (in terms of deliberative quality) methodologies such as participatory budgeting.

A further stage of the debate consisted in passing from one particular methodology, and especially from randomly selected mini-publics, to a broader perspective focusing on the notion of the deliberative system (see Jane Mansbridge et al., “A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy”, in Jane Mansbridge et John Parkinson (eds.), *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.1-26.) The idea was that no particular methodology alone could embody the whole logic of deliberative democracy, which has to develop along several interconnected paths. The deliberative system has thus to rely on a set of institutions, from mini-publics selected by lot to elected legislatures through expert committees and international organizations. The system has to be conceived according to a division of labor which would increase the efficiency and the legitimacy of the political order. Therefore, the concept of the deliberative system offers a broader and integrated vision of democracy and of potential DIs, without focusing upon a central device.


What is a system?

One can have some doubts about the concept of the deliberative system. An important specificity of PHOENIX is that we include both methodologies which focus on participation and others which focus on deliberation. As one knows, the two notions have affinities but are also in tension, as the ideal deliberation is more difficult to reach when many people participate. Our thesis is that enhancing the political trust for a Green Deal can only be reached when the two dimensions are included. This is why we speak of a participatory and deliberative system.

A more substantial issue arises with the exact meaning of the word ‘system’ when speaking about a ‘participatory and deliberative system’.

A first conception of the system could be functional. The electronic paradigm is one of the clearest examples of this perspective. An electronic system needs to be functional. All the elements have to fit together perfectly, without any tensions or gaps, in order to avoid a computer crash (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The functionalist paradigm (1): the electronic system




A slightly less functionalist perspective could be illustrated with the paradigm of the school system: all its elements must also fit together, but have a certain autonomy, which is hardly conceivable with the first paradigm (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The functionalist paradigm (2): the school system

age	school	grade	THE AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM	
3	Nursery School			
4				
5	Kindergarten			
6				
7	Elementary School or Primary School	first		
8		second		
9		third		
10		fourth		
11		fifth		
12	Middle, school or Junior High school	sixth		
13		seventh		
14	Senior High school	eighth	student	Examinations / degrees
15		ninth	Freshman	High school Diploma
16		tenth	Sophomore	
17		eleventh	Junior	
18	Community College	twelfth	Senior	
19		1	Undergraduate	Associate in Arts/Science
20	University or College	2		Bachelor of Arts/Science
21		3		
22		4	(Post)Graduate	Master of Arts/Science
...		...		Doctor of Philosophy

However, although the logic of this functionalist paradigm is often implicit in the literature, it is explicitly rejected by authors such as Mansbridge, who claim that their perspective is not functional, and defend a more complex view of the deliberative system referring to it as a kind of division of labor. The latter could be conceived in a more or less harmonious way. In a company, for example, although the roles may be autonomous, a good division of labor implies an intensive collaboration between all of them. The classical notion of the checks and balances also refers to a kind of division of labor: although tensions between the different institutions are possible, the institutional system is supposed to function well when the different institutions respect the constitutional division of labor (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. The paradigm of the division of labor (1): the system of checks and balances



However, our vision of the participatory and deliberative system includes the idea that strong conflicts will arise in the implementation of the Green Deal and that this system must

deal clearly with this reality in order to be credible. The paradigm of the division of the deliberative labor which is overwhelming in the literature is not adequate to take this into account. The vision of the 'normal' social and political system in liberal democracies, and of the potential role of deliberation within it, are much too optimistic, even naive. In our perspective, the paradigm of the ecosystem is much more heuristic. In an ecosystem, there are predators and prey, constant evolutions, invasives species, and therefore strong tensions, asymmetries and conflicts between the elements. The equilibrium is fragile and the ecosystem can change completely. When domination is usually presented as a pathology of the normality of deliberative systems, domination is intrinsic to the very notion of ecosystems, although it does not preclude forms of interdependency (see Figures 5 and 6). In this perspective, participatory and deliberative innovations can be seen as some kind of invasive species that could radically alter the dynamic of the political ecosystem in order to shape it in order to face the ecological challenge. However, the actors who promote these democratic innovations for the New Green Deal will no doubt have to face strong opponents, and enter in agonistic relations with them. And in the present political context, it is not difficult to predict that other 'invasive species' could be quite undemocratic.

Figure 5. The ecosystem paradigm (1): predators and prey





Figure 6. The ecosystem paradigm (2): Invasive species



Participatory and deliberative system in the age of multilevel and global governance


In order to better understand the potential role of a participatory and deliberative system, it is also important to analyze its place in the context of multilevel and global governance: the notion of participatory governance is also widely used in international organization and in the literature.

The main cognitive interest of the notion of governance is to go beyond a pyramidal and institutional conception of power. Governance is “A set of regulation mechanisms in a sphere of activity, which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority” (Rosenau et Czempeil, *Governance without Government*, 1992). In addition, the notion quite often has normative implications: “Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regime empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). In this perspective, cooperation for the common good is at the forefront, agonistic interests melt in this dynamic, power and domination are absent.

The metaphor of the network society has often been used to better understand the notion of governance. Instead of being organized in a pyramidal way or around a center (the government, in the English meaning, i.e., the classical three powers and their system of checks and balances), governance would look like social networks, i.e., a network that is


supposed to be horizontal, interactive, and open. All its elements could be in relation with each other (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. The social network as a paradigm (1)?



However, the literature on social networks describes them in quite a different way: When they can be represented as a horizontal system, their elements are not at all equal. Some are much more central, visible and connected than others (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. The social network as a paradigm (2)?



In fact, such a picture is a good paradigm for thinking about governance. Although it is true that it is not more organized in a pyramidal way or around a center, the governance network is highly asymmetric, with quite powerful actors having a disproportionate power and

outsiders who are nearly powerless. Furthermore, a majority of the former are not elected, do not receive any democratic authorization, and are not accountable to citizens.

The role of DIs in this situation is to make governance more participative. But its dynamics, if taken seriously, is not to add a marginal element to the existing set of institutions. The ecological challenge requires major changes. The task is not to improve the deliberative system and build a harmonious system of participatory governance and preserve it from pathologies. It is to try to democratize a social and political system that is largely unjust, only partly democratic and unecological. As suggested above, participatory and deliberative innovations can be seen as invasive species in this ecosystem. However, in this perspective, deliberation and institutional participation are only one part of the story. Protest, civil disobedience, or social movements will also be key for preserving the earth, non-human, and the welfare of future generations.

Tangrams and systems

To summarize, in the PHOENIX project, a **‘methodology’** is understood as a set of methods, protocols and rules, which means a particular procedure with a specific sequence of steps, or a set of procedures. Participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, public debate, mixed councils and assemblies are defined as consolidated ‘methodologies’.

A **‘tool’** refers to different devices within a consolidated methodology or a participatory experience in general, for example, the practice of sortition for the selection of participants, the use of certain ICT, tools that aim to foster trust among stake-holders, or the mapping of the challenges a city has to face (see Section 3).

A **‘tangram’** refers to a participatory and deliberative system, that is a system in which different methodologies and tools are coordinated in order to improve participation in a specific context with the EGD in mind. The tangram can be designed with different rules or procedures based on different methodologies (participatory budgeting and citizens’ assembly, for example) and different tools. A variety of methods and tools can be used in the different steps of the sequence of participation acts, depending on the administrative level, the characteristics of the context and the negotiations with each Territorial Commission for Co-Design (TCCD).

A Tangram as a ‘participatory and deliberative system’ has to be understood with the paradigm of the division of labor, in the variant of the checks and balances system: tensions between the different methodologies and tools, as well as between the different actors, are inevitable and must be dealt with, but the deliberative and participatory system aims at fostering cooperation and a kind of division of labor.

A tangram always functions in the **context of political systems which have to be conceived with the paradigm of the ecosystem**, in fragile equilibrium, with predators and preys, and invasive species. DIs can be conceived as invasive species which face indigenous species but also other concurrent invasive species. They will face strong adversaries, especially when the ecological challenge is at stake. They will enter in agonistic relationships in which deliberation and institutional participation are only part of the story.

A tangram, when institutionalized, aims to **make governance more participatory**. However, the objective is to reduce the asymmetrical relations of power within governance, and to force the lobbies which oppose the ecological transition to accept it, on way or another. All stakeholders are not (nor can they be) equal and cooperative. Conflicts are inevitable and cannot melt into deliberation. We have to keep in mind this context when designing tangrams and trying to implement them.

1.4. Interdependencies of societies and nature in democratic innovations for the ecological transition

From the very beginning, nature has been understood as a condition of opposition to the organization of social life, according to Latour (2004), reporting symbolically and practically to non-human elements in nature/culture collectives that vary according to the relative positions of each one. Bearing this in mind, the European Green Deal (EGD) transition pathway is a major challenge for Europe, whose ambition requires joint efforts to articulate diverse contexts and visions of humans/nature collectives and relations. The challenge is to understand and consider the social construction of nature and the environment, as contextual, produced by a web of different dimensions interrelated and interdependent, comprising different meanings that condition the implementation of EGD's measures.

The ecological transition (ET) drawn by EGD is fundamentally a concept that aims to implement a new social and economic model to respond to the main contemporary socio-ecological challenges, based on a redesign of the ways we live, work, and produce. However, the complexity of this transition relies on the need to adopt new deliberative and participatory models since the traditional ones are not able to address the current needs of societies (Andreta et al., 2022). When it comes to respecting the nature, the ET doesn't simply mean 'greening' the current system. It is a deep transformative policy that must overcome centuries of history where humanity has pushed at nature to dominate and exploit (Aldeia/Alves, 2019). This can only be done by reconciling nature with humans, by showing the paths that interpenetrate them in a single living organism. Restoring totality, interdependent relationships, and connections in what Jason W. Moore (2016) called the "Web of Life" where all forms of life belong and are related in multiple ways.

The adoption of innovative democratic models, following Smith's (2009) definition, implies deepening institutions of higher societal participation in public policy. This perspective recognizes the importance of collective action and, most importantly, the role of 'societal stakeholders besides citizens' (Hendriks, 2019, p. 445). The key question here is on who is included in the 'societal stakeholders' category. If there is a call to restore the society-nature relationship, maybe bringing nature to the heart of ET will be assumed as a democratic innovation. Therefore, how can we conceive new participatory models integrating the socio-cultural reality of each territory and its relationships with nature? The challenge here lies in overcoming Habermas's (Habermas, 1974, 1989) proposal regarding the principles for spaces for deliberation and citizen participation—general accessibility, elimination of privilege, and discovery of norms and rational legitimations. In fact, these principles may not fit the transition needed since they can exclude and marginalize, firstly, those underprivileged groups with limited access to these spaces of deliberation (Fraser, 2003, as cited in Caselunghe et al., 2019) and secondly, the non-humans 'societal

stakeholders', that historically have been put outside the debate, neglecting their agency (Čapek, 2010) and with a diminished possibility of being heard since they need someone to represent, translate and mediate their interests. In fact, it may be dangerous to apply the concept of agency—traditionally attributed to humans—as the “...ability to convert ideas into purposeful actions” (Nash, 2005, p. 67), since it may reproduce an anthropocentric approach that still limits the recognition of non-humans as agents of change and subjects of history. However, maybe what needs to be done is to rethink the idea of the agency concept and its resignification. It is undeniable that nature is a powerful force that can take control of the landscape and shape it, constraining human actions.

The recognition of the ‘rights of nature’, which is connected with the nature agency concept, has been framed by several constitutional, legislative, and judicial enactments, which defend that non-humans and natural systems are entitled to legal personhood status (Stone, 1972). Despite this importance, and the overwhelming amount of ecological transition debate, there may be a risk of excluding non-humans from the deliberative process and locking them into this legal discussion. To avoid this and to strengthen democratic citizenship and participation, adopting a ‘discursive citizenship’. According to Dryzek (2000) discursive citizenship is “...pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions (including the tradition of deliberative democracy itself), transnational in its capacity to extend across state boundaries into settings where there is no constitutional framework, ecological in terms of openness to communication with non-human nature, and dynamic in its openness to ever-changing constraints and opportunities for democratization.” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 3). In this type of citizenship, interspecies-communication is valued, constituting an ecological shift where the superiority of the human species is replaced by the moral recognition of non-humans.

The historic Cartesian duality between nature and society may also be deconstructed by the discursive citizenship, through the abandonment of the exclusivity of the anthropocentric narrative that over time excluded different classes of humans but, also made irrefutable that non-humans are outside the boundaries of the political sphere and in a condition of ‘nature’. However, this is, as Latour (1993) stated before, “ethically problematic and empirically false”. The interdependencies among all species, including humans, are undeniable and both biophysical and symbiotic interactions took place on different scales. Therefore, democratic innovation towards an ecological transition should not restrict the participation to only humans. If this criterion is used, the risk of an isolation from the whole—Moore’s ‘Web of life’—increases, limiting the possibilities of facing socioecological challenges and to meeting the needs of humans and non-humans, while

respecting their rights. New participatory processes should be grounded on the moral recognition of the entire web of life and not only some species. Non-humans may not be able to participate directly in deliberative processes, but this does not mean that their needs and interests should not and cannot be represented there. The implementation of a discursive citizenship implies that humans are responsible for representing the rights of non-humans'. This might well be the core of the democratic innovation that ET needs.

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1.5. Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in PHOENIX

Responsible research and innovation (RRI) is a policy-driven discourse that emerged from the European Commission and is defined as “an approach that anticipates and assesses potential implications and societal expectations with regard to research and innovation, with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and sustainable research and innovation.” It emerged in early 2010 as a major premise that different social actors (researchers, policymakers, civil society organizations, individual citizens, businesses, etc.) work together through the research and innovation cycle to better align the process and outcomes with the value, needs and expectations of society. Thus, RRI has to integrate the following dimensions¹:

Anticipation: systematic thinking about any known, probable, plausible and possible impacts of research and innovation.

Inclusiveness: involvement of societal actors from science and research, industry, policy, and civil society.

Reflexivity: a reflection and discussion on the commitments, motivations, and purposes of the project’s outcomes.

Responsiveness: the ability to respond with enough flexibility to adapt the programme to participants’ needs and expectations.

The Horizon 2020 program stimulated the concept of RRI in Europe and beyond under policy and research funding through the ‘science with and for society’ (SwafS) work program designed to “help citizens, organisations and territories to open a new chapter of their development through joint research and innovation activities in five strategic orientations”.² The European Commission³ describes RRI as a framework, as explained by RRI Leaders Horizon 2020 project:⁴

¹ Retrieved from <https://www.rri-leaders.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Flyer-digital-4.pdf>

² Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2018-2020 - 16. Science with and for Society. (European Commission Decision C(2020)6320 of 17 September 2020). Retrieved on https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-swfs_en.pdf p. 16

³ Idem, p. 17

⁴ Retrieved from <https://www.rri-leaders.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Flyer-digital-4.pdf>

Public engagement: involvement of different societal actors in science and technology, involved in all research and innovation steps (conception, design, development, outcomes, evaluation, and use).

Gender Equality: to promote women's participation as researchers and integrate the gender dimension in all phases of the research and innovation process, including forming gender-balanced teams for decision-making, management and/or coordination.

Science Education (formal, informal and non-formal): to increase society's overall science literacy, for example, by making science and technology more attractive for students and thus promote scientific vocations amongst children and young people.

Open Access | Data: to improve knowledge circulation about research and innovation activities so that they are more transparent and easily accessible to all audiences, for example, via open access to publications and data platforms.

Ethics | Research Integrity: to foster research and innovation integrity in all activities, in full compliance with the highest ethical standards.

Within this framework, PHOENIX integrates the RRI approach into its research and internal structure, as now briefly explained.

Public engagement is the main topic of PHOENIX research, and the project is conceived to enrich democratic innovations. The first-year research involved as much as possible the social actors in the pilot territories where PHOENIX methodologies will be tested. It will also be an opportunity for different societal actors (researchers, policymakers, civil society organizations, individual citizens, businesses, etc.) to be directly involved in the design of methodologies to discuss the pathway to the Green Deal implementation. These actors will be involved in all steps: conception, design, development, outcomes, evaluation, and use.

Gender Equality: gender is an important cross-cutting dimension in PHOENIX. In the research teams, PHOENIX the gender distribution is unbalanced, with women's participation more in supporting activities in the teams than as leaders, despite the project coordination being shared with a woman and a man. In the research and innovation process, is a fact that environmental issues have more impact on women than on men, so it is an important factor when designing the methodologies to be tested in the pilots. To ensure that a balanced number of women are present in the participatory activities, PHOENIX designed the Territorial Commissions for Co-design with gender balance for the representative elected members. The consortium will discuss how to face these gender

issues in the next project meeting, planned for March 2023 and transform the results into a Gender Equality Plan (GEP).

Science Education (formal, informal and non-formal): PHOENIX includes in its dissemination activities to increase society's overall science literacy. For example:

- **Formal education:** PHOENIX is organising training sessions for students, professionals and researchers in the thematic area of participation, deliberation and Green Transition (with focus on circular economy, farm to fork policy and energy transition). The sessions will be online (such as webinars) and have no fees. The speakers will be specialists in the thematic areas, including PHOENIX Advisory Board Members. Also, the CES team, which leads the consortium, has been participating with the 'tangram-we are nature' activity in the sessions called 'CES vai à Escola' ('CES goes to school') promoted by the Centre for Social Studies (CES) as an opportunity to promote the dissemination of knowledge produced in the areas of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities, particularly by sharing the research work carried out at CES and stimulating critical debates around the main challenges of contemporary societies. This project seeks to contribute to the mission of CES regarding the democratization of knowledge, the promotion of human rights and the constitution of science as a public good, stimulating the construction of an ecology of knowledge towards a fairer society; inclusive and reflective. The activity planned by the CES team leading the PHOENIX consortium involves children (from 4 to 12 years of age) in groups to discuss what nature is. The children can hand make the tangram pieces and then assemble the puzzle in different shapes (among them trees, animals, and humans' figures). These activities are selected by the teachers in the formal educational system.
- **Informal and non-formal education:** will be promoted in all PHOENIX pilots, not related to the formal educational system. This kind of education is more related to the methodologies and tools designed to be tested in the pilots. Each pilot will involve a group of citizens from different backgrounds to take part in the discussion about the Green Deal policy area. It will contribute to new individual attitudes, values, skills, and knowledge. It may also involve them in the engagement for a better environment.

Open Access | Data: all non-confidential data produced by the PHOENIX partners will be made available to all audiences both on the website and the repository Zenodo. PHOENIX scientific partners will publish its research results in open data format, to ensure the transparency and access to all publics.

PHOENIX has already included indicators from RRI projects in the evaluation (see Deliverable 5.1) and will integrate the outputs of some RRI projects funded by the European Commission in the design of methodologies. The projects with thematic areas relevant for PHOENIX are listed below.

Projects acronyms	Project outputs relevant for PHOENIX	Project website & Profile at Cordis
RRI Tools	This project ran from January 1 st 2014 to December 31 st 2016, funded under EC program FP7-SIS. RRI tools' objective is to “develop and use a Training and Dissemination Toolkit on Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) [...] addressed and designed by all the stakeholders of the Research and Innovation (RI) chain of value, including Researchers, Civil Society, Industry and Education but will specially focus on Policy Makers in order to impact significantly in the future governance of RI”. The outputs of this project are transversal to PHOENIX, making the Toolkit and the “ Self-reflection tool ” a helpful resource.	https://rri-tools.eu/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/612393
TeRRIFICA	TeRRIFICA–Territorial RRI Fostering Innovative Climate Action–is a H2020 project funded by the EC under the SwafS topic. The objective of this project was to “create a comprehensive overview on the state of the art of climate change adaptation research, tangible climate action and climate change adaptation examples, related policies as well as communication strategies and methods at different levels of complexity”. PHOENIX will use in special, the “ TeRRIFICA Guide on engagement & co-creation ” and “ TeRRIFICA Report on Institutional Framework ”.	https://terrifica.eu/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824489
TeRRitoria	TeRRitoria project ran from February 1 st 2019 to February 28 th 2022, funded by the EC program H2020. This project objective “is to experiment with the adoption of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach in European regional and territorial R&I systems. TeRRitoria is based on the idea that RRI approaches, policies and practices, developed so far at the level of research institutions, may be adapted to that of regional and territorial governance.” ⁵ From the TeRRitoria outputs, PHOENIX will focus on the final document “ Recommendations for Responsible Regional Innovation ” while designing its methodologies for the Tangram, under WP3 activities.	http://territoriaproject.eu/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824565
SeeRRI	SeeRRI - Building Self-Sustaining Research and Innovation Ecosystems in Europe through Responsible Research and Innovation - is a H2020 project funded under the SwafS topic. It started on February 1 st 2019 and	https://seerri.eu/

⁵ Available at <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824565>

	ended up in October 31 st 2021 with the objective of “develop a general framework with a set of core principles and a roadmap that territories could use for guidance in this co-creation process.” ⁶ For PHOENIX, SeeRRI outputs are helpful, in special the Deliverable 4.1 “ Thesaurus and Conceptual Framework of Self-Sustaining R&I Ecosystems ”.	https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824588
MOSAIC	MOSAIC - Mission-Oriented SwafS to Advance Innovation through Co-creation - is a H2020 project funded under the SwafS approach, started on January 1st 2021 and planned end for December 31st 2023. The MOSAIC project will address “SwafS knowledge base gap within a mission-like environment focused on climate-neutral and smart cities priorities. MOSAIC will introduce effective instruments applicable to successful co-creation approaches in quadruple-helix Open Innovation pathways.” ⁷ For PHOENIX, many outputs produced so far for the MOSAIC project are relevant and will be incorporated in the design of methodologies, such as: Deliverable 2.1 Co-creation review: experiences of cocreation from Science with and for Society initiatives ; Deliverable 3.1 Characterising Mission Implementation Contexts ; Deliverable 3.2 Mission-context cross charting report ; Deliverable 3.3 Incentivising and fairly rewarding citizen’s participation in Open Innovation–Recommendations for policymakers . PHOENIX team will follow the future outputs of this project.	https://mosaic-mission.eu/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101006382
RIPEET	RIPEET - Responsible research and Innovation Policy Experimentations for Energy Transition—is a H2020 funded project under the SwafS topic. This project “aims to bring together quintuple helix actors of the territorial socio-technical energy regime in Transition Labs to envisage and implement a place-based energy transition process. RIPEET’s objective is to support responsible research and innovation (RRI) policy experimentations for the energy transition in three European territories– Extremadura (ES), the Highlands and Islands of Scotland (UK) and Ostrobothnia (FI). Using existing landscape and regime-level pressures, the project aspires to facilitate the development of territorial socio-technical futures	https://ripeet.eu/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101006295

⁶ Available at <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824588>

⁷ Available at <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101006382>

	<p>based on RRI actions.”⁸ This project results will be of interest for PHOENIX pilots discussing the energy transition policy area under the Green Deal, thus, the results are all important. PHOENIX CES team, leading the pilots’ implementation, will monitor the RIPEET results closely to incorporate them in the methodological design, such as: Deliverable 2.2 Synthesis report on ecosystems, reflection and territorial priorities; Deliverable 3.1 RIPEET Toolbos of Establishment of RRI-based methodologies for experimentation; Deliverable 3.2 RIPEET handbook; Deliverable 4.1 Territorial Transition Pathways; Deliverable 5.3 Transition Labs for Regional Energy Transition; as well as other relevant information to be published or already available on the project website.</p>	
PROSO	<p>PROSO–Promoting societal engagement under the terms of RRI- is a H2020 that ran from January 1st 2016 to February 28th 2018, with the objective to “foster societal engagement under the terms of RRI in the research and innovation systems in Europe through generation of a policy guide for developing governance for the advancement of societal engagement under RRI in relation to three fields of R&I”.⁹ The project outcomes that will be used for PHOENIX are diverse, such as: Deliverable 2.1 Report on the expert workshop “Contemporary experiences with societal engagement under the terms of RRI”; Deliverable 2.2 Societal engagement under the terms of RRI; Deliverable 3.2 Three reports on barriers and incentives for societal engagement under RRI, one for each R&I domain; Deliverable 4.1 Methodology Citizen Panels; Deliverable 4.2 National Reports – Citizen Panels; Deliverable 6.2 Policy Guide.</p>	<p>http://www.proso-project.eu/</p> <p>https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/665947</p>

⁸ Available at <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101006295>

⁹ Available at <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/665947>

2. Four participatory and deliberative methodologies

PHOENIX has chosen to propose a system with four main pillars, which correspond to four methodologies which have already been developed (initially mostly in isolation from one another), which are among the best participatory and deliberative practices, and on which our teams have previous important experience: participatory budgeting, citizens' assemblies, mixed councils and conferences associating diverse kinds of actors (such as the organized civil society and public servants), and the public debate. Each of these methodologies has its own efficiency, particular limits, but also a specific legitimacy which to some extent is in tension with the legitimacy of the others (and with the legitimacy of electoral democracy), especially for the realization of the EGD. Our research studies how to deal with these conflicts of legitimacy and how to maximize citizens' and institutional involvement for a Green Deal.

In the last three decades, participatory budgeting has been the most popular methodology of participatory democracy worldwide. It has taken quite different forms from its invention in Brazil to its diffusion in Europe. Its strength is that it has tackled the financial dimension ('it's economy, stupid!') and has allowed grassroots citizens and organizations proposing projects that are implemented quickly. In our continent, it has often included a strong urban ecological dimension. However, the deliberative dimension of PBs is often medium, it rests on self-selection and it is not adequate when planning for the future.

Citizens' assemblies are the most ambitious examples of mini-publics selected by lot, and, in their most popular version, the embodiment of deliberative democracy. They rely on a form of descriptive representation that allows a cross-section of the people to deliberate on a public issue in nearly ideal conditions. In the last couple of years, a number of citizens' assemblies have been organized on the climate in various European countries, and the dynamic is quickly developing. However, the link to concrete decision-making is often uncertain, the relation with the broader public sphere and the ecological social movements and NGOs is far from evident, and the interest groups which are marginal in this methodology (present only through hearings) come back in parallel arenas.

Mixed councils and conferences associating the organized civil society and public servants have been organized in various forms, from the United Nations Climate Change Conferences to the Food and the UN Agriculture Organization Regional Conferences, from the French one-shot 'Grenelle de l'environnement' to the Brazilian system of councils and conferences on public policies (particularly between 2003 and 2016). The latter developed from the local to the state and the federal levels, enabling the organized civil society to cooperate with civil servants in the elaboration of public policies. It has mostly tackled social issues, but also ecological ones. Its strength is its strong impact on public policy and the association of the organizations that have a real influence in society. However, its

deliberative dimension was contrasted and it was somehow difficult for ordinary citizens to identify with the process. Other cases of mixed councils and conferences have faced different challenges and have different legitimacies.

The public debate has had the advantage of addressing a large public composed by self-selected citizens, NGOs, and interest groups. Its first domain has been the environmental and ecological issues. Its methodology has strongly improved, especially in France, and it has the crucial advantage of being potentially institutionalized on various scales, from the local to the European one. However, it is only consultative, so that citizens can wonder if the game is really open; the self-selection of participants implies a strong risk of exclusion of the subaltern groups, and the deliberation quality is often contrasted.

Taking into account the specificities of these methodologies, our aim is to promote experiments that hybridize them, to test their development in new territories and scales, and to analyze to what extent they can develop in a participatory and deliberative system that reduces tensions and promote citizens' involvement for and trust in a European Green Deal. This implies an in-depth analysis of the four cornerstone methodologies and of a number of cases studies which concretize them.

2.1. Participatory Budgeting


Participatory budgeting has been one of the most successful participatory instruments of the past three decades. Ever since it was invented in Porto Alegre (Brazil), at the beginning of the 1990s, it spread first in Latin America (Cabannes, 2006), and then globally. In Europe, a first wave of participatory budgets (PBs) emerged simultaneously at the beginning of the 2000s. As they were mainly consultative and not ambitious enough, most of them did not last long, and the experiences often ended with a political change in local governments. A second wave developed starting in the 2010s, with methodologies that most often implied consecutive steps: project proposals coming from lay citizens, NGOs and other civil society organizations; discussion with the administration in order to study the feasibility of the projects; discussion between citizens in order to explain their scope; vote opened to all citizens in order to prioritize the projects; implementation of the projects, sometimes including an active involvement of citizens. This second wave as seen a majority of experiments in which the decisions taken in the PB process were binding, allowing some empowerment of the participants. In any case, PB is a highly dynamic process in the world and in Europe. At the time being, hundreds and perhaps thousands of experiments are taking place (Dias 2018).

What is Participatory budgeting?

Broadly speaking, participatory budgeting allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances, focusing mostly on investments. In order to give a more precise definition of the process, other criteria may be added (Sintomer et al. 2012): (1) the financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; Participatory budgeting is dealing with the problem of limited resources; (2) an institutional body with some power over administration must be involved; (3) it has to be a repeated process; (4) the process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums and (5) some accountability on the output is required.

A key factor of the success of the PB is that contrary to the old participatory methodologies, which consisted in a series of serial vertical discussions between citizens who defended some projects and the rulers, PB also implies to a certain degree horizontal discussions among citizens. While the former methodologies often tend to favor the so-called ‘Nimby’ (not in my backyard) effect, PBs tend to avoid it through a number of tools (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Participation, old and new



Nevertheless, PB is a complex phenomenon. While participatory democracy and deliberative democracy have been the two main theoretical frames for scholars to analyze PBs, they have been interpreted in quite different ways. Some, following Habermas, have insisted for example on the conditions for a good participatory deliberation, while others, in a post-Marxist tradition, have focused on the importance of participatory devices in and for social struggles. Other, in a pragmatist perspective, have insisted on the interaction and cooperation between lay citizens, civil servants and politicians. Field research on participatory experiments has until now followed two steps. At first, monographic analyses have been conducted on various cities and different procedures, sometimes comparing two or three cases. A second step has allowed comparing more experiments, through conferences and collective books, sometimes on the basis of field research that has been conducted with different methodologies and theoretical categories, sometimes in a more integrative way (Fung/Wright, 2003; De Sousa 2005; Avritzer, 2002, 2009; Dias, 2018; Baiocchi/Ganuza 2012; Sintomer et al., 2012).

When one turns to the practitioners, two main roots of PBs can be identified. The first one refers to the Porto Alegre's model (see Section 4.1.1): social justice and the inversion of social priorities in favor of the dominated groups, democratizing democracy through grassroots democracy and citizens' control, and good government through transparency, fight against corruption, more accountability and responsiveness of local administration (Abers, 2000; Allegretti, 2003; Avritzer, 2002; Baiocchi, 2005; Herzberg, 2001; Gret/Sintomer, 2005).

The second root has been the evolution of the New Public Management (NPM) towards more citizens' participation. Born mostly as a neoliberal ideology, one trend of the NPM has promoted policies aimed at making public services more at the service of the public. With

the motto '*Konkurrieren statt privatisieren*' ('Competing instead of privatizing'), the German employees' union has defended in the 2000s that the state and municipal governments must develop participation in order to be more competitive. Public budgeting has often been improved through PB, because governments and administrations were pushed to better calculate the cost of their projects and of their policy programs in order to make it possible for citizens to make choices in the process. Transparency, accountability and responsiveness have also improved. This modernization effect has been predominant in Europe. The political consequences have been much more contrasted. In many cases, participatory budgeting has contributed to an improved communication between citizens, administration and the local political elite; it has had positive impacts on the political culture and competences of participants. However, with some exceptions, grassroots democracy has not been qualitatively improved through PB, has often developed in more informal frames; frame, and institutional politics has basically remained the same. The social consequences of European PBs have been even more modest (see Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3. and 4.1.4.).

A key question for PB is how much money is at stake, and on what kind of projects. Does the broader picture change beyond the mere decisions taken within the PB? In fact, one can—for PB but more generally for citizen participation—invite citizens to participate on crucial issues, on secondary but still important issues, or on details—and if the latter, it could be a springboard for profiling bigger issues or a trap which, to some extent, hampers citizens to engage on structural problems.

Participatory budgeting and the Green Deal

In addition, one has to recognize that in most cases, PB was not conceived for dealing with ecological problems and there is no elective affinity between the former and the latter. In Porto Alegre, there was hardly any relations between PB and ecology, and Allegretti (2003, 2005) has demonstrated that the urban structure (a horizontal city, implying much transportation and therefore bad for the environment) has not changed during the most successful PB period. The very nature of PB, which focusses on the next year's (or the next two years) investments, makes this methodology focus on the short term, and is therefore not very suitable for ecological prospects, which by definition imply a long-term vision. The problem is reinforced by the scale issue. In the Latin-American model, grassroots assemblies and participatory councils are the core of the PB methodology, but they are hardly efficient beyond the local scale. The problem is somewhat reduced when the vote for prioritizing the projects is made through online referenda rather than in person, but this affects the quality of deliberation.

Nevertheless, contingent relations can develop between PB and ecology. The first kind can be illustrated by Paris' PB or the Seine-Saint-Denis' PB, a province situated in the working-class northern Paris suburbs. It happens that citizens chose to support a lot of green projects, and through this largely unplanned outcome, the citizens' desired image of the city appears much more ecological than its actual state (see Figures 2 and 3). This tends to reinforce those in the local government who promote an ecological transition on a wider scale, and can contribute to a real move. That said, in these emblematic cases, the most important decisions remain outside the PB often: the closure of the Left Bank expressway to car traffic in Paris, and the urban developments linked to the 2024 Olympic Games in Seine-Saint-Denis, had not been discussed within the PBs. Is it only by chance? There is a huge difference between contributing to (small) ecological issues, where finding a consensus is relatively easy, and facing the (big) challenge of the Green Deal, which implies structural decisions and the opposition of powerful lobbies.

Figure 2. Advertising for the Paris' PB

Près de 3000 projets ont déjà été réalisés dans Paris. Ils concernent notamment **la transition écologique, le sport, l'agriculture urbaine, l'art, la solidarité ou la propreté, le cadre de vie, l'éducation et la jeunesse.**



Figure 3. Media article on Seine-Saint-Denis' PB

106 lauréats pour la première édition du budget participatif de la Seine-Saint-Denis

Parmi les 181 projets proposés et validés par l'étude de faisabilité, la grande majorité a pu être financée. Le département envisage déjà d'organiser une autre édition l'année prochaine.

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100.000 euros seront alloués à la plantation d'arbres à Bagneux. (Shutterstock)

A second kind of contingent relation between PB and ecology takes place when part of the methodology is explicitly devoted to environmental and ecological issues.

These are strong limits for the PB, when related to the ecology. In this respect, at least for the big structural choices, other methodology seems more promising, such as the citizens' assemblies for the climate or the mixed councils and conferences on public policies, such as the Agenda 21 (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4).

Participatory Budgeting, challenges and democratic goods

What can be said about the way the PB methodology responds to our challenges?

Time: Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/topic at stake. As previously acknowledged, PB is not very performing on this challenge, as it mostly focusses on the short run.

Complexity: Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations. As PB focuses mostly on specific projects, it is not particularly performing on this challenge. Nevertheless, it can improve the understanding of projects proposed by other sectors of the citizenship and the whole public budgeting process.

Scale: Optimizing synergies and cooperation among stakeholders' responsibilities in a transcalar and interscalar perspective. As previously acknowledged, PB is not especially performing on this challenge.

Constitution of public: How to make the system fully inclusive? How to favor behavioral changes to increase active partnerships also in the implementation phase of co-designed policies? PB can deliver a good input when targeting subaltern groups and outsiders with adequate methods (visits to disadvantaged neighborhoods, community organizing, etc.). In Latin America, it has often been described as the instrument of the poor, although this has generally not been the case in Europe.

Deliberation and conflict: Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the transition pathway. As previously acknowledged, PB can deliver a good input when organizing a horizontal discussion among citizens, which is part of its DNA. Still, PB also implies a 'competitive' dynamic for getting the projects prioritized.

Trust: Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants involved in the codesign of the transition pathway. PB can deliver a good input when organizing a horizontal discussion among citizens on the one hand, and among citizens and local government on the other hand. Nevertheless, empirical studies have not demonstrated

that on average, the successful implementation of PB increases trust in government or in the political system. It seems that PB and institutional electoral politics remain on two different tracks.

In addition, what can be said concerning the relation between PB and our four democratic goods?

Inclusiveness: A lot depends on the context and the proactive action of the organizers. When this democratic good is really integrated in the participation process, PB can make a real difference as it can include outsiders that are not only present but mobilized. Therefore, although it is not as inclusive as a mini-public, it may make the voice of the voiceless more powerful.

Popular Control: Well-conceived PBs should and could make an important contribution on this democratic good, as they imply the continuous mobilization of the citizenry—or at least of those who are more active in the process. It is not a one-shot event.

Considered Judgement: As previously acknowledged, PB allows a horizontal discussion on the common good between citizens. Nevertheless, the quality of deliberation is usually lower compared to a mini-public. Online PBs also tend to decrease the quality of deliberation.

Transparency: On this issue, PB generally leads to an improvement, especially when the whole budget, and not only the part which is discussed within the process, is made more transparent.

This said, PB is also a good case in order to take a critical look at our four democratic goods. For example, is the first democratic good inclusiveness, and not equality, which is a broader and more comprehensive concept? Why is the second democratic good popular control rather than empowerment, which again seems a broader notion? According to what democratic goods is it possible to balance the power struggles and asymmetries on the one hand, cooperation and trust on the other hand? Potentially, PB is probably a good methodology but there is a huge difference between the first dynamics in Porto Alegre and most PBs in Europe.

Similar questions could be raised about our six challenges. For example, to what extent can PB be part of a participatory/deliberative system? At the time being, there have been only a few examples in this direction and the Madrid case, which might have been promising, did not last (see Section 4.1.2.).

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2.2. Citizens' Assemblies

Citizens' assemblies belong to the category of democratic innovations that political scientists call 'deliberative mini-publics'. Political scientist Robert Dahl theorized the idea of using an institution of citizen participation that would bring together a microcosm of the whole society, hence the idea of a 'minipopulus' (Dahl, 1989: 340). As Yves Sintomer puts it, mini-publics allow for a "representative sample or a fair cross-section of the people to deliberate for the people as a whole" (Sintomer, 2023: 364).

Farrell and colleagues have defined a number of features that characterize citizens' assemblies (Farrell et al., 2019). According to Farrell et al., random selection best distinguishes deliberative mini-publics from other deliberative and participatory processes. Random selection is intended to bring together a representative sample of citizens and more accurately reflects the composition of society than elected bodies. It is supposed to provide a degree of inclusivity by ensuring that not only the 'usual suspects' participate in deliberative and participatory processes. Further, citizens' assemblies can be convened in a variety of ways. It can be a civil society initiative, an academic research project, or an initiative established by the government (at the local, regional, national, or transnational level). Farrell and colleagues stress that citizens' assemblies can be deployed to find the "best possible answer" to a given problem, serving as 'circuit breakers' for polarizing political issues, or mechanisms for inclusion by bringing a diverse set of voices that would otherwise not have been heard without a carefully designed process" (ibid., 5).

Citizens' assemblies differ from other democratic innovations in that they place great emphasis on the process of deliberation. That is, citizens formulate a joint statement or advisory set of recommendations after receiving information from experts and having an open and reasoned discussion about a given issue of public interest. Participants obtain information by, on the one hand, interacting with each other and thus learning about different perspectives and, on the other hand, listening to experts and sometimes lay people with relevant experience. For example, at climate citizens' assemblies, witnesses may include scientists, policy experts, advocacy groups, politicians, and people with direct experience of climate change impacts. Two questions arise in this context. The process of how experts are selected is crucial: Citizens' assemblies need to provide transparent guidelines for the selection of the most appropriate experts and the independence of those experts.

Ideally, deliberation takes place in a well-regulated exchange of arguments between the different parties. Deliberation should not be distorted by an unequal distribution of resources (power, money, education, etc.) and in theory, all citizens have an equal opportunity to participate in deliberations and to voice their positions. According to the deliberative theory, which was first theorized by Jürgen Habermas in the 1960s but has

since undergone many reformulations and further developments, deliberation must be free of any external constraint and is based on the principles of justification and mutual respect between its participants. The participants should be bound only by the results of the deliberation. Deliberation aims at reaching a consensus based on reason and consensus. Finally, deliberation generates a common good that changes the preferences of the parties, i.e., the goal is that participants change their attitudes through deliberation and are enabled to understand other attitudes.

In deliberative mini-publics, deliberation is merely consultative, although researchers are ambiguous about whether recommendations should be binding or not. According to the prevailing view, the role of mini-publics should not go beyond consultation. Accordingly, citizens' assemblies help guide decision-makers and public opinion in their judgments, but as they lack formal authority and accountability to other citizens who do not participate in the mini-public, their decision-making power should remain limited. Accordingly, citizens' assemblies should feed their input back into the broader political system (e.g., in the form of a referendum or a nonpolitical debate, in Parliament or in the broader public (Farrell et al., 2019: 9). The opposing position, expressed, for example, by Gerwin (2018), argues that if we truly believe that mini-publics are the best mechanism for reaching conclusions on particular issues, then recommendations should be binding, at least if they are endorsed by a sufficient proportion of a mini-publics' members (e.g., 80%). There is a middle ground between proponents and opponents of consultative decisions. In this perspective, mini-publics summarize arguments and disseminate them to the broader public to promote the quality of deliberation at a systemic level. For example, they might prepare referendum questions and inform citizens before they cast their votes, as in the case of the Irish assemblies.

Regarding the democratic goods of inclusion and considered judgment, Graham Smith and Maija Setälä (2018) point out that even if deliberative mini-publics are carefully designed to promote inclusion and deliberation, societal inequalities nonetheless remain present and have an impact on the process. The selection processes for citizens' assemblies involve a certain degree of self-selection, especially since those invited do not have to accept the invitations. Accordingly, the well-educated and politically interested and active tend to be overrepresented among participants (Graham/Setälä, 2018: 7). Further, research has shown that women and less educated participants tend to be less active and make fewer contributions to small group discussions, even when they are actively facilitated. This is particularly related to deliberation, which requires skills, abilities and self-confidence that are not evenly distributed but rather socially influenced. Participants of lower economic

status tend to have lower capacities and opportunities to contribute to high-quality deliberation.

Moreover, it has also been shown that it's not always the deliberative nature of arguments that has a persuasive effect on participants. For example, Gerber et al. (2014) analyses of the European deliberative poll show that, on the immigration issue, the most frequently repeated position has more impact than the quality of the argumentation. Kahane (2016) has also raised the question of whether mini-publics can express all the different and opposing arguments in deliberations. The diversity of participants and the inclusion of experts itself do not ensure that discourses outside the social mainstream can be adequately considered and heard (Graham/Setälä, 2018: 7).

In addition, from a democratic theory perspective, a problem with expertise in general is that it can undermine individuals' ability to exercise considered judgment. When scientific authority is given (too much) respect, experts are not only trusted, but their views may be seen as authoritative (Howell et al., 2020). This can lead to undue expert influence or expert dominance, i.e., a situation in which participants simply echo the opinions of experts—which is the opposite of the deliberative idea. Moreover, citizens may use authoritative expert information selectively and in a manipulative way to justify their pre-existing views.

As far as the democratic good of popular control is concerned, the mini-publics in general have, so far, had rather little influence on political decisions (Goodin/Dryzek, 2006). The weak traceability of the influence of mini-publics is confirmed even where mini-publics are an institutionalized part of the policy-making process, as in the case of Danish consensus conferences. Moreover, the analysis of their influence often focuses only on the final decisions of the government or organizing body and on the implementation of the recommendations, not on other ways of influencing the policymaking process (e.g., media attention to the issue or social impact).

The democratic good of transparency is partly achieved through citizens' assemblies. On the one hand, citizens' assemblies are transparent in their procedure and publish their processes as well as their roles of functioning on their websites, which leads to an increase in transparency. On the other hand, they are still not very well known in the general society and, accordingly, their advantages are enjoyed only by a limited number of citizens.

With regard to the challenges defined by the PHOENIX project, citizens' assemblies can address three challenges in particular. Ideally, they can set adequate time frames for policy at stake (challenge 1), as in the Irish case described in 4.2.3. If the information phase is successful, they can also help make complex issues more understandable (challenge 2). If

the deliberation is of good quality, they can also contribute to a more deliberative dialogue to address conflicting visions and expectations for the EGD (challenge 5). In some cases, it can also be noted that citizens who have participated in citizens' assemblies demonstrate behavioral changes. For example, after the citizens' assembly, they form an association on the topic discussed or to monitor the policy in this regard. However, this is difficult to generalize.

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2.3. Mixed Councils and Conferences on Public Policies

Mixed councils and conferences associating the organized civil society and public servants have been organized in various forms.¹⁰ The Brazilian system of councils and conferences on public policies (particularly between 2003 and 2016) constitutes a model that was one of the starting points of the PHOENIX research. It developed from the local to the state and the federal levels, enabling the organized civil society to cooperate with civil servants in the elaboration of public policies. It has mostly tackled social issues, but also ecological ones. Its strength is its strong impact on public policy and the association of the organizations that have a real influence in society.

However, as it has not been reproduced or adapted as such in Europe, we have decided to extend the research to other bodies mixing citizens with other actors. A number of experiments have taken place in this direction. The most important in numbers have been the Local Agendas 21 (see Section 4.3.5). Other experiments include the Conference on the Future of Europe (see Section 4.3.3.), the French ‘Grenelle of the environment’ (see Section 4.3.4), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Regional Conferences (see Section 4.3.6), or the United Nations Climate Change Conferences.

In this section, we will mostly analyze the Brazilian model, relying especially on a contribution of Leonardo Avritzer. As two case studies pertaining to this model are analyzed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, this section will be shorter.

The Brazilian model

The National conferences are forms of relationship between the state and civil society to determine priorities for public policies. Their normative framework was first instituted in the late 1930s when the Ministry of Education and Health was re-organized through Law 378 (Hochman and Fonseca, 2000). The 1988 constitution re-introduced the concept. Different administrations have implemented them, but their golden age was during Lula’s (2003-2010) and Dilma’s (2011-2016) administrations, which expanded them to all areas of social policy. Several characteristics are important:

- Ideally, the participatory process begins at local level, develops at state level and concludes at federal level, in a kind of pyramidal scaling-up which aims to produce outputs at all administrative levels.

¹⁰ This contribution relies on the presentation of Leonardo Avritzer, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil.

- These conferences concern mostly social policies. Economic policies, infrastructure and environment are only marginally concerned (see Figures 1 and 2).
- The conferences, especially at state and federal levels, do not include individual citizens but representatives of civil society organizations.
- They constitute a mixed body with representatives of CSOs working together with civil servants and politicians, and they aim at directly influencing government policies. Because they put together such important actors, CSOs are in a lot of cases to at least partly reach their aims (see Figures 3 and 4).
- Therefore, they do transcend the paradigmatic liberal division between state and civil society. They also differ from the political theorists who, from Habermas to Urbinati, sharply oppose the formation of public opinion and state action.

Figure 1. Percentage of National Conferences, by theme–Brazil, 1988–2009 (Source: Pogrebinschi, 2012)




Figure 2. Government Programs and National Conferences (Source: contribution Avritzer)




Figure 3. Conferences Effectiveness (Source: contribution Avritzer)





Figure 4. Who participates most in the debates (Source: contribution Avritzer)



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2.4. Public debate

Public debates were institutionalized for the first time in France. Following the French example, the Tuscany region (Italy) institutionalized public debates in 2016, and appointed a national commission for this purpose at the end of 2020. Since the Tuscan model is based on the experience of the French one, the following text focuses only on the French procedure. For a description of the Tuscan model, see the subsection 4.4.3 in this report.

The public debate is a dispositive of participatory democracy in France and is implemented by the national commission for public debate (CNDP). The CNDP was created in 1995, after heated environmental debates, particularly in connection with the 'TGV Mediterranean' railway line. The so-called 'Barnier Law' of 2 February 1995 on environmental protection, created the commission responsible for organizing public debates on projects with a significant impact on the environment. The idea is to involve the public as early as possible to discuss the objectives and main features of the projects, at a time when it is still possible to revise and substantially change them (CNDP, 2022).

The peculiarity of the French institution is that according the law on local democracy of 2002, the CNDP is an independent administrative authority that acts on behalf of the state, but receives neither mandates nor instructions from the government. The commission must be consulted by the owners of major projects or, optionally, by the government on development or environmental policies, in order to discuss their appropriateness. The Grenelle 2 Act of July 10, 2010 expanded its prerogatives. The 2016 regulation further expands the remit of public debate, introduces a right of citizens' initiative and assigns new tasks to the CNDP. For example, owners of smaller projects can voluntarily approach the CNDP to appoint a person responsible for ensuring consultation. The CNDP organizes local as well as national public debates.

The special commission of the public debate (CPDP), which organizes the public debate for four to six months, draws up a report on all the exchanges that took place, and the national commission draws up a final conclusion. Both commissions are neutral and do not give an opinion on the project submitted for public examination. At the end of the process of the debate, they publish their report and summary of the opinions of the public and the different stakeholders. Three months later, the decision-maker must make a decision, explaining what it does or does not take into account from the public debate.

The procedure of a public debate includes several subsequent phases: the preparation, about six months under the supervision of the CPDP to which the CNDP delegates the organization of the debate in the field (for each debate); the public debate itself, which lasts four to six months; several phases of consultation after the public debate, under the supervision of the project owner who, since the Grenelle 2 law, can ask the CNDP to appoint a guarantor to accompany them (Fourniau, 2013).

In terms of democratic goods, the public debate is undoubtedly convincing in terms of transparency and information dissemination, however the inclusiveness of the procedure is more ambivalent. That has to do with the fact that the public debate has been set up as a debate open to all, without prior qualification of the public.

Jean-Michel Fourniau draws attention to the fact that, since it is no longer the decision-maker who designates and qualifies the audiences with whom he or she consults, the objective of composing an audience that is representative of society as a whole had to be quickly abandoned. The public gathered in each debate, despite a very broad information and transparency effort on the territory, is essentially composed of opponents of the project. That is, the people who voluntarily respond to the meetings, and especially those who express themselves, do so mostly to express objections to both the possibility and the characteristics of the project. Public debate, then, does not provide a snapshot counting of opinions for and against the project to the same extent that a poll or referendum does. It records the arguments voiced by a concerned public, many of whom have thought about the project before and who, out of their attachment to their environment, are committed to formulating a societal critique of the project in the debate. In the dynamics of the public meetings, especially through the interplay of exchanges, questions and answers, and expert testimony—as well as through the balance that results from the confrontation of arguments throughout the debate—a construction of the debate takes place that goes far beyond the mere juxtaposition of objections (Fourniau, 2013).

In the practice of public debates, the critique of the necessity of the project and its opportunities widens the scope of the discussion, going far beyond the project owner's dossier to include the various dimensions of sustainable development. The public debate can thus lead to a reformulation of the dichotomous question of whether the project should be implemented or not. Rather, the problems and (potentially) all different possibilities are considered from the perspective of sustainable development (*ibid.*).

Regarding the democratic goods of popular control as well as deliberation, it can be stated that public debates institute a kind of dichotomy between deliberation and decision-making. While the deliberation with the public is increasingly accessible to the public, the decision is still a privilege of public representatives (Bertrand/Marguin, 2017: 461). Alice Mazeau also notes that if the participative procedures of the public debate have been able to encourage the public criticism of the projects in recent years, most often they do not widen the decision-making processes, i.e., the decision remains the monopoly of the elected officials and the project owners and does not allow the collective construction of the societal choices. Above all, the last few years have been marked by two parallel

developments that show that the institutionalization of citizen participation is not without tensions: on the one hand, a regression of environmental law and public participation in the name of economic efficiency; on the other hand, the promotion of citizen participation in the ecological transition, particularly in the form of renewed support for citizen initiatives (Mazeau, 2021: 635). In addition, since the public debate tends to collect the different attitudes towards a project, the quality of deliberation (considered judgment) within the process is often not in the foreground.

Regarding the challenges defined by PHOENIX, the public debate potentially responds to three challenges. Public debates can improve the comprehensibility and tractability of complex issues (challenge 2). They can also contribute to optimize synergies among stakeholders by bringing together different publics and stakeholders (challenge 3). If successful, they can foster a more deliberative dialogue to address conflicting visions and expectations of EGD (challenge 5).

Finally, it should be noted that the public debate focuses on the question of acceptability of challenges, the definition of which remains the monopoly of project owners (Fourniau, 2013).

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3. Tools

In the following, we present three tools, trust, ICT, and mapping, that can improve participatory and deliberative innovation in different ways.

- Trust is a key tool and must be involved in the exploration of democratic innovations, as it is crucial for citizens to accept and support environmental policies.
- ICT have gained significant importance in recent years and are used in democratic innovations to enhance participation, access and understanding of deliberative and participatory models.
- Participatory mapping is an important and increasingly popular process of mapmaking that seeks to make visible the connection between different communities by using the commonly recognized language of cartography. It is a compelling way to demonstrate to external entities how a community functions and is it is used more and more as illustrative material in democratic innovations.

These three tools combined can make democratic innovation more accessible, participatory, and efficient.

3.1. Trust

It is generally (although not universally) agreed that over the last 30 years there has been a long-term decline in citizen trust in government in mature democracies (Van de Walle et al., 2008). Lack of political trust has been shown to undermine public engagement, hamper long-term policy, and hinder collective action (Hetherington & Husser, 2012). On the other hand, increases in trust ameliorate these effects and boost support for unpopular government services and initiatives like one connected to sustainability issues and climate change (Herian, 2014; Stoker et al., 2014; Warren, 2017). Indeed, several studies have observed how trust may enhance public support for climate policies (Harring & Jagers, 2013; Kallbekken and Sæælen, 2011; Rhodes et al., 2014). The reasons for this decline can be identified in the failure of the government to meet citizens' competence expectations or to act in the best interests of the citizenry. Previous research has provided examples and clarified these trust-degrading factors. Perceived failure to perform to citizens' competency expectations (Hetherington, 2005).

Although citizen trust generally has been limited to one-dimensional measures, our literature review allowed us to identify a rather interesting multidimensional model of trust (Kitt et al., 2021) that encompasses three types of trust. These may determine a citizen's confidence in an actor making decisions on their behalf, thus going beyond the quite diffuse two-dimensional conceptualization of trust consisting only of competence and integrity (the latter sometimes being called 'care' 'honesty' or 'general trustworthiness'). The Kitt and colleagues' model (2021) was derived from the integration of several other works (Bronfman et al., 2012; Huijts et al., 2007; Poortinga & Pidegon, 2003; Terwel et al., 2009). It is composed of the following elements: (1) perceived competence, (2) perceived level of integrity, and (3) perceived value similarity. The latter dimension comes from the salient value similarity (SVS) model and suggests that people may base their trust judgments on whether they feel an actor shares similar values to their own or has a similar understanding of a given situation (sometimes referred to as 'social trust') (Poortinga & Pidegon, 2003).

Apart from the citizen trust definition, identifying people's target for trust is of utmost importance. Indeed, multiple actors may be perceived by citizens as bearing responsibility for addressing climate change. The most obvious ones are, of course, governments, which are crucial in enacting climate change policies (Hammar & Jagers, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2017). However, we were able to identify many others that appeared to be key, based on the environmental issue at hand. A non-exhaustive list of these actors encompasses the private sector (e.g., car manufacturers for low-carbon transport); environmental groups; scientists; partial institutions (e.g., parliament, politicians) and impartial ones (e.g., those who exercise government authority and enforce policies); agricultural interests' groups; and mainstream media (Arbuckle et al., 2015; Hajjar & Kozak, 2015; Kitt et al., 2021; Kulin & Johansson Sevä, 2021). Although a direct comparison among all these actors is not

possible, usually environmental groups (especially regarding value similarity) and scientists (for their competence) emerged as the most trusted by people, while local leaders and the government are often viewed with distrust (Hajjar & Kozak, 2015; Kitt et al., 2021).

In the literature, two major areas of research emerged as connected with citizen trust, namely policy support and pro-environmental behavior.

Trust in environmental groups and scientists is generally positively associated with climate policy support (Dietz et al., 2007; Huijts et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 2014), whereas trust in the fossil fuel industry has been associated with opposition to climate policies (Rhodes et al., 2017; Shwom et al., 2008). Apart from the current scenario of generalized distrust, trust in government appeared to be the most impactful in this domain since policies are usually enacted by local or national authorities. High levels of trust in government appeared to increase people's support for low-carbon policy (Kitt et al., 2021), renewable energy and fossil fuels policies (Kulin & Johansson Sevä, 2021), mitigation policies (i.e., regulating carbon dioxide, reducing offshore drilling, providing tax rebates, funding renewables research, carbon taxing companies) (Giordono et al., 2022), water conservation policies (Thaker et al., 2019), acceptance of public policies regarding recycling (Bruno et al., 2022), support for reforestation strategies (Hajjar & Kozak, 2015), and willingness to pay taxes to combat climate change (Anderson, 2017).

Interestingly, the effect of citizen trust on policy support may depend on the community's perception of collective efficacy, which could be defined as people's perceptions of their collective abilities to effectively manage tasks that require coordination and collective action (Lee, 2006; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015). Indeed, Thaker and colleagues (2019) stressed how even low-trust individuals may support resource-saving measures like high-trust individuals, if their collective efficacy is high enough. In a sense, the lack of citizen trust in the government appears to be compensated by the trust in their community.

The second major area of research focused directly or indirectly on people's pro-environmental behaviors, which can be defined as those direct or indirect conducts of individuals or societies that do not contaminate the environment (Steg & Vlek, 2009). Multiple factors can impact pro-environmental behaviors (Blok et al., 2015; Juvan and Dolnicar, 2017). Among these factors, citizen trust appeared to improve green consumption and increase sustainable practices towards—the conservation of electricity, water, energy, etc. (Umrani et al., 2020; Elia 2022)—promoting environmentally-friendly lifestyle choices, like opting for electric and solar cars, hydro-power generated appliances, and air fryers to minimize pollution and conserve resources (Chekima et al., 2019) and other pro-

environmental behaviors like nature-related leisure activities, recycling efforts; citizenship actions, and environmental activism (Elia, 2022), and adopt protective measures for an extreme weather event if owning a business (Lo et al., 2021).

Citizen trust also appeared to amplify (i.e., moderate) the effects of cultural values (i.e., collectivism, femineity, uncertainty avoidance, and future orientation) on pro-environmental behaviors (Elia, 2022). Citizen trust may also affect pro-environmental behavior indirectly through climate change beliefs and norms (Arbuckle et al., 2015; Wynveen & Sutton, 2015).

Individuals' beliefs about the world and their place in it are central to most major behavioral models. The expectancy-value (EV) model (Fishbein, 1963), the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985), and the VBN theory (Stern, 2000), all highlighted that beliefs provide the foundation from which attitudes toward objects and actions are formed, and those attitudes can be highly predictive of behaviors.

It is critical to recognize, however, that beliefs may not be scientifically based as in the case of climate change where the anthropic origin of it is debated by the general public (Maibach et al., 2009; Weber & Stern, 2011). For instance, Arbuckle and colleagues (2015) revealed how trust in different entities may lead to different beliefs. Farmers who trusted agricultural interest groups were more likely to negate that climate change is occurring or to attribute it to natural processes independent from human activity. Conversely, farmers who trusted environmental interest groups (e.g., scientists, conservation organizations, and state agencies) were more likely to recognize the anthropic origin of climate change and thus support adaptive actions (due to an increased risk perception).

Similarly, Wynveen and Sutton (2015) found that the value-belief-norm (VBN) chain of environmentalism that links values to climate change behaviors appeared 'broken' for people with low trust in institutions. More specifically, the lack of trust seemed to inhibit the path from awareness (of the consequences of climate change-related impacts) to the ascription of responsibility, as well as the one connecting the feeling of obligation to help improve the environment and the actual behavior. Even in this case, citizen trust acted indirectly on pro-environmental behaviors. Citizen trust also eases the deployment of environmental programs (like Local Agenda 21 programs), indeed, higher levels of citizen trust appeared associated with more communities in a country adopting a program that requires coordination of multiple stakeholders, thus allowing 'complexity' to be addressed better (Owen & Videras, 2008).

Eventually, our literature review highlighted how successful participative experiences may increase citizen trust (Weymouth et al., 2020). More specifically, people involved in mini-publics developed a higher trust in government, and this trust improvement increased in a statistically significant manner and almost linearly from the first workshop participants attended to the final one.

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3.2. Information and communications technology (ICT), and artificial intelligence (AI)

Digital participation platforms have been increasingly frequent as a way of fostering citizen participation in different processes (e.g., participatory budgeting; legislative contributions). The uses of digital participation platforms have contributed to increased democratic legitimacy, inclusion, as well as the number of participants in a political and decision-making process.

The Empatia Platform, developed and maintained by OneSource, is an example of a digital participation platform. Empatia Platform is a result of the project Empatia H2020 and designed to support a wide range of participatory processes. It is used to support local, regional, national, and international processes. Some processes supported by the Empatia Platform are local, municipal, and national PB; Consultations and debates; citizens' assemblies; and many others. The Empatia Platform also supports Empaville, a participatory role-playing game useful to test different methodologies and for training.

As a way to improve digital participation platforms, advanced tools for e-participation play an important role. Advanced tools for e-participation enable the creation of multi-purpose and interactive websites, facilitate the user experience and contribute to making e-participation platforms more accessible. These tools include user tracking, content classification, recommendations and predictive search, data clustering, chatbots, and accessibility. A more detailed description of these advanced tools for e-participation can be found in Annex III.

In the following we focus on one example of the Decide Madrid and Decidim Barcelona platforms. Although the challenges and objectives imagined for Decide Madrid and Decidim are different from those imagined for PHOENIX, the use of three e-participation tools, namely chatbots, data cluster, and recommendation, are interesting to better visualize how e-participation tools can improve the quality of participation.

The examples of Decide Madrid and Decidim Barcelona

The Decide Madrid project has a platform that has been used by the Madrid city Council since 2015 as part of the city's participatory budget. Through this tool, citizens can publish proposals on city issues and can also comment and vote on other citizens' proposals. A detailed analysis of the functioning of Decidim Madrid can be found under 4.1.2. in this report.

A case study on the use of chatbots on the Decide Madrid (Consul) platform was conducted in 2022. The results of this case study, entitled 'A Conversational Agent for Argument-driven E-participation', will be presented in this section to exemplify the potential of the use of chatbot tools in e-participation processes, specifically in the case of participatory budgets

supported by the Decide Madrid platform. The use of a chatbot integrated with the instant messaging social network Telegram was evaluated, framed in the citizen-to-government scenario.

The chatbot developed for the platform presents conversational intentions that are supported by artificial intelligence. The conversational intentions presented by the AI aim to start a conversation with the user, presenting solutions to their questions, as well as the proposals available by category or topics, details of a proposal, users' comments, or arguments.

The chatbot for the Decide Madrid platform has been integrated into the Telegram platform. Telegram is used as a user interface so that it can communicate with chatbots. The chatbot in question could, however, be adapted to any other application.

The chatbot had access to the data previously published on the platform Decide Madrid. The data contains information from the 21,744 citizen proposals automatically classified into 30 categories and 325 topics, geolocated in 21 districts (129 neighborhoods). The total number of comments the chatbot had access to was 6,838. For the case study the proposals were reduced to 80 totaling 5,633 comments (Segura-Tinoco et al. 2022:200).

The use of chatbot on the Platform Decide Madrid resulted in longer user session time, i.e., participants spent more time on the platform. The result also evidences higher user persuasiveness and engagement of the participants.

The chatbot tool was positively evaluated by participants with regard to: (1) Usability to explore citizen-generated content; (2) usefulness for discovering and understanding the opinions of existing citizens; (3) persuasiveness to promote citizen participation; and (4) transparency and equity.

Two assets were identified in the use of the chatbot tool in the case of the Decide Madrid platform—efficiency and summarization capacity. The chatbot proved to be a quick way to request and obtain information with a direct and compact presentation. In addition, platform users highlighted the transparency and impartiality of the information presented by the chatbot, as they were able to check arguments for and against the proposals in a structured way and organize comments and arguments by topic. In general, chatbot presented itself as easy to use.

The use of the chatbot was positively evaluated for presenting itself as a better tool to search for information, as it offers direct and quick access to concise content.

The limits identified in the use of the chatbot on the Decide Madrid platform were errors and complications that occurred when the input user's speech was not understood by the chatbot, which points out the need for greater flexibility in the tool's commands.

The participants reported missing a more 'natural' conversation, that is, a more colloquial language by the chatbot. Finally, as for more specific (technical) issues, there were suggestions from the participants to make a more fluid transition between navigating proposals and facilitating the reading of proposals with long descriptions.

In the future, personalized recommendation engines could be incorporated to proactively present relevant content to the user, thus mitigating the problem of information overload. Richer data structures, analytics, and visualizations to facilitate decision-making can be developed (Segura-Tinoco et al., 2022: 203).

Regarding democratic goods and the contribution to the quality of participation, the use of a chatbot on the Decide Madrid platform demonstrated, among other features, the possibility for the user to access structured and linked arguments for and against the platforms proposals. With the aim of facilitating a better search and exploration of the content and pros and cons of proposals on a given topic, the chatbot also helps in discovering and understanding the problems of the city and the concerns of citizens. Consequently, obtaining well-formed opinions for decision-making leads to better decisions in participatory processes. In addition, providing argumentative information leads to a greater perception of transparency and fairness on the part of the user (Segura-Tinoco et al. 2022: 203).

The use of data cluster tools and recommendation tools were also analyzed on the Decide Madrid Platform, given the overload of information that citizens find on e-participation platforms (Arana-Catania et al., 2021). The Consul platform was improved with the addition of information extraction and visualization modules, with the aim of facilitating the use of the platform and interaction of users with each other and with the internal content (Segura-Tinoco et al., 2022: 203).

The new modules have the following functions: (a) categorize proposals to facilitate their aggregation and development; (b) suggest relevant proposals to be supported by individual citizen users; (c) group citizens together so that they can more easily interact with people with similar interests; and (d) summarize comments to proposals to facilitate understanding of people's views on their merits or disadvantages (Segura-Tinoco et al. 2022:204).

The dataset that the researchers had access to contains 26,400 proposals, 12,135 comments and 5,303 tags.

Three groups were selected for clustering (Arana-Catania et al. 2021:12):

(1) tag generation and proposal clustering: The categorization of the proposals was carried out through topic modeling. The title, description and summary fields have been merged into a single individual document for each proposal. These three elements are free text fields that are filled in very differently by each citizen. In some cases, the title contains the proposal itself, which is limited to one sentence, and the description and abstract contain generic author comments about the proposal. In these cases, the most relevant terms that characterize the proposal are therefore found in the title of the proposal. In other cases, the title has little content, and the authors elaborate the proposal in detail in the description field. In these cases, the most relevant terms of the proposal are in this field. Therefore, in order not to lose the key terms needed to categorize the proposal regardless of the narrative style of each citizen, all fields were combined into a single text to perform the analysis.

(2) comments summary. The comments associated with each proposal were combined, producing a single text for each proposal to then be summarized.

(3) user clustering. The aim of this module is to connect users who may have common interests to facilitate their collaboration.

Four main assets are presented as a result of the application of data cluster tools and recommendation tools on the Decide Madrid platform:

(1) NLP and machine learning techniques have significantly improved the effectiveness of citizen participation and collective intelligence processes. The time required to perform similar proposal research tasks was 40% to 60% less with the enhanced version of Consul. Similar proposals that were not found in the platform version without the clustering and recommendation tools, were presented to users.

(2) Users noted better categorization of proposals with the improved form of Consul. This demonstrates that the proposals have become structured in a more accessible way.

(3) The clustering and recommendation tools allowed tasks that were previously not feasible, such as summarizing texts or discovering users with similar interests.

(4) Interactions between users and their ideas were possible. This suggests that an improvement in relation to the collective intelligence of the user community is a perspective, which would enable new ways of thinking collectively.

While the four tasks selected for evaluation are quite specific and the challenges of Decide Madrid are different from those of PHOENIX, they also comprise the most essential types of interaction in citizen participation platforms of this type. Furthermore, these types of interactions are also key to more complex participatory processes, such as collaborative legislation processes or participatory budgeting. This implies that the improvements observed would have indirect consequences for the effectiveness of engagement processes.

Regarding Decidim Barcelona, this tool was inspired by the Consul experience and originally developed by the municipality of Barcelona in the context of the Decidim Barcelona project.

The report “Computer and coordination of debate II” (Favino e Ferigato 2022) defines Decidim structure as built over components (comments, proposals, amendments, votes, debates, etc.), whose appropriate combination realizes spaces (initiatives, processes, assemblies, and consultations).

The consultation and initiative spaces coordinate open debates between citizens. While the initiative spaces allow participants to create initiatives collaboratively, the consultation spaces allow participants to coordinate referendums, trigger discussions and debates, etc.

Given the number of proposals received by Decidim, data cluster tools can be an asset to group proposals and facilitate the participant’s search for similar proposals.

A case study directed in 2018 analyzed the use of three different data clustering tools on the Decidim platform (González 2018). The best results were obtained using the latent semantic analysis (LSA) method. LSA is a method for dimensionality reduction that takes as input the term-document matrix built using TF-IDF. The idea behind LSA is that terms that appear together in a collection of documents will have a similar projection on the new vector space. LSA gave the best result from all the experiments carried over this dataset.

Similar to the results of using data cluster tools in Decide Madrid, when grouping proposals in Decidim Barcelona there are direct consequences in improving the engagement of participants.

The example of Better Reykjavik

“Better Reykjavik” (BR)¹¹ can be defined as a sort of “online participatory social network” built using the web application called 'Your Priorities', which today is announced as “an open-source online idea generation, deliberation & decision-making social networking platform connecting governments and citizens since 2008 in thousands of projects”¹².

It is conceived to allow registered users to post ideas for improving their territories, referring to topic-specific 'communities' created by the city of Reykjavik in relation to specific participatory channels, as Participatory Budgeting (PB) or Open Consultations (OC).

The organizational work that led to the BT platform started from—and was initially funded by—two private citizens: the web developers Robert Bjarnason and Gunnar Grimsson, with previous experiences also in the commercial domain). Initially called “Shadow City” it started to be shaped during the period of political protests and riots against corruption and institutional misleading behaviors that shook Iceland between 2008 and 2009 after the country fell into a deep economic recession, and the three major banks collapsed, generating among citizens a widespread feeling of frustration and anger toward the dominant political class and the established economic system. The two funders of the platform wanted to contribute to public debate believing that—especially in a country with the climate characteristics and the low-density of Iceland—a bottom-up online platform could be a valuable tool.

After several transformations, the specific platform called “Better Reykjavik” was launched in 2010, with the explicit goal of contributing to restore public trust in Iceland’s political institutions. The first 'community' (a sort of message forum) set up on the portal was entitled 'Open Consultations', aimed to collect campaigns and policy ideas from citizens and organized groups. Since then, other communities were added. In 2011, the Better Reykjavik platform was formally accepted by the Reykjavik City Council as a qualified support for their participatory policies, sparking the creation of the “My Neighborhoods” forum, which received a €5.7 million initial investment from the city government. The city, since then, supported the opening of more communities such as the yearly Participatory

¹¹ See: <https://betrireykjavik.is/domain/1>

¹² See: <https://www.yrpri.org/domain/3>

Budgeting forum and; in 2017, a forum dedicated to the co-creation of the City's education policy through crowdsourcing was also created¹³.

The agreement between the City and the platform was made possible by the creation of a no-profit organization called "Citizens Foundation"¹⁴ based in Reykjavík, formally founded under Icelandic law in 2010, with the main goal to promote electronic collaborative democracy around the globe and to develop the software needed for that purpose. Its central web-based democracy tool is called Open Active Democracy (OAD)¹⁵, on which are based its major democracy-building projects like "Better Reykjavík", "Shadow Parliament"¹⁶ (Iceland only) or the international project "Your Priorities"¹⁷ or My voice at the City Council (an agenda setting project).

The Citizens Foundation (CF) highlights its interests in building "nonprofit innovations in technology" which can generate platforms and tools of artificial intelligence (AI) able to "empower" citizens and governments, while rebuilding "trust in democratic deliberation and institutions". The main goal is that of enabling and empowering communities for solving complex societal problems and finding shared solutions through Community Idea Generation. To improve the quality of participation, the CF also elaborates secure electronic voting apps, tools to favor "Content and Toxicity Management" and to promote a constant flow of users' feedbacks through surveys and AI-driven analytics. It also provides "cloud space", with different financial formulas, included a free one for no-profit and citizens-based organizations with very low resources. An important aspect is that all the community solutions created by CF are public and open source: so, its GitHub archive is quite large, and demonstrate the permanent and incremental evolution of CF's work. The "Open Active Policy" provides a deep policy-making gamification platform (with use of avatars for participants and other tools)¹⁸ while "Your Priorities Realtime" represents a

¹³See: <https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/crowdsourcing-better-education-policy-reykjavik>

¹⁴ See: <https://www.citizens.is/>

¹⁵ See: [rbjarnason/open-active-democracy](https://github.com/rbjarnason/open-active-democracy). GitHub

¹⁶ See: <https://old.datahub.io/dataset/iceland-skuggathing> (old website: <http://skuggathing.is>). Shadow Parliament (Skuggaðing) opened formally in February 2010; it imported all proposals from the Icelandic Parliament (Alþingi), enabling citizens to choose which proposals they support or oppose and also forward their own proposals. The system received acclamation from the Icelandic blogosphere and over 2,000 citizens took part in using the system, including members of the Parliament. It has however not been used in any formal way by the Icelandic Parliament.

¹⁷ See: <https://www.yrpri.org/domain/3>

¹⁸ The latter was used as a part of the Icelandic Constitution Crowdsourcing project: a game called Make Your Constitution served to teach citizens (and especially the youth) what constitutions are about.

prototype of a new type of participatory monitoring process, which includes blended methods, and facilitation tools for live meetings in person or online through a range of real-time participation activities (for example, for the creation and use of Community Scorecards).

The centrality of user-tracking and other main tools

BR is based on the model-platform of “Your Priorities”, through which individuals, groups and governments can create their own participatory web portals with various sub-forums called 'communities'. “Your Priorities” was developed as a way to make online citizen participation simpler and more convenient, allowing users to both propose new ideas and deliberate on others’ proposals. According to developers, the application “allows large groups to speak with one voice and organize ideas.” (Citizens Foundation).

User Tracking Tools are commonly used in the back-office of platforms. In the case of the CF’s platform that gave origin to Better Reykjavik, the bottom-up origin required to clearly understand the potential uses that could be proposed to citizens and valued by them. The platform, created bottom-up for supporting citizens in a context of protests and political discussions, was configured as a BT platform, and—initially—it did not receive the level of attention that the developers had imagined and hoped, as few persons knew about its existence.

In this perspective, the team gave much importance to the amount of data collected through the user tracking tools: among the goals, there was that of teaching to other interested people how to use the collected data to do marketing work and, thus, to increase e-participation of potential users. This needs to share and socialize tips on how to use tracking-data also later on remained a central element of the “Better Reykjavik Platform” and it helped to understand how, despite the investments done by the city government in improving the technological platform, the absence of specific budgets for marketing could not overcome the problem of reduced participation.

User tracking is used by the BR team to understand where they can invest the budget dedicated to marketing to bring more people to participate or even to identify that certain features included in the platform can reduce participation, globally or for certain groups. It is important to note that, in the last three years, the BR team noticed a decrease in the data collected through the most well-known user tracking platform: Google Analytics. From one side, this is due to the fact that many users are using Google Analytics blocking tools and— from another side—there is a certain fear of public administration to harvest data, due to the diffuse sensitivity and the strict rules generated by the GDPR of 2016 on data protection. In

this perspective the Better Reykjavik platform has preferred to create their analytics' tools for working in backend in a completely anonymized way, and without the use of cookies. From the CF's citizens-driven perspective the potential of ceasing data to thirds parties is not important, while having the possibility of working with detailed data remains an indispensable need, as it guarantees an incremental and permanent evolution of participatory tools.

In order to “rationalize” and “optimize” its work, the CF takes care that all ICT or AI added to the Better Reykjavik platform come from the perceived need to improve some area of the platform, and respond to a specific request of the managers, facilitators and organizers. An example comes from the first mobile version of the platform, which was added in 2014 after realizing that the increased use of smartphones to access the platform required adapted formats and features. Another example is the first AI that was inserted in the platform: the automatic translator. In 2011, with the increase of tourism in Iceland, the number of migrants arriving in the country to work also increased. Thus, the city sought a way to include these migrants in decision-making. The platform was then divided into language areas and “Google Translate” (at the time quite imperfect for translations into and from Icelandic) was used to translate into the different languages of the main migrants' communities—so that there could be debate about quality of life's improvement taking advantage from contributions in different languages. Currently, the translations that are carried out have a high level.

Accessibility is today another important issue for Better Reykjavik. Due to its bottom-up origin, CF does not consider the platform as just a mere tool for accessing the public debate, but also as the front-office and the showroom of a “community” that can (or cannot) give an image to the users about its capacity of being welcoming and inclusive for everybody. So, providing tools for accessibility to different type of disabilities is a fundamental task. The number of tools has been growing recently thanks to the work in Scotland, as the country has a legal framework with high quality requirements for accessibility. This help to increase the standards and raise the bar up in terms of features for granting universal accessibility. For example, today there is the possibility of participation via video or audio on the platform, so that people with disabilities can send/comment on proposals, or just browse the website. There is also the possibility, through AI, that audio is converted into video and vice versa—eventually adding translations. In order to allow the inclusion of people with disabilities in the entire processes, the new features also make accessibility easier for those working on the backend of the platform.

Content review tools are also used by the Better Reykjavik team to keep the platform free of toxic content. These tools began to be used when, from educational sessions in schools about the platform and the e-participation processes, the presence of some toxic discourses was noticed with some days of delay. Prior to the use of content-rating tools, the first toxic comments took a long time to be identified, so that the tendency of some teenagers to publish texts with toxic content created damages to the entire participatory process. As a matter of fact, studies on the analytics proved that the presence of toxicity discouraged several users, that decided to leave the platform. Currently, moderators immediately receive an email informing them of the presence of toxic content and the content can be read, judged by human beings in its context, and can be quickly removed from the platform. The CF's platform favors the adoption of a "zero-tolerance policy" for toxic content (hate speech, offensive speech, profanity, etc.).

Two other important tools used in the Better Reykjavik platform are: (1) clustering tools and (2) recommendation tools.

Clustering tools were introduced based on the need for automatic grouping of demands to improve the work of the technical teams: so, they have an important role for the management of back-office activities. For example, when the feasibility evaluation of proposals is conducted by technical offices and civil servants, a drop-down allows to cluster easily the different types of motivation for rejecting a proposal, or underline why it is problematic and must be revised by proponents (financial feasibility vs high costs; being out of local competences; being too generic and not detailed enough, etc.). From there on, clustering tools started to be used also to improve the way proposals are presented online to users, since there are many of them which can be similar. From here the recommendation tools acquired centrality, too: as it was possible to formulate question to proponents, suggesting to look to other similar projects, and proposing ways to merge or integrate and complement proposals.

These tools were also integrated with other, as—for example—randomization algorithms and ranking tools. In fact, presenting on online pages the citizens' proposals in the order in which they are submitted could make users lose interest, putting aside the first proposals, for example. In combination with the recommendation tools, clustered proposals are presented to users based on topics that are identified as being of interest to the participant., or also on the base of forms of randomization that avoid to visualize always the same things while opening the portal. AI—putting in evidence key-word of interest for users—can offer a valuable contribution to decide in which ways proposals will be displayed online.

Today, also Chatbots are being integrated to this system: in fact, a Proposal Assistant can appear and help citizens (with detailed questions) to better formulate the description of a proposal, and the integration of its parts. For the future, the Better Reykjavik team has been working on adding new AIs to the platform. Among them, one can list those tools that allow fact-checking, or tools that serve to extract DATA from OPEN DATA Repositories, and that can enrich the vision of the territory and the topic on which the proponent is working, so to increase the quality and justification of his/her proposal. The guiding principle of all these transformations is to use technology to improve the quality of deliberation in the processes supported by the platform.

The CF realizes small sessions of user testing and send instant polls (having received also 1000 answers!) to check the functionality of new features.

An attention has been given to different voting methodologies, that can be studied in the effect they produce or the behaviors they induce on the voters. The need to guarantee the credibility of the platform (reducing and disincentivizing phenomena as multiple voting by the same person with different credentials) has guided to encounter forms for granting the unique registering of each potential voters. In BR, for example, users must obtain a verification of their identificatory document by the Icelandic National Voter Registry. Authentication is required as voting by users will determine the spending of real city funds; it is conducted comparing the ID number given by participants with an Anonymized version created by the National Registry for this purpose.

Alliances among registered users for raking proposals are possible, using simple methods that remind those used on social network (like-dislike). Usually, alliances serve to filter the first proposals which converge and match with the more diffuse interests of the users' communities. By separating points for and against a proposal into columns, people are able to see the most popular points of view on each topic and proposal. Voting methodologies are imagined, modified and substituted on a recurrent basis, taking into account the study of users' tracking analytics. For example, the possibility that—in the participatory Budgeting—a user can change the distribution of his/her votes until the last minute of the voting period was introduced because there are situations in which a person votes while “having someone around with a smoking gun, that insists for him/her to vote for a specific proposal”¹⁹: in this case. The possibility of modifying the vote later on “is a guarantee of freedom and autonomy”. But gradually, it also “became clear that maintaining the vote

¹⁹ Interview of the author with Robert Bjarnason (11.01.2023).

open to changes until the last minute is also a way to value the effort of proponents in doing an active campaign on their proposals, and so value the effects of the debate that happens in the public sphere”. So, it was reconfirmed as an important measure to be maintained. Despite that, CF admits that data emerging from analytics have not been valued enough, for example to visualize which tendencies (and which motivations) exist that explain the way in which distribution of vote changes, after a first vote has been already cast.

Helping with democratic goods and PHOENIX’s challenges

The experience of the Better Reykjavik platform is enriching, especially when we think about democratic goods. Clustering tools, as already seen in the example of Decide Madrid, point towards an increase in the transparency of the processes, especially when combined with tracking tools. Together, they can also allow to and support proper and specific investments in marketing to publicize the e-participation processes and the platform itself. Tracking helps to optimize cross-selling when a platform supports different communities linked to different Participatory channels (as in the case of Reykjavik city).

The tools adopted to allow accessibility and thus the participation of people with disabilities point towards guaranteeing inclusiveness. The translation tools also proved useful to involve foreign communities (migrants and refugees) and to favor a gradual dialogue with those who speak Icelandic.

The creation of Chatbots (that can help to improve the quality and the detailed writing of the proposals; but also, can suggest data on the topic or the territory to get inspiration from) are an important contribution to improve the capacity of produce informed judgement.

Tools as “Your Priorities Realtime” make simpler and mature the participatory monitoring of the processes, including blended methods and a wide range of activities that can favor popular control over the process in its different phases.

Even though the challenges of Better Reykjavik are different from those of PHOENIX, the practices of disseminating the e-participation processes and the platform itself through information obtained with user tracking tools, which led to a substantial increase in participation, point to the Challenge 4: “Behavior change to increase participation”. Finally, a platform free of toxic content, due to a zero-tolerance policy for this type of content with the use of content classification tools or the use of recommendation tools to improve the user experience, point to Challenge 6 “increasing mutual trust relations among different participants”.

Sustainability and replicability

As already said, the “Your priorities” platform—used as a starting point for “Better Reykjavik” is open and free, and a constant evolution of its features is guaranteed by the Citizens’ Foundation, in collaboration with all partners that have been engaging with its use in the last 12 years. One of its core principles is crowdsourcing, i.e. a process of “collaborative knowledge production” based on the collection of input from the public as opposed to from the experts. BT has been able to leverage massive online community participation - with more than 70,000 citizens engaging (out of a population of 120,000 in the Icelandic capital). The success of the Better Reykjavik program can be seen also from the age demographics of its participants: a steady increase in participation is occurring in all age groups and there does not appear to be decrease in participation or enthusiasm, not even since the Best Party has been dissolved.²⁰

As the platform is in permanent evolutions, its limits are gradually being overcome—thanks also to an attentive support of test and evaluating groups that respond to the goal of Citizens-Foundation of maintaining a user-centered approach to its consolidation. Thus, the main limitations which are visible are more in the rules and in the performance of the communities that use the platform, that in the platform itself. The limited structure of the CF possibly does not allow to process and take advantage in a quick time of all the useful reflections that emerge from user-tracking and the testing methodologies used; but many of the institutions and organizations that anchor their participatory channels to “Your priorities” produce interesting Reports of analysis that could leverage interesting future changes (for example, the Reykjavik municipality produces interesting annual reports full of data and qualitative studies).

The platform has inspired many of the biggest towns in Iceland to do similar projects (as Kópavogur, Garðabær, Mosfellsbær). All those projects have been successful and are repeated regularly. Better Reykjavik’s agenda setting project (“My voice at the City Council”) has also been replicated in other municipalities (as Hafnarfjörður, Fljótshálsa, Stykkishólmur). Decide Madrid also had a lot of interchanges with BT: project where we consulted for them. The Norwegian Consumer agency used “Your Priorities” In 2012 Estonia experienced a political scandal that caused a large amount of mistrust in the national government, and used this platform to crowdsource legal reforms. The 15 most voted ideas were submitted to parliament, and 7 of them have been passed

²⁰ See Participedia page on Better Reykjavik: <https://participedia.net/case/5320>

into law. Your Priorities has also been used in Bulgaria, United Kingdom, India, and the US. Today, the Foundation has partners worldwide, including the state of New Jersey, the Scottish Parliament, the World Bank, the Malta government, the cities of Oakland, Vienna and Frome, but also civic movements and organizations as Extinction Rebellion or the Eastbourne Eco Action Network. The solutions proposed have been used in more than 45 countries, including in a network of more than 20 Icelandic municipalities, in several Russian cities and in the Multi City Challenge Africa (a 3-stage process to identify innovative and implementable solutions to pressing public problems by tapping into the skills, talents and abilities of diverse residents of different African cities).

Conclusion

The Decide Madrid platform was presented as an example of using three tools, namely chatbots, data cluster, and recommendations that are explained more in detail in Annex III. The use of these three tools on the Decide Madrid platform allowed participants to obtain well-formed opinions for better decision-making in participatory processes. In the same way, the case of Better Reykjavík demonstrates the use of artificial intelligence tools as an improvement to the participation and call to action of the citizens. Finally, the Decidim Barcelona platform was presented to demonstrate the use of data cluster tools, presenting results similar to the use of these tools in Decide Madrid: improvement in citizen engagement.

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3.3. Mapping

The word territory is normally defined through a simple boundary delimitation: “land that is under the control of a particular country or political leader” (Oxford dictionary online). At the same time, it is quite evident that every process dealing with environmental questions cannot be unrelated with the physical and social nature of different places.

In the tradition of physical planning, according to the vision of many scholars, the very notion of territory is dependent on the relation between natural cycles and communities nested in a milieu where those cycles are materializing their effects; a relation read along its historical depth, which in Europe is particularly significant.

Dealing with the Green Deal, and more in general with environmental questions, it is therefore evident we cannot ignore the many differences every territory proposes to our attempt to understand the core of this place/community relationship that was in equilibrium for centuries and is now, at least, critical in maintaining a reasonable balance. For the same reason we can affirm that in the design of environmental policies, especially if involving citizens’ participation, territories matter.

For those who agree with this vision, the question is how to incorporate the territorial analysis in the design of policies? And inside deliberative or broader participatory paths, how can we support the actors in the understanding of this relationship man-nature-settled society? Obviously, these are very difficult questions, since the relationship that gave birth to territory is certainly based on a very wide series of actions, reactions and regulative feedbacks that present great difficulties of understanding and that require the ability to understand the complexity of the natural-anthropic system.

The territory is a living organism of great complexity, resulting from co-evolution processes between society and the environment (Magnaghi, 2000). Therefore, we need to interpret this complexity in the definition of planning strategies and in the design of policies and practices.

In this text we would like to argue that, within the PHOENIX research topics (but also in more general terms), a relevant possibility to address this degree of complexity relies on the use of mapping techniques and tools. Maps allow the observer to perceive the relationship between the many components of geographical reality, or better said they are based on the ability of our brain to immediately build relationships between element (in the case of map points, lines and surfaces; in reality between objects) that are inherently meaningful. Maps are an important logical tool of a multitemporal and multivariable form of thinking—the main tool of an operating graphic language which “constitutes the spatial form of logical reasoning with multiple variables, while the mathematical analysis of data is a linear reasoning. The mathematical analysis has the advantage of rapidity and quantity, but is an

automatism that we have to undergo (and this is liked by many). The graphical analysis has the advantage that the data set can be perceived in continuity, that the subsequent operations are understood and that the cards can be redistributed at any time.

This is not the right context for an in-depth discussion on the concept of maps and mapping, but it is important to note that the idea of mapping and maps as objects are—especially if inserted in a political activity—not neutral.

In the wide field of graphical form of reasoning and expression maps are characterized by several features. The most relevant, in our opinion, are that make it possible to call a map a drawing:

- selection;
- generalization;
- symbolization;
- use of topological rules.

We do not discuss the last one because it is external to the subject of this text and we simply draw attention to some consequences of the first three.

1. Selection: when we represent space, and phenomena happening in the space, we inevitably select (only) some element of reality. Even if the maps, as written before, are good tools to grab complexity, the process of selection is unavoidable, and is always a reduction of this complexity. While less than in writing and counting, this simplification is always present, and this is always a choice of the map designer (whoever it may be, single or multiple). This point is combined with the next one.
2. Generalization. In cartography this is a process of simplification of the shape and detail of every graphical element at the decrease of the scale. Above a certain degree of complexity, we do not have logical and technical tools to deal with problems and so we generalize. The rules to obtain generalization are, however a product of our way of acting. In a project-oriented drawing, they are a political decision (Farinelli, 2003).
3. Symbolization. Every language, in a certain sense, works through selection and generalization, but this is not enough. To be understood, we need a set of words identifying things and concepts. In the case of maps this vocabulary is not fixed, but needs to be reformulated every time someone does the act of mapping. This

reformulation corresponds to a kind of questioning of the model of the world we have and want to communicate.

Considering these three features of maps we can certainly adopt the idea that Paul Klee expressed in his “Das bildnerische Denken, 1956”, namely that “art [or a map] does not reproduce what is visible, but makes it visible” (translated by the authors from the Italian edition).

To conclude this introduction, we underline that maps are historically an instrument, mainly in the use of the political and military power to represent the geographical space for precise purposes. We must bear in mind that “the geographic representation, by appealing to common sense, generate consensus, that is it generates in people normalized images ... that are at the origin of equally ‘normal’ behaviors” (Dematteis, 1985). Nowadays we commonly use maps mainly in mobile phones, and the frequent use leads to non-critical fruition. This can be problematic for privacy, or ethical reasons, but it is even more challenging if maps became an instrument inside a planning activity or a participatory process.

On the other hand, maps are a powerful tool to address complex questions and problems in a non-hierarchical and non-deterministic manner and this attitude is particularly useful in making a participatory decision-making process open, inclusive and effective.

Participatory mapping: a short review

Throughout most of the history of cartography, maps have been used to administer nations or cities, support colonial projects, reinforce property rights and underpin military operations (Pickles, 2004). Single individuals in modern societies have, until recently, only rarely mapped; they have used maps created by cartographers. Yet all human beings can map: people have natural mapping abilities (Blaut et al., 2003). And, in response to technological and social change in the last twenty-five years, cartography has increasingly been democratized (Rood et al., 2001), with an emergence of critical approaches to mapping (Crampton and Krygier, 2006). The participatory mapping plays a significant role in this process.

The use of maps in participatory processes is certainly not new. Especially, in the last 20 years we have witnessed an explosion of participatory mapping initiatives throughout the world, in countries from the both south and the north of the world (from Southeast Asia, through Central Asia, Africa, Europe, North, South and Central America to Australasia).

Participatory mapping is, in its broadest sense, the creation of maps by local communities—often with the involvement of supporting organizations including governments (at various levels), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities and other actors engaged in development and land-related planning. Many different types of communities have undertaken mapping projects, ranging from relatively prosperous urban groups in northern Europe and America to forest-dwelling indigenous groups in the tropics.

Actually, then, the expression ‘participatory mapping’ indicates a multiplicity of very different practices, from the drawings in the sand of the community involved in ground mapping activity in IFAD Mount Kenya East Pilot project [MKEPP], to sophisticated participatory mapping systems of land use and ecosystem services prioritizations in the Arctic developed in the CONNECT project. Though there are differences among initiatives in their methods, applications and users, the common theme linking them is that the process of map-making is undertaken by a group of non-experts who are associated with one another based on a shared interest. For the sake of simplicity, this report will refer to these different mapping types generically as participatory mapping.

In general, we can say that participatory mapping is a map-making process that attempts to make visible the association between land and local communities by using the commonly understood and recognized language of cartography. Participatory mapping is significantly different from traditional cartography and map-making because both the process by which the maps are created and the uses to which they are subsequently put are significantly different. Participatory mapping focuses on providing the skills and expertise for community members to create the maps themselves, to represent the spatial knowledge of community members and to ensure that community members determine the ownership of the maps and how, and to whom, to communicate the information the maps provide. Participatory mapping process can influence the internal dynamics of a community. This process can contribute to building community cohesion, help stimulate community members to engage in decision-making processes, raise awareness about pressing territory-related issues and ultimately contribute to empowering local communities and their members (IFAD, 2009).

Participatory maps often represent a socially or culturally distinct understanding of landscape and include information that is excluded from mainstream maps, which usually represent the views of the dominant sectors of society. This type of map can pose alternatives to the languages and images of the existing power structures and can thus be placed in the domain of critical cartography (Cresti, 2013). The dossier Good Practices in

Participatory Mapping edited by Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2019), suggests some criteria to recognize and denote community maps:

- Participatory mapping is defined by the process of production. Participatory maps are planned around a common goal and strategy for use and are often made with input from an entire community in an open and inclusive process. The higher the level of participation by all members of the community, the more beneficial the outcome because the final map will reflect the collective experience of the group producing the map.
- Participatory mapping is defined by a product that represents the agenda of the community. It is map production undertaken by communities to show information that is relevant and important to their needs and is for their use.
- Participatory mapping is defined by the content of the maps which depicts local knowledge and information. The maps contain a community's place names, symbols, scales and priority features and represent local knowledge systems.
- Participatory mapping is not defined by the level of compliance with formal cartographic conventions. Participatory maps are not confined by formal media; a community map may be a very simple drawing or may be incorporated into a complex computer-based GIS. Whereas regular maps seek conformity, community maps embrace diversity in presentation and content.

However, participatory mapping processes include very different experiences in relation to;

- the spatial scale of interest. As with any type of map, participatory maps present spatial information at various scales. They can depict detailed information of village layout and infrastructure (e.g., rivers, roads, transport or the location of individual houses). They can also be used to depict a large area (e.g., the full extent of a community's traditional use areas, including information related to natural resource distribution and territorial boundaries);
- the mapped information. Participatory maps are not confined to simply presenting geographic feature information; they can also illustrate important social, cultural and historical knowledge including, for example, information related to land-use occupancy and mythology, demography ethno-linguistic groups, health patterns and wealth distributions;

- the fields of application. Participatory maps are used in a variety of fields. Actually, the Participatory Mapping Institute (PMAP)²¹ highlights these domains as preferred areas for the application of participatory mapping: urban and regional planning; justice and sustainability; ecosystem management; integrated landscape management; active living and urban lifestyles; child and age-friendly environment;
- the purposes of process. The Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2019), suggests six purposes for initiating a participatory mapping project:
 1. To help communities articulate and communicate spatial knowledge to external agency. Participatory maps have proved to be an effective, legitimate, and convincing media to demonstrate to external agencies how a community values, understands and interacts with its traditional lands and immediate space. Maps present complex information in a well understood and easily accessible format. This enables groups with language and cultural barriers and differences in land-related values and world views to easily communicate and understand the information presented. “Maps can show a vision... more clearly than thousands of words” (Aberley 1993, 4). (e.g., Italian experiences of ecomuseums);
 2. To allow communities to record and archive local knowledge. Local communities are increasingly using participatory maps to record and store important local knowledge and cultural information (e.g., cultural mapping in Peru);
 3. To assist communities in land-use planning and resource management. Participatory maps can be a medium to help plan the land use and the management of lands and make community knowledge about lands and resources visible to outsiders. This include also identifying and locating specific natural resources such as forest products, medicinal plants, grazing lands, water sources, hunting and fishing grounds, fuel sources and building materials (McCall, 2002). Maps can also be an excellent medium to articulate and communicate desired management plans to regional and urban planners (Aberley, 1993) (e.g., for input into bioregional maps);
 4. To enable communities to advocate for change. Within the broad participatory mapping toolbox, counter-mapping is the map-making process whereby local communities appropriate the state’s techniques of formal mapping and make their own maps to bolster the legitimacy of customary claims to land and resources (Peluso, 1995). These maps are viewed as alternatives to those used by government,

²¹ The Participatory Mapping Institute (PMAP) is a global network of researchers and practitioners committed to moving beyond the state-of-the-art in public participation and participatory mapping systems. <https://participatorymapping.org/about/our-vision-and-mission/>

industry and other competing outside groups. They become a tool in a broader strategy for advocacy. They present communities' claims, which often do not coincide with the government's ideas of who has rights to particular areas of land. (e.g., in British Columbia, Canada, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en First Nation bands have used maps in their attempts to have their native sovereignty recognized by provincial and federal governments). At times, participatory mapping initiatives have succeeded in empowering grassroots efforts to hold governments accountable for poor decisions related to land and resource use and allocation. In the case of counter-maps, map-making has become a form of political action that is capable of bringing about change;

5. To increase the capacity within communities. Often the benefits of participatory mapping initiatives are far wider and more intangible than those that result simply from map production and use. One of the greatest strengths of these initiatives is the ability of the mapping process to bring community members together to share their ideas and visions, which can contribute to building community cohesion (Alcorn, 2000).
6. To address resource-related conflict. Participatory mapping can be used to manage (i.e., avoid and reduce) conflicts between a community and outsiders and to address internal conflicts. Maps can represent a conflict graphically, placing the parties in relation to the problem and in relation to each other. Peter Kyem (2004 a, 2004 b), an expert on mapping and conflict, notes that participatory mapping applications can be very productive in the early stages of a dispute with a spatial dimension. This is because the substance of the conflict is still limited to issues that are distributed in space and can be mapped and analyzed. He also recognizes that participatory mapping is an effective (and non-problematic) tool at the post-conflict settlement stage. (e.g., mapping ancestral domains in Northern Mindanao—a PAFID-IFAD project).

A broad range of participatory mapping tools exists. The choice of which to use is determined by the way in which the map will be employed, the perceived impact the mapping tools will have on the target audience and the available resources. They range from low-cost, low resource-input activities (such as hands-on mapping) to high-cost and high resource-input software's (such as developing and deploying GIS). Below are the five most popular tools:

(a) Hands-on mapping. These tools include basic mapping methods in which community members draw maps from memory on the ground (ground mapping) and paper (sketch mapping);

(b) Participatory mapping using scale maps and images. Local knowledge is identified through conversation and then drawn directly onto a photocopied map or remote-sensed image (or else onto clear plastic sheets placed on top of the map). The position of features is determined by looking at their position relative to natural landmarks (e.g. rivers, mountains, lakes). This method is commonly used where accurate and affordable scale maps are available. This method also works well with aerial and satellite images. Additional information can be located on the map using GPS data gathered in the field;

(c) Participatory 3-D models (P3DM). Participatory 3-D modeling is a community-based method that integrates local spatial knowledge with data on land elevation and sea depth to produce stand-alone, scaled and geo-referenced models. P3DM are scale relief models created from the contours of a topographic map. Sheets of cardboard are cut in the shape of the contour lines and pasted on top of each other to create a three-dimensional representation of topography. Geographic features can be identified on the model using pushpins (for points), colored string (for lines) and paint (for areas). Data depicted on the model can be extracted, digitized and incorporated into a GIS;

(d) geographic information systems (GIS). GIS are computer hardware and software technologies that are used for storing, retrieving, mapping and analyzing geographic data. Since the 1990s, the participatory GIS (PGIS) movement has sought to integrate local knowledge and qualitative data into GIS for community use. PGIS practitioners (who are often technology intermediaries from outside the community) work with local communities to democratize the use of the technologies;

(e) multimedia and internet-based mapping. Maps are frequently supplemented with the written word, but this can be an imperfect medium to represent local knowledge, especially for indigenous peoples, who are more likely to be non-literate and accustomed to communicating orally. Much local knowledge about the land is transmitted in the form of stories and legends that use metaphor and sophisticated terminology that might be lost if the information is transcribed. Multimedia and Internet-based mapping can combine the usefulness of maps with other embedded digital media.

Participatory mapping has probably been most practiced in the countries of the global south (Perkins, 2007). The new orthodoxy of participatory mapping relies strongly upon mapping to help implement locally-led, village-based development (Chambers, 2006; Crouch and Matless, 1996; King, 2002; Parker 2006). In Europe the oldest and most widespread form of participatory maps are the community maps which are inspired by the British Parish Maps project of the early 1980s, which later spread all over the world. The

project is by Common Ground, a charity based in Dorset, which has been at the forefront of community conservation and environmental education in England for the last thirty years. It was founded in 1983 by Sue Clifford, Angela King and the writer Roger Deakin, with the idea of 'local distinctiveness' at its heart. In 1985, they launched the Parish Map project, as an ongoing initiative encouraging local people to map what their own parish valued. The remit was to support local distinctiveness. The mapping process was seen as being at once both aesthetic and political, encouraging active participation in map making, with the process, in theory, bringing together local communities to 'hold their own ground' (King and Clifford, 1985). The subsequent county-level initiatives have kick-started more recent involvement, for example in Bedfordshire, Cheshire, Shropshire, Devon, Norfolk, Suffolk and West Sussex. In these practices it is local people who decide what is mapped, who is involved, how mapping should be carried out, the form of the map and its medium. Building on this experience, the practice of community maps spread rapidly throughout Europe. The practice of community maps has been widespread in Italy where it has been used both as a tool for analyzing and archiving land resources and as a planning tool (Borghi, 2016).

The community map can become a useful tool in PHOENIX project to co-design of environmental policies. By using an immediate and direct code of representation, it makes the reading of the environment's characteristics and values accessible to all, thus making it more concrete for the inhabitants to be able to actively participate and discuss transformation choices and to trigger processes of care for the territory.

In recent years the use of deep maps has also spread into participatory practices in Europe (Bodenhamer et al. 2021). There is no strict definition of a deep map. But it has been called the 'essential next step' following the spatial turn that reshaped the humanities by the turn of the century (Bodenhamer et al. 2015, 1). The term is drawn from William Least Heat-Moon's *PrairieEarth* (1991), in which he layers the many stories of Chase County, Kansas. A deep map is a detailed, multimedia depiction of a place and all that exists within it. It is not strictly tangible; it also includes emotion and meaning. A deep map is both a process and a product—a creative space that is visual, open, multi-layered, and ever-changing.

Where traditional maps serve as statements, deep maps serve as conversations. The aim behind this concept is ultimately to comprehend the many layers of memory, experience and perceptions of a particular place over time through the wide variety of narratives that are anchored there. Going well beyond Euclidean cartography, a deep map may for example interweave official documents with auto-biographical stories, folklore, architecture, archaeological objects, weather reports and natural history. It can take a variety of forms—from literature, to radio talks, to multi-media installations and other art

forms. Thanks to the communicative and evocative power conferred on them by the multiple languages used, deep maps can be a valuable tool for disseminating and sharing contemporary environmental issues. In this perspective, they can therefore become a useful tool for the PHOENIX project.

Participatory mapping is increasingly employed in modern and contemporary art. In addition to the map in a fixed artistic representation, created by a single artist, mapping is being carried out as part of performance art practice and enacted by wider community groups. The first experiences in this regard can be traced back to the situationist ‘derive’ inspired by the practice of Guy Debord in Paris in the 1950s. Debord mapped his rambling around Paris as a form of resistance to capitalism’s acquisitive power. By walking and mapping personal tracks across the city, psychogeographers argue that alternative, more playful maps can be made, which open up new views of the same spaces. The 1990s saw a significant revival in psycho-geography and urban exploration in the UK, which was frequently associated with new social movements, street theater and protest (Pinder, 2005). Participants walk the city in new ways, following algorithmic patterns (first left, second right), solving puzzles, reclaiming places from commerce or surveillance by staged performances, navigating new routes and constructing new maps. Sometimes permanent mapping emerges from these events and is displayed in exhibitions. It often, however, remains an ephemeral performance, of the moment, and shared by the participants alone (Parkins, 2007). Artistic practices of this kind are currently used by environmental movements such as XR (Extinction Rebellion).

Mapping practice for many community artists also often employs geospatial technologies to subvert accepted norms. For example, Christian Nold’s work on bio-mapping illustrates the potential of mixing geo-spatial technologies with biometric sensors and helps communities create their own maps.

Many contemporary artists have tried their hand at artistic practices based on collective mapping, as forms to bring out new visions of the world and places. In this perspective the following works are significant: *Alighiero Boetti, a Kabul Afghanistan nell’anno millenovecentoottanta*, by Alighiero Boetti (1980); *From Here to There (Manhattan)*, by Nabutaka Aozaki (2012); *The constellations series*, by Bouchra Khalili (2011). Many useful suggestions for PHOENIX can be found in the artistic practices of participatory mapping. Indeed, engaging in artistic mapping activity allows people to think in new ways about their places and bring new places into being.

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4. Case studies

The selection of the case studies has been quite an important part of the task 2.1, and logically occupies an important place in this deliverable. Our methodology used to select these cases has been mostly qualitative. First, we have relied on the large expertise of our team members, as a number of them have worked on these issues in the last couples of years (or in some cases decades), and have selected a first short-list of cases. Second, we have made a literature desk-research, in English but also in several languages that our team masters, to check our first results and we have subsequently added a couple of cases. Third, with the seminar we have discussed the cases related to each typology, and have added some additional ones. Fourth, we have conducted interviews with scholars and practitioners in several countries in order to check the cases we did know less in-depth and to verify whether other potential cases could be added. The short-list we compiled included around 70 cases. On this basis, we decided to choose 21 of them for a deeper analysis, each being presented here this Part 4, and to list the further 50 ones (see Annex IV).

The criteria used to compile these two lists follow:

- Mostly cases related to the four cornerstone typologies.
- Mostly cases which have taken place in Europe, with a couple of exceptions of particular importance.
- A reasonable balance between the different regions and countries in Europe (an exact balance being not possible, both because the different kinds of democratic innovations do not take place evenly in EU countries and because of some limitation in our expertise).
- At least two-thirds of the cases include a strong dimension on ecological issues, with no more than one-third chosen because of their procedural importance although they do not imply the ecological dimension.
- Cases which can, at least to a certain extent, considered as best-practices, even though most of them present serious limitations regarding their procedural quality, the way they face our six challenges, and they include our four democratic goods, and their outputs on public policies, especially on issues related to the ecological transition.
- Cases that we can analyze seriously either because of our knowledge in the field, or because significant literature has been published on them, or because we can rely on interviews with well-known researchers and/or practitioners. We have eliminated cases for which no reliable information was available.

For each of the case studies, we have tried to analyze how the practices are able to face our six challenges (and in some cases some additional challenges), how they incorporate the

four democratic goods around which our research focuses, to what extent they cross-fertilize, and to what extent they can enter in a deliberative and participatory system—in brief, what are their strengths and limitations. The different elements that have been assessed in these case studies will later on be important in the construction of the tangram.

4.1. Participatory Budgeting

4.1.1. City of Porto Alegre (Brazil)

NB. For the way in which the Porto Alegre's experiment face our six challenges and incorporates the four democratic goods, see section 2.1.

In the 1980s, one of the most important waves of urban social movements occurred in Porto Alegre (Avritzer, 2002). As in other major cities, there had been a population explosion in recent years, caused by the rural exodus. This had led to a big increase in the slum areas (favelas). There was enormous need and the old habits of patronage had reached their limits. The Workers' Party (PT), led at the national level by Lula (who was to be elected President of Brazil in 2002) had strong local support. The PT has a history of trade union struggles (of which Lula himself had been a part) and includes progressive Christian currents organized in grassroots church communities and imprinted with liberation theology. Moreover, a large number of experienced left-wing and extreme left activists (such as Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded Lula as the head of Brazil in 2010) joined the movement, which was very important in the formation of the party. In Porto Alegre the most radical currents were particularly well represented.

When the Popular Front, constituted around the Workers' Party, took over the Town Hall in 1988, they were confronted by a Town Council with a majority of opposition parties. The Brazilian political system is a presidential one at both municipal and federal level, and the executive and the legislature are elected separately on the basis of direct universal suffrage. It was also to cope with this cohabitation that the executive launched a participatory structure that enabled non-elected citizens to take part in budgetary decision-making (Fedozzi, 1999; 2000). This process was strongly marked by the Marxist revolutionary tradition, but the 'Soviets' were organized in neighborhoods rather than in factories. This was the basis for creating the pyramid of delegates, with explicit reference—for the most part mythical—to the Paris Commune of 1871—there was no crossover between state and civil society organizations in Porto Alegre. They were both totally independent and the participatory space was built around new institutions that facilitate cooperation between the community organizations and the town executive. (The legislative body was only marginally involved, although at the end of the day its approval was required to adopt the final budget.) The procedure that was implemented was the result of a compromise between the initial proposals made by the Workers' Party and those that emanated from the community associations; moreover, it was the outcome of a learning process that continued until 1992 (Baiochi, 2005; Wampler, 2010).

During this period, the local government successfully managed to stabilize the city's financial situation, taking advantage of national reforms which granted more financial support and autonomy to local governments. The tax system was reformed, with more

resources redistributed to social policy. The civil service at municipal level also underwent a deep reform, and while the existing staff progressively abandoned the idea of an immediate revolution in favor of the prospect of more progressive management, participatory budgeting gradually acquired its key characteristics. By 1992, these had become stable. Participatory budgeting was initially conceived, thanks to a window of opportunity, by actors who had no exact ideas about what they were trying to do (Abers, 2000). PB benefited from a series of converging circumstances such as the movement of democratization in Brazil, the reform of local finance, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent discrediting of bureaucratic socialism.

Participatory budgeting showed itself to be a highly original process that was both coherent and functional. Centered on municipal investments, it is anchored in two dimensions. The first is geographical: each territory defines its own priorities and discusses them with its neighbors. The second is thematic: every town council department has its own meetings and committees. By developing a joint vision via territories and themes, it is possible to develop a transversal vision that reaches from the micro-local level of neighborhoods to the city as a whole. Many meetings are held in the neighborhoods. They are more or less formalized and make it possible to discuss needs in a very detailed manner. At the district level, annual general assembly's take place, and permanent participatory forums allow projects to be prioritized, implemented and followed up. At the town level, the participatory budget council meets several times a month and delegates finalize the synthesis of these proposals, negotiate them with the municipal authorities and define the rules of the game for the following year. Assemblies are open to all volunteers and, although the neighborhood associations play a major role through their ability to mobilize, they have no statutory privileges.

The delegates to the district forums and participatory budget council are closely linked to their grassroots and have a 'semi-imperative mandate'. Throughout the year, a carefully organized cycle is used to maintain and develop the quality of discussion, the follow-up of decisions and mobilization of citizens. The overall process is structured by very precise rules that are discussed anew every year and which are largely determined by the citizens themselves. Prioritizing and ranking of projects is carried out by a weighted voting system that takes specific populations and infrastructure needs into account, as well as the ability of public services to meet those needs. It is thanks to these formalized criteria for distributing resources that participatory budgeting enables the implementation of social justice, combined with a majoritarian logic (projects that meet the redistributive criteria and which gain the greatest support are ranked highest). There is also a certain democratization of the technical choices via the intense discussions that the delegates have

with the town engineers. All in all, the power granted to participants is considerable, and they also have great procedural independence. All investments are subjected to a joint decision-making process between the executive and the participatory structure; the respective weight of these partners varies, according to the field under consideration. The Participatory Budget Council plays only a consultative role in the remainder of the budget, although its influence remains significant (Allegretti, 2003; Genro/De Souza, 1998; Gret/Sintomer, 2004; Herzberg, 2002).

It is significant that the working class was actively involved and appropriated this instrument. Even if there was a quantitative limitation, the level of participation increased from one year to the next: the main cycle of district assemblies brought together about 1,000 people in 1990. This increased to 14,000 in 1999 and peaked at 17,000 in 2002. The ‘demonstration effect’ is that of a process that convinced an increasing number of citizens of its usefulness. What is even more remarkable is the social composition of participants: whereas the working class has traditionally been marginalized from politics, it is massively present in participatory budgeting. Working class participation makes up the vast majority, with women attending the assemblies more regularly than men. Moving up the levels of the participatory pyramid, these characteristics change and the weight of men and upper socio-professional categories of the working class—as well as of those with time to spare (the unemployed, for example)—tends to increase. The participatory budget council does, however, reflect the overall population of the city: far more, at any rate, than the Town Council or the leadership of local parties.

Initially, the ideological frames of the promoters of the experiment mainly underlined the need to ‘reverse priorities’ for the benefit of the neediest and to ‘democratize democracy’ via participation. The two objectives are supposed to be linked: participation should enable the working class to promote their own interests and end the appropriation of the state by the dominant classes. Progressively, a third objective was added, namely the prospect of ‘good governance’ based on the improved local administration that resulted from the fight against patronage, the internal reorganization of administrative services and the rapid and more systematic inclusion of people’s needs in public policies. These ambitions were partly realized (Gret/Sintomer, 2004). Establishing clear rules for the distribution of resources and the public nature of discussions clearly improved the transparency of the budgetary process, reduced patronage networks and encouraged better accountability on the part of political leaders and civil service managers. The fact that the working class was mobilized and the criteria for redistribution to the poorest neighborhoods based on social justice (Marquetti/de Campos/Pires, 2008) meant that daily life in the outlying zones was transformed. The lower classes felt a sense of symbolic recognition as legitimate actors,

their real weight in the decision-making process was considerably increased and the participatory budget enabled the creation of a ‘plebeian public sphere’ (Baierle, 2006). The latter was also supported by the emergence of a new, partially institutionalized power, separate from the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

The project faced a series of challenges, such as how to increase participation with regard to issues that go beyond short-term considerations, the risk of progressive co-optation of civil society activists into the political system, and the danger that routine could replace an initially innovative dynamic. The institutional political system was only very partially transformed by the participatory experience, and the power struggles within the PT were no different from those in traditional organizations. Nevertheless, until the early 2000s, the experiment appeared to be a powerful process, and the government was re-elected three times, which is exceptional in Brazil. The participatory budget was recognized by such international institutions as the World Bank and the UN Habitat program and was applauded by the left both in Brazil and internationally. In January 2001, the first World Social Forum took place in Porto Alegre; it was to be followed by three others in subsequent years (2002, 2003 and 2005). The city became the capital of the alter-globalization movement, and seemed to have assumed its leadership, as proclaimed in the slogan ‘another world is possible’. Other left-wing Brazilian towns emulated the process sooner or later, and in 2002 Lula’s successful election as president was largely based on the previous success story of these local governments.

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4.1.2. City of Madrid (Spain)

Decide Madrid is a participatory system supported by a multi-use online participatory platform (OPP), launched in September 2015 in the city of Madrid (capital of Spain) (<https://decide.madrid.es/>). For a detailed analysis of the digital tools used by Decidim Madrid, please consult 3.2. in this report. Decide has been developed as a portal of citizen participation (portal de participación Ciudadana) to support the digital and hybrid participatory processes launched by the city administration; among them the Participatory Budgeting (PB) stands out. In the terms of use, its objective is described as “to encourage the participation of citizens in the management of the city, involving them in the generation of innovative and viable ideas and proposals, in order to improve their quality of life. It is a strong commitment to a management closer to citizens that allows the city council to receive citizens’ proposals and to create direct communication channels with citizens, helping managers to make the most appropriate decisions for the general interest” (translated from Spanish by Royo et al., 2020, p. 7).²²

Decide Madrid has been developed by the municipal government by Manuela Carmena (May 2015–May 2019), which was sustained by a coalition named Ahora Madrid (Madrid Now). The coalition and its political program had a legacy with the anti-austerity protests movement led by 15M movement that claimed real popular democracy. Among the parties within the coalition, Ganemos had the greatest representation (largely composed of members of the party Podemos, in its early stages). The Carmena government designed and implemented Decide Madrid responding to its electoral commitment to democratize the municipality. In the electoral program, they stated that one of their commitments was to “implement tools for citizen participation through the Internet” (Royo et al., 2020, p. 7).

Since 2015, the City of Madrid developed and implemented a participatory system, named Decide Madrid. Its platform includes different e-participation processes (such as e-forum, e-consultation, and e-voting), mainly catalyzed in an annual participatory budgeting process. Indeed, on the one hand, a large part of those participatory processes flow into the digital PB phases, on the other hand, it has attracted the highest level of registration to the platform and participation (Royo et al., 2020, p. 2). Among the international recognitions, Decide Madrid was one of the winners of the 2018 United Nations Public Service Award. It has been awarded for its level of innovation, the encouragement of equality promoted, legal framework, and the participatory decision-making developed (UN, 2018). Decide

²² Available at: <https://decide.madrid.es/condiciones-de-uso>

Madrid also survived the political change of the city administration in 2019 (currently led by José Luis Martínez-Almeida, supported by a center-right coalition).²³

Background and context

At the national level, the “direct citizen participation in public affairs and individual or collective petitions” in Spain is anchored to the 1978 Constitution (art. 23 and 29). While Law 57/2003 specifically introduced the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to facilitate the citizens’ participation in public matters at the local level; Law 40/2015 established “the requirement for local governments to carry out online public consultations” (Royo et al., 2020, pp. 6-7). In the city of Madrid, an Organic Regulation approved in 2004 (and its subsequent modifications) regulates the participation of citizens (Royo et al., 2020, p. 7): the Reglamento Orgánico de Participación Ciudadana (Organic Regulation of Citizen Participation). In 2016, based on art. 27 of that Regulation, the Junta de Gobierno (government council) of the city of Madrid established the Decide Madrid platform and the related participatory budgeting. Since Carmena’s municipal government (elected in May 2015), the digital and hybrid participation particularly characterizes the relationship between Madrid and its citizens (or at least part of them).

The decision to develop Decide Madrid has been inspired by different legacies and political (and ideological) experiences, which converged on the promotion of digital democracy (via digital-driven participation). On the one side, the government legacy with the 15-M social movement claiming for Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now)²⁴, which provided a fundamental impetus for the candidacy of the neo-municipalist coalition that expressed it (including shortly after the direct support of a new party, named Podemos). On the other side, Carmena’s administration widely relied on technopolitical tendencies, supported in particular by the participation area spokespeople such as Pablo Soto, computer scientist nominated concejal (member of the city government), and Miguel Arana Catania, director of citizen participation of the Madrid city council at that time. For instance, Arana overtly

²³ The two post-2019 editions were not held. However, an edition took place in 2021 (transforming the tool into a two-year process).

²⁴ It was the title of the digital appeal, supported by hundreds of movements, associations, and groups—that called the street protests on May 15. The largest demonstration was in the capital, Madrid, where at the end of the march, a group of about 250 protestors decided to occupy the central square of the city, the Puerta del Sol, waiting for the regional and municipal elections of May 22 (Hughes, 2011). The media coverage of that occupation and the attempts of police repression pushed thousands of people to take to the streets alongside the first protesters, and the demonstrators multiplied in Spain and beyond. This new heterogeneous movement took the name of 15-M (May 15) and played an important role in the Spanish political debate in the following years.

predicts that direct democracy will overcome the representative one, in particular through digital tools (Arana Catania, M., personal interview, September 21, 2018). Moreover, the decision to design a participatory system led by a PB counted on previous experiences of participatory budgeting in Spain. The diffusion trend of PB in Spain began in 2001 with three municipalities of Andalusia (Córdoba, Puente Genil & Cabezas de San Juan) (Ganuza, 2010), joined by the PB of the cities of Albacete (since early 2000) and Sevilla (2004–2009), which are considered two other reference experiences. Seville, Cordoba, and Albacete largely followed the historical Porto Alegre model of participatory budgeting (Participedia, 2019). Differently, the Madrid system developed its own model, particularly combining that municipal tradition with digital participation²⁵. Indeed, Madrid developed a hybrid PB in which a significant part of the process is supported by a digital platform.

Description of the (digital) participatory budgeting

Within Decide Madrid's participatory ecosystem (institutional bodies and processes), this section focuses on the digital participatory budgeting of the city, describing its characteristics and phases. The PB is a decision-making process where citizens deliberate and directly decide how to spend a part of the public budget (Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke & Allegretti, 2012). Among the many PB adaptations and numerous variants of it, Madrid designed a digital-driven model with the following characteristics: (a) all people empadronadas/os (registered residents) in Madrid and over 16 years of age can present proposals; (b) the participants can submit proposals via the platform or at any of the 26 citizen service offices; (c) the vote can be cast online or in person. For voting online, the participants must be registered in the platform, verify their identity, and input a secure code (sent by mobile phone or email). For voting in person, the identification occurs through DNI; (d) the proposals must be oriented to city investment(s); (e) the PB budget is allocated in the investment chapter of the city total budget, it is divided between citywide projects and district-level projects (the latter received the most money in all editions); 8f) the distribution between the districts follows the criterion of population: more population, more funding; (g) Proposals must be submitted individually (although they may come from collective elaboration, by associations or groups); (h) the Juntas de Distrito (district council) should organize face-to-face spaces/events for complementing the online process; (j) the

²⁵ Podemos included in its political principles document (Podemos, 2014, Annex, c), pp. 17-18) PB among the participatory tools that the Podemos members engaged in municipal candidacy had to promote, for empowering citizens with “participar, votar y controlar los presupuestos” (participate, vote and control budgets).

participants vote for both citywide proposals and district-level proposals (selecting only one district per participant); and lastly, (k) the vote can be expressed by proxy (Nebot, 2018).

The Decide Madrid participatory system is composed of six main steps (bounded with the PB): (1) collection of proposals; (2) support phase, aimed to rank and prioritize the proposals²⁶; (3) participants' comments and discussion on the approved proposals (during a period of 45 days); (4) the assessment of the technical feasibility of the proposals; (5) the voting of the proposals; (6) the execution of the winning projects by the city council. The first, second, third, and fifth phases are carried out through the Decide Madrid platform.

The analysis of the Madrid PB experience can be divided into two different phases, corresponding to the two different governments of the city since 2015. The first phase, 2016–2019, includes the development of the tool and the implementation of four annual processes. The first PB (2016) had a total budget of 60 million euros (24 million for citywide projects, and 36 million at the district level). In the second edition, the total budget increased to 100 million euros, to finance mainly districts projects (70 million was allocated to district-level projects and 30 million to city-level projects). The 2018 and 2019 editions had a budget similar to the 2017 PB. In terms of participants, the first edition engaged 45,500 participants (including the voting phase). The number of participants increased to 67,100 people in 2017, and 91,000 in 2018. However, the PB experienced a participation decrease in the 2019 edition, in which 75,600 people participated (around 15,000 fewer participants) (Decide Madrid, n.d.). The second phase started in 2021 with a two-year PB edition, in which the proposal elaborated and voted in 2021/2022 will be executed from 2023. The 2021–2022 PB had a total budget of 50 million euros (15 million for citywide projects and 35 million for projects related to the districts), i.e., half the budget of the previous edition (2019). As yet no participants' data is available for the 2021–2022 edition.

Online Participatory Platform (OPP): Consul

The Decide Madrid OPP (Decide.Madrid.es) engages residents in submitting and voting on policy proposals and community project ideas. According to Cantador et al. (2017, p. 2) Decide is “a web system designed to allow Madrid residents to make, debate and vote proposals for the city on a variety of topics, such as transport, natural environment, urbanism, social rights, health care, education, and culture”. In particular, the inputs

²⁶ The proposals must get support from 1% of the registered residents in a period of 30 days to be approved and to pass to the next phase (Cantador et al., 2017, p. 2).

submitted in the platform flow into the idea phase of the annual PB cycle (Participedia, 2019). The Decide Madrid platform is hosted by the open-source software CONSUL (see <https://consulproject.org/en/>), the development of which has also been supported by the municipality of Madrid, during Carmena's mandate.

The digital component has been an important element of the new participatory season in Madrid, both in technical and communicative terms. On the one hand, the digital platform reduced the cost of the processes and could broaden the audience of participants; on the other, it concretised the above-mentioned digital democracy and technopolitics claims. Furthermore, the platform could count on a robust diffusion of digital technologies in Madrid, in terms of devices, connection, and use. For instance, according to Royo et al. (2020, p. 6), in 2017 91.7% of Madrid households had a broadband internet connection.

Beyond the participatory budgeting (albeit linked to it), the Decide Madrid users over the years could access different digital participatory tools (and/or processes) via the platform: debates, propuestas ciudadanas, votaciones ciudadanas, and procesos participativos. The debates allow the participants to “exponer temas que le preocupan y sobre los que quiera compartir puntos de vista con otras personas”²⁷ (expose issues that concern them and on which they want to share points of view with other people). Each debate can receive comments from the rest of the users, who can rate positively or negatively both the initial debate and the comments. In the initial phase this tool achieved a certain success, then gradually decreased—particularly after 2018—in terms of use (i.e., from 2665 debates in 2016 to 32 in 2021). The propuestas ciudadanas (citizen proposals) enable the users to submit direct proposals to the Madrid city council. The proposals that reach the support of 1% of the Madrid population (around 28,500 citizens), expressed by certified users, must be discussed and voted on by the city council. Similarly, to the debates, the number of Citizen proposals decreased over the years, going down from 6,868 proposals in 2015 to 7,917 in 2016 and then down to 1,014 proposals in 2021²⁸. The votaciones ciudadanas (citizen voting) is a participatory tool that promotes referenda on citywide proposals voted by citizens (registered and certified users only). Citizen voting can be called by the city council or via a citizen proposal, which meets the threshold of 1% support. This tool has been used for 57 votes: 2 of them via citizen proposals, both in 2017, and the other 55 from upon city council requests. Lastly, the procesos participativos (Participatory processes) are consultative processes that allow the users to propose changes and/or integrations to the

²⁷ Retrieved from <https://decide.madrid.es/debates>

²⁸ Retrieved from <https://decide.madrid.es/proposals>

legislation and regulation in force in the city (including some municipal decisions). The platform hosted a total of 122 non-binding participatory processes.

According to November 2021 data, the platform counts 450,258 registered users; among them, 269,136 are also certified (necessary condition to support a proposal or participate in citizen voting). Registrations were increasing exponentially since the launch of the platform in September 2015. However, since 2019 they slowed down to about 10,000 new users in two years, showing a significant slower trend. Nevertheless, the main problem in the platform's use has been the loss of the constant activity of the users, which is clearly visible in the drop in interactions in the platform's debates, proposals, and voting.

Impact and democratic goods

The Decide Madrid platform and processes have been designed and developed for promoting more democratic decision-making and increasing its inclusiveness. In particular, the online idea creation and support and the online voting aim at fostering the processes' inclusiveness since they are easier and less demanding for the participants if compared to equivalent in-person processes. However, the impact in terms of inclusiveness showed mixed results that imply complex analysis. Firstly, while the initial trend (2015–2017) was characterized by an increase in participation, in quantitative and qualitative terms (e.g., proposals and votes); the second phase (from the end of 2018 to today, particularly after 2019) pointed out a participation decline at all levels. Secondly, there is not sufficient data on the participants' profiles for properly assessing inclusiveness, since the platform does not allow analyses of the data by ethnic groups, genders, religious communities, and so on (although analyzing participation by district can provide interesting insights). Furthermore, the inclusiveness goal promoted by digital-driven participation clashed with the negative impact on the deliberative dimension. Indeed, the design of Decide Madrid reduced the possibility of deliberation between citizens in elaborating, debating, and deciding on ideas and proposals. It is considered the 'major flaw' of this democratic innovation, often producing decisions that do "not reflect public opinion" and do "not involve those who have a different view on a topic" (Participedia, 2019).

The lack of deliberative and collective spaces and phases is also reflected in terms of considered judgment (see Smith, 2009). Indeed, the processes supported by the platform tended to mainly promote individual participations which limited 'collective judgements', empathy (generated by the point of views sharing and dialogue), and citizens' problem-solving. Decide Madrid showed significant results at the level of 'individual judgements'. Indeed, the platform and the institutional communication through other channels provide citizens with information via technical reports, related laws, tutorials, and

so forth. This information seeks to facilitate participation of citizens and to empower their knowledge and awareness in terms of how the process works, their rights, and the participatory tools at their disposal (Royo et al., 2020). Two criticalities emerged in this regard, on the one hand, many citizens considered the information ‘not enough’, particularly “about the effect of their contributions and the progress of the projects already approved” (Royo et al., 2020, p. 11). On the other hand, some citizens pointed out that it is “not presented in an understandable way” (Royo et al., 2020, p. 11).

The Decide Madrid platform had also a significant impact on local government policy, showing positive results in terms of popular control (see Smith, 2009). In particular, in the five PB editions, the city administration allocated a total of 410 million euros to the projects. Moreover, the Madrid model tried to overcome the problem of cyclical participation called by the administration and strictly depending on the city budgeting approval. Indeed, the Madrid participatory system enabled citizens (users) to continually propose and share suggestions, ideas, and proposals. According to Participedia (2019) this resulted in “a broader range of ideas and a larger and more diverse sample within the system” showing greater flexibility, inclusiveness and feasibility compared to previous models of PB.

Lastly, the OPP participation impacted the efficiency of the participatory processes, reducing their cost and broadening the audience of participants, as well as transparency. The availability of data can be expanded, in particular with greater profiling of the participants/users; but the platform already allows levels of transparency—in terms of data and accessibility—that would be extremely difficult to achieve offline.

Challenges

The Decide Madrid PB intersects the PHOENIX project’s six challenges only in a limited way since it does not specifically focus on environmental goals. Instead, this PB is particularly useful for providing evidence, insights, and reflection on the challenges and potential aspects of individual digital participation, as this case study analysis seeks to point out. However, this section focuses on which challenge(s) the Decide Madrid PB met and how. In particular, two of the six challenges have been identified in this case (which intersect them to varying degrees) and analyzed.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizon for the policy/topic at stake

The Decide Madrid PB within the Madrid participatory system developed multi-channel processes that frame participation at different times, institutional levels, and geographical location. On the one hand, it allowed the promotion of potentially continual participation with intensification phases; on the other hand, the citizens have been invited to reflect,

plan, and elaborate proposals at different levels (mainly at the district level and at the entire city level). Although the annual (and then biannual) frequency of the PB editions inevitably influences the entire agenda, the possibility of a continuous proposal process supports constant interaction or at least provides the citizens with a tool that can be activated according to their needs and/or specific situations occurred (for example linked to climate change impact). On the contrary, Decide Madrid PB struggles to deal with medium/long-term issues, generally the most important time frame horizon for promoting systemic and lasting environmental changes.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

Probably the most significant outcome of the Madrid PB is the citizens' behavioral change generated by the inclusiveness of this democratic innovation, which has been institutionalized over time and routinised (bringing it closer to the citizens' lives). Although individual and digital participation has only partially allowed the construction of a community, the PB has favored the constitution of a 'public' at least empowering their growing demand for inclusion in decision-making. Evaluating the impact of the PB on civil society actors is instead more complex. While they may benefit from the creation and growth of this 'public', their scarce inclusion in the participatory processes promoted by the municipality (PB and various others) has been one of the elements of major conflict between the institution and the Madrid associations/organizations/social movements.

Conclusion

The Madrid PB and the entire Decide Madrid participatory system played an important role in developing a digital-driven European model of citizen participation. It is considered a reference and it inspired many other cities in Europe and the world (also further aided by the diffusion of the CONSUL software). Among its main critical aspects (and challenges), the Madrid model tended to sacrifice deliberation and without this it resulted in massive participation. Indeed, the percentage of engaged citizens is still low, even if in line with similar processes in Europe. While participation has been steadily growing in the first three editions and an institutionalization process (which survived the political change) is ongoing, the 2019 decline in participation and changes to the current two-year PB show setbacks in this democratic innovation.

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4.1.3. City of Tartu (Estonia)

Tartu, the second largest city in Estonia with a population of 97,037 residents, was the first Estonian city to introduce a local, city-wide participatory budgeting (PB) in 2013. Since then, it has allowed residents to decide on 1% of its investment budget through PB.²⁹ The non-profit foundation e-Governance Academy (e-GA) has introduced participatory budgeting in Estonian municipalities, starting with Tartu and spreading from there to 16 other municipalities.³⁰

Every year the Tartu city government allocates 100,000€ to two winning ideas that will be developed into projects. After an opening public event in which the rules for participatory budgeting are explained, all proposals, from individuals and organizations, are collected. The PB of Tartu does not have a thematic focus or a specific criterion. The only condition is that—as the budget for the PB comes from the investment budget—the proposed ideas should include (material and tangible) investment objects in the public urban space, that they should be accessible 24 hours a day and that they should not generate unreasonable costs in future budgets.

The communication department of the city, as the main coordinator of the process, analyses the feasibility of the ideas from financial, temporal and technical points of view. The project authors are given suggestions on how to improve their ideas or if possible, to join forces with other authors who proposed similar ideas. Decisions on ideas deemed as infeasible are made public on the online platform for local government's councils information system (VOLIS).³¹ Experts from the city of Tartu and external experts of the given area assess the proposed ideas. Then the deliberation phase begins, which takes place between the authors of the ideas, the external experts and the experts from the community. Thematic groups are formed: each thematic group discusses and evaluates its ideas according to the previously agreed criteria. Each thematic group must then decide which ideas from that group should be presented to the public for voting. In a hybrid event (face-to-face and streamed online) the authors of the ideas have the opportunity to present their ideas to the wider public and to solicit their support. Experts and authors of ideas deliberate and vote to create a shortlist of 25 ideas to be voted on by the public. Residents

²⁹ In the pilot project in 2013, this corresponded to the sum of 140,000€; since then, the sum has increased to 200,000 € in 2021.

³⁰ We sincerely thank Kristina Reinsalu, Programme Director of e-Democracy at e-Governance Academy (e-GA), for the interview on November 8, 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this interview.

³¹ Estonia has a well-functioning IT infrastructure that integrates the provision of e-services at local and national levels. VOLIS software, an already existing tool for local democracy processes, has been integrated into participatory budgeting so that citizens can present their proposals, change drafts and give their opinion in real time or stream a municipal council meeting (Krenjova/Reinsalu 2013: 33).

have the opportunity to raise questions and participate in the deliberations, but not to vote on the shortlist. In the final phase, every person, of at least 14 years of age who, according to the Estonian Population Register, is a resident of Tartu, can vote electronically or with a ballot paper filled in at the town hall (with three votes per person). Since this year, young people aged 14–26 who are studying at a general education school, vocational institution, college or university in the city of Tartu can also vote (without necessarily having Estonian citizenship or being registered in Tartu).

In the Estonian context, participatory budgeting promised to be a means, on the one hand, to encourage Estonian citizens to participate more actively in public life and to challenge an individualistic understanding of citizenship, and, on the other hand, to motivate municipalities to engage more with citizens. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, citizens of post-Soviet societies tend to have low trust in their state's institutions. The desire to protect themselves from a (former) intrusive and repressive authoritarian regime still shapes many citizens' perceptions of state institutions to this day. Similar to other post-soviet countries, the democratic transition in Estonia is marked by rapid institutional change and a comparatively slower development of civil society and political and civic culture (Krenjova/Reinsalu, 2013: 33). However, this seems to be a trend that has been reversed in recent years, as Estonia is above the EU average in state institutions according to EU surveys (Interview Reinsalu, 2022).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

In its first years, the participatory budgeting process attracted more or less only the 'usual suspects', middle class individuals who were already interested in local politics and knew how to advocate for their interests and concerns (Interview Reinsalu, 2022). The Tartu PB does not provide specific structural incentives for the inclusion of traditionally underrepresented communities or economically and socially disadvantaged residents. One measure the municipality is taking to compensate for the different political skills of the PB participants is to offer authors of the shortlisted ideas a lecture on marketing and communication given by a communication professor from the University of Tartu to train them to campaign for their ideas.

Kristina Reinsalu (e-GA), who as an external consultant advised the municipality of Tartu on the introduction of PB, observes nevertheless a change from citizens' proposals submitted at the beginning, which were individualistically oriented, to proposals that are now much more supported by neighborhoods or associations—although the institutional model of

participatory budgeting has not changed (ibid.). According to her, the last nine years of participatory budgeting in Tartu have made civic culture a bit less individual and more collective, also because collectively supported projects have a greater chance of winning. Some civil society associations, which had previously been more engaged in protest actions, have also embraced PB in order to draw attention to certain circumstances and to mobilize neighborhoods according to the PB calendar. This brings in new residents that are active on the neighborhood level. This is the most evident and important strength of the process.

Engaging young people remains a challenge as they are not very active in participatory budgeting. The city has lowered the voting age from 16, the usual age for local elections, to 14 for PB to appeal to more young people.

Popular Control

The voting results are binding for the municipality. Therefore, it can be argued that residents have direct decision-making power. However, the amount of the budget over which they decide is very limited.

Despite the specificity of the binding vote, the Tartu PB model resembles both the ‘proximity participation’ and ‘participatory modernization’ models of PBs developed by Sintomer et al. (2012: 21). It is comparable to the proximity participation model, in the sense that it has a low degree of politicization and a low level of mobilization, and it deals with ‘small things’ like the installation of park benches, the renewal of sidewalks, sports fields renovations or the creation of bicycle lanes. Here, participation primarily serves to increase communication between residents and the municipality. Thus, some projects do not win, but might indirectly influence the city council in subsequent years because they highlight a concern or problem of the citizens. For example, in the first year several project ideas focused on the improvement of the riverbed of the river Emajõgi in Tartu, which did not meet the needs of the citizens. None of these project ideas were ultimately funded, and yet, in recent years, the river is probably the part of Tartu that has been transformed the most by the municipality (Interview Reinsalu, 2022). The Tartu participatory budget also has elements of the ‘participatory modernization’ model, in which the state modernizes itself in order to achieve a higher level of legitimacy of public policies (Krenjova/Raudla, 2017: 12). The participation of citizens, who in this model are seen more as users or customers of public services, serves primarily to promote good management. The inclusion of marginalized groups or the promotion of social policies are not the focus here.

Considered Judgment

Deliberation is made possible by the electronic platform VOLIS, where residents can not only cast their votes but also publicly submit their own proposals and comment on the others, which allows for online deliberation. They can also participate in the hybrid event and listen to the deliberation between experts and authors of the ideas.

Transparency

Tartu participatory budgeting puts a lot of emphasis on transparency. From the public launch event explaining the rules to the publications on the city's website, social media, VOLIS platform and public space, Tartu's participatory budgeting makes significant efforts to make the process transparent throughout all stages. From the beginning, much emphasis was placed on investing in communication strategies (e.g., the use of advertising screens in the city) to mobilize residents and publicize participatory budgeting and its role in the decision-making process. The public hybrid event to discuss the shortlist of ideas also indirectly serves to inform citizens about other budget-related issues or to explain to them the background for rejections of projects, thereby educating them about the principles of local government and its budget administration (Interview Reinsalu, 2022).

Challenges

Based on the scarce data available on this democratic innovation, it is very difficult to answer in detail which challenges this case addresses. It can be assumed that two of six challenges are tackled.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

One aim of the introduction of participatory budgeting was promoting active civic participation, which seems to have succeeded, given the number of participants and the continuity of the process. As mentioned before, according to Reinsalu, the PB proposals have become more collectively oriented, suggesting that behavioral changes have been achieved through the process and that these may also influence the political culture in the long run.

Challenge 6. Increasing trust relations among participants

Participatory budgeting process in Tartu gives citizens the opportunity to engage in direct dialogue with the city administration. This, most likely, also has a positive effect on the relationship of trust between citizens, public servants and politicians.

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4.1.4. City of Budapest (Hungary)

Participatory budgeting (PB) in Budapest was first introduced at the district level in 2016 (in Kíspeszt, the 19th district) and at the city-wide level in 2020 and represents the first initiative of involving citizens in public finances.³² While the district-level participatory budgets have a very small budget, no deliberative forums and are more about developing public bureaucracy, the city-wide participatory budget has a larger budget (0.3% of the city budget) and more material and expertise resources, especially as it collaborates with the city of Paris PB and with academia. The following sub-chapter will therefore focus mainly on the city-wide PB, as it seems to be more interesting for the analysis due to the existing possibilities of deliberation and the larger budget.³³

Before describing the procedure in more detail, it seems necessary to outline some of the factors that led to the establishment of the PB and the wider political context in which it took place. During the 2019 municipal election campaign, active participation of voters in municipal decision-making became an important message and a unique selling point of opposition parties. The local elections have changed the majorities and the profile of mayors in several Budapest districts. Many former civil society campaigners entered the political stage and were elected in the districts and in the city administration. Together with the ecological party ('Dialogue for Hungary'), led by Mayor Gregely Karácsony, they brought up this hitherto new idea of participatory tools, including citizens' assemblies and participatory budgeting. The new civil society actors who have entered the public and bureaucratic administration have made a decisive contribution to the introduction of PB. Indeed, PB was not only introduced on the initiative of the mayor and the ecological party, but also in response to a need of civil society.

In general, citizen involvement in public decision-making in Hungary is not always welcomed by either citizens or civil servants, and in any case is not a matter of self-evidence. This can also be deduced from the fact that even the word for 'participation' is not familiar in the Hungarian language. Therefore, PB is called 'community budgeting' in Hungary. To

³² We sincerely thank Gabriella Kiss, ecological economist and associate professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest (Institute of Business Economics), for the interview on November 17, 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this interview. Kiss observed the process and advised, together with Daniel Oross, political scientist at the Center for Social Sciences, the Budapest city administration on the PB.

³³ To understand the political context, it should be pointed out that the financial autonomy of local government has decreased in recent years. In 2011 the act CLXXXIX reduced the power of local governments and increased the state power over them (Klotz, 2021: 150). In 2020, the central government cut their budget significantly. As a result, the municipalities also had to cut their PB budget and there is very little budget for development. There is no reasonable hope that they will be able to increase it soon. Due to the lack of budget, some districts were not able to introduce PB (Interview Kiss, 2022).

reverse this tendency, the city council established a new department called ‘Open Budapest’ which is responsible for participation and cooperates with other departments in the administration. While some departments have been restructured to embrace participatory ideas, others are still reluctant even to accept the concept of participation. The Budapest administration is thus currently in an ongoing transformation phase.

The city has held several in-person events throughout 2020 in preparation for the PB. These include public information forums, brainstorming sessions, and online office hours to discuss and submit ideas. The ideas could be submitted online and had to fit into one of the three categories: social care, green Budapest, and the whole Budapest (Klotz, 2021: 157).

A forum with experts from the municipality is organized to advise citizens on their potential project ideas. In the first phase, around 700 ideas were generated. In the second phase, the municipality checks the feasibility of the ideas and develops them. After a list of technically feasible and eligible project ideas (around 200) has been created, citizens are invited to discuss these ideas. In this third phase, the municipality organizes ‘participatory councils’ with residents of Budapest to draw up a final shortlist of projects that is sent to the voting phase (approximately 40–50 ideas). The vote of citizens for the projects is binding.

The city conducted communications campaigns with forums to make the PB known and more accessible, but the emergence of the pandemic forced the city to switch to an online format. The challenge of the city PB is the administrative problem that no citizens are attributed to them, since citizens ‘belong’ only to the district. This is an odd situation resulting from the two-level administrative situation. The municipality tries to cope with this problem by increasing their efforts regarding communication. For example, the process used gamification in the form of a card game adopted from the Finnish PB “OmaStadi” to stimulate suggestions for project ideas and to develop feasible and implementable ideas during the public information forums. Different packs of cards were prepared, tailored to the respective areas and criteria in the municipality politics. Gamification is a method often used in participatory and deliberative processes to increase interest and participation. Nevertheless, the fact that the city lacks a citizenry remains a challenge to the success of the PB.

Framing of Climate Change

Budapest as other municipalities in the European context, declared a climate emergency in November 2019. PB as opposed to the climate assembly that was also organized in Budapest in 2020 deals more with day-to-day issues and did not address climate change directly. However, PB shows what kind of problems the citizens are facing with regard to

climate change and sustainability in their daily life. This helps public authorities understand which areas should be further developed and where public money should be spent.

Still, participatory budgeting has a green category, where ideas for ‘climate change adaptation and environmental sustainability’ can be submitted alongside ideas that promote the expansion of green spaces (cf. Petrov, 2021). Gabriella Kiss indicates, however, that so far, the category has been mainly used for planting trees, community composting or providing an access point to the river Danube. This is also due to the fact that there is little awareness of climate change among the Hungarian population, as the central government does not address the issue very much. Climate change is hardly represented in public discourse and the media.

Overall, the municipality focused more on the possibility of public participation and emphasized less the ecological struggle in PB, since participatory processes are new and little known in Hungary.

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

The final election, which can be made anonymously, namely without identifying oneself at the level of the city, makes it difficult to evaluate how inclusive the PB is and who exactly participated in it, as there is no data available. There is also no information about the effectiveness of the OmaStadi game in Hungary, but it was evaluated in Finland. In terms of inclusion, the game was found to reduce the time and resources required for participation, thus allowing more citizens to participate in the process. However, the game also has a tendency to occasionally favor potentially resourceful and active citizens because of their strong ideas, personal charisma or authority (Wiberg Sode 2020, 95).

Popular Control

The final vote of the citizens is binding. However, the budget that citizens will vote on in participatory budgeting is small. Due to the above-mentioned budget cuts and the mandatory duties that the municipality must perform, it cannot increase the budget for the PB. According to Gabriella Kiss, this is why the Budapest PB is more of a bureaucratic reform for generating ideas rather than a democratic one. The Budapest PB model resembles therefore both the ‘proximity participation’ and ‘participatory modernization’ models of PBs developed by Sintomer et al. (2012: 21). It is similar to the proximity participation model, in the sense that it has a low degree of politicization, since it deals with ‘small things’ like the installation of park benches or the creation of bicycle lanes. Here, participation primarily serves to increase communication between residents and the municipality. The

Budapest PB has also elements of the ‘participatory modernization’ model, in which the state modernizes itself in order to achieve a higher level of legitimacy of public policies. The participation of citizens, who are seen here more as users or customers of public services, serves first and foremost to promote good governance.

Considered Judgement

There is definitely a deliberation dimension to the PB, as various forums are organized where citizens can come together and discuss the different project ideas. However, there is little data or evidence to assess the quality of deliberation, as the PB is still very recent.

Regarding the ‘OmaStadi’ game, in terms of the quality of deliberations, Andreas Wiberg Sode points out that there is evidence in Finland that high deliberative quality may be hindered by the strong attachment of some players to their own ideas, which makes them reluctant to consider the opinions and perspectives of other players. Occasionally, the game also favored potentially resourceful and active citizens due to their strong ideas, personal charisma, or authority. (Wiberg Sode, 2020: 95).

Transparency

The PB still has very little visibility and is hardly known among citizens. In today’s design, it cannot be said that the PB increases the transparency of the budget. The municipality’s communication campaign faces real challenges as it has no direct communication channel to the citizens. For example, unlike the district, they do not have a newspaper that is sent directly to the citizens. In addition, this is aggravated by the fact that the media, which are controlled by the central government in Hungary, hardly report on it. Furthermore, there is also a lack of general knowledge within the population about what is a good and feasible idea for the PB. This will probably take a few more years for citizens to better understand the process and become familiar with it.

Besides, the economist Gabriella Kiss stresses that the municipality should strive to make the whole budget more transparent, not only the part for the PB. Initial efforts have already been made, such as a hackathon, to develop accessible and comprehensible visualizations for the budget.

Challenges

Four of the six challenges are being addressed to varying degrees by the case.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

The PB helps to better understand how the local government works and its limitations vis-à-vis the central government. It also helps to better understand what kind of projects can be implemented by the city (including ecological projects) and which projects are already planned by the city.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

The introduction of participatory budgeting had the declared aim of promoting civic participation. It puts citizens in a position to cooperate with the local government and motivates them to seize their own space for action (up to a certain extent). According to Klotz, the initial results of participatory budgeting are encouraging, as citizens are getting involved both in submitting project ideas and voting in elections (Klotz, 2021: 155).

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

The PB does not directly address the EDG, but through the green criterion it leaves a margin to deliberate on ecological issues, potentially reducing conflict. However, there are no data available to make more precise statements.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

Since the PB gives citizens the opportunity to engage in dialogue with the municipality, this will most likely also improve the trust relationship between citizens, civil servants and politicians. According to Oross and Kiss, politicians indicated that they see “PB is an effective communication tool that connects politicians with citizens” and therefore supported the introduction of PB in Budapest (Oross/Kiss 2021: 14).

In addition, the ‘OmaStadi’ game is also intended to strengthen the (trust) relationship between the citizens.

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4.1.5. Cantón de Cuenca (Ecuador)

In the Republic of Ecuador, the ‘cantónes’ are second level administrative divisions of the national territory: thus, a type of local government (GAD). Overall, there are 221–spread among 24 provinces–and, in turn, they can be subdivided into parishes (both urban and rural). ‘Cantons’ have a binary governmental structure, as there is a “jefe politico” (appointed by the President) and also an alcalde (mayor), who coordinates a municipal government–the mayor is elected by inhabitants by universal suffrage for a four-years term in a single electoral round.

The ‘Cantón de Cuenca’–which has some of the largest Inca ruins in the country - is developed around its capital and main city, Santa Ana de los Ríos de Cuenca (commonly referred to as Cuenca). The latter is also the capital of Azuay Province, located in the south-central part of Ecuador, in a zone of highlands, where mountains reach 4,500 m, and where the national park of El Cajas and the largest hydroelectric plant in the country (on the river Paute) are located. Other rivers are Tomebamba, Yanuncay, Tarqui and Machangara.

Called ‘the Athens of Ecuador’, the city of Santa Ana de los Ríos de Cuenca is located at 2,560 m above the sea level, and was founded in 1557 by Gil Ramírez Dávalos, and named after the Spanish City of Cuenca. While the capital of the cantón–listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site–has around 330,000 inhabitants, the cantón itself has almost double that (around 661,000). Cuenca features a mild subtropical highland climate, alternating rainy (between March and May) and dry seasons (between June and December): rains are more intense. A large part of the territory of the Canton of Cuenca has a conservation designation, reaching 75% of the territory due to its natural ecosystem conditions. Moorland areas cover 36% of the whole canton.

The area is a production center for flowers growing and manufacturing of textile industry and car tires, furniture and other crafts (such as the famous Panama hats). Farming and beekeeping have shrunk in the last decade, but are still important for the city economy. The canton also has kaolin, plaster, limestone, sand and carbon mining. Recently the production of electrolytic hydrogen has been intensified to improve its role in sustainable development. Cuenca hosts four Universities (the Universidad de Cuenca, established in 1867, being the most important).

The canton is under the administration of the mayor of Cuenca, who is also the president of the council. As Cuenca is the capital of the Azuay province, the main offices of the Azuay Governor Office and the Azuay Prefecture³⁴ are also located in the city.

The canton is divided into 15 urban parishes and 21 rural parishes. In accordance with the provisions of the Decentralization Law, the number of council members proportionally represents the population of the canton: 15 + the mayor, in the case of Cuenca. The most vast rural area, Molleturo, covers around 1,000 Km², and is located about 1.5 hours by car from the capital. Despite the rural part of the canton being home to around 35% of inhabitants, only 1 of the 15 members of the Municipal Council is elected by them. Currently—since May 14, 2019—the Mayor of Cuenca is the businessman Pedro Palacios Ullauri.

Participatory Budgeting in Cuenca

Since the beginning of the new millennium, and especially after the approval of the New Constitution (2008)³⁵, Ecuador has been an important reference for issues related to the citizens' rights to participation (Navas, 2014; Santos, 2010), in spite of the capacity of inserting them in the legal framework aimed to guarantee fairness and justice (Loor, 2020) is often considered more outstanding than the concrete experimentation of democratic innovations. The latter are often marked by relevant degrees of tokenism that affect many of them, included participatory budgeting practices (PB), which are enshrined in the constitution itself (Art. 100, Art. 267) as an important tool of citizens' participation (Paño-Yáñez & Torrejón-Cardona, 2018; Pilay Toala, 2013).

The PB of Cuenca's cantón is one of the oldest experiences of participatory budgeting in the country, which in the mid-1990s started developing its features, to respond to social pressure, especially in relation to the basic rural needs. Formally, PB was introduced in 2001 with some specific characteristics. The main one is that it has been applied to the 21 rural parishes and their villages only (which represents 230,000 inhabitants), and not to the town center of Cuenca. Somehow, this formula was viewed as a sort of 'compensation' for a vast area that has no properly proportional representation in the municipal council, which runs

³⁴ The Prefecture, sometimes also called the Provincial Government, is directed by a citizen with the title of Provincial Prefect of Azuay, who is elected by direct suffrage in a single formula together with the vice-prefect candidate, and .is responsible of the maintenance and creation of road infrastructure, tourism, education, among other tasks.

³⁵ <https://www.ambiente.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/09/Constitucion-de-la-Republica-del-Ecuador.pdf>

the cantón. Moreover, since the beginning, there have been attempts to link PB with local economic development and solidarity economy, to stimulate the increase of social capital /especially as regarding women's equality) and to reactivate the traditional community-based collective work typical of Andean America, known as 'mingas' (see Cabannes, 2004).

During the 20 years of its implementation, several new features were gradually introduced in order to incrementally achieve higher levels of equality and incorporate wider diversity among participants, inside a vision of PB as part of a participatory democracy 'ecosystem' (OIDP; 2020). An explicit source of inspiration for the PB has been Rosario (in Argentina), which happens to be a sister-city of Cuenca's cantón.

It must be stressed that PB was born with the specific goal of promoting quality of life (in a 'buen vivir' or good life perspective) and community empowerment, especially among non-organized citizens. In fact, those organized (as often occurs in Ecuador and other Latin American countries) already had forum and other spaces of social dialogue with the cantonal and municipal institutions (OIDP; 2020). However, PB is coordinated also with other pre-existing institutes of social dialogue. For example, the inter-parish committee which makes final decisions on how to invest resources, is composed of both individual participants and representatives/speakers elected in villages for accompanying public policies of the municipal government (Cabannes, 2003).

Co-management, co-execution and control of implementation of all policies and projects that use cantonal resources are central characteristics of the Cuenca's PB, and are supported by a series of training spaces (with specific attention to empowerment and capacity-building of women) that aim at giving more deliberative quality to decision-making, granting a more evidence-based mapping of real needs and priorities of the different communities, and favoring the creation of shared vision of development based on common understanding of more pressuring urgencies and common interests.

On the internet, there are very few references to the rural PB of Cuenca's canton, which were mainly conducted through public face-to-face meetings until 2020, being that procedures have not changed much since 2001. Conversely, in 2022, an URBAN PB for the 14 urban parishes of Cuenca began to be very visible online³⁶, when—since Covid pandemic—a wide spread effort was done to promote the integration of PB with the digital platform

³⁶ <https://www.cuenca.gob.ec> and especially:
<https://cuencaparticipa.cuenca.gob.ec/processes/presupuesto2023>

‘Cuenca Participa’ <https://cuencaparticipa.cuenca.gob.ec>). This has been provided by DECIDIM—an environment co-funded by the municipality of Barcelona that offers an open-source software and technical assistance to different cities around the world.³⁷ The platform is a central tool of the open government portal of the Cuenca Cantón.³⁸

The structure of the new urban PB is almost similar to that of the rural PB and implies a cycle of phases that start on July 1st, and last until the end of October. Phase 1 is dedicated to ‘preparatory assemblies’ (15 days between end of July and mid-August), when citizens present their needs and capture them on the cards delivered according to the axes of the Territorial Plan (PDOT) and dialogue with delegates of each dependency, public company or other municipal entities. Among the main topics are: mobility and connectivity, environment, economics, infrastructures, cultural/socio activities. In this phase, the municipality also presents information on the works and projects executed in each parish during the previous year; as well as the projects that could be executed in the new year, and any new projects which are being considered. Phase 2 (technical analysis) lasts one month (between mid-August and mid-September), to verify the feasibility and technical and economic relevance of citizens’ proposals that will be displayed in the voting phase. In phase 3, a series of citizens’ assemblies prioritize works and services that will be part of the 2023 budget, according to people voting. The municipality also prepares the draft budget which incorporates the PB most voted projects. The mayor convenes a cantonal assembly, where the municipal budget is announced and approved. Preliminary projects start to be elaborated in December for their implementation in the next year. The progress of the projects can be accompanied on the participatory platform ‘Cuenca Participa’ and are monitored by appointed ‘follow-up and monitoring citizens’ assemblies’, whose composition comprises inhabitants with a two-year mandate (but criteria for selection are not clarified in regulations, so cannot be displayed here).

PB also relies on a preliminary ‘diagnosis phase’ (January-June) in which the municipality carries out a diagnosis of the citizen requirements and works carried out in each parish, creating a matrix which is shared with the representatives and the citizens observers, and published on the Cuenca Participa platform and on the institutional web portal www.cuenca.gob.ec.

³⁷ <https://decidim.org>

³⁸ <https://cuencaendatos.cuenca.gob.ec/>

In the last decade, according to cantonal data, around 20% of the population has participated directly in the participatory budget process, or at least in its voting phase (OIDP, 2020), with almost 60% of the attendees being women.

In terms of governance structures, at the canton level, the directorate-general for Participation and governance is the body in charge of coordinating PB and its relations with decentralized entities in collaboration with the directorate-general of appraisals and cadastres, which have some overlapping responsibilities, although its main goal is in the field of production of detailed information that can be used in the participatory processes. Since its origin, PB is also strongly articulated with territorial planning, especially now that the distributional mechanisms must relate rural needs and the search for forms of sustainable development. In the past—as is still provided by the main Regulation of PB (Ordinance n. 281/2008)—it was the general directorate for Planning (and mainly its unit of rural development) in charge of the rural PB (Cabannes, 2003). External knowledge is brought in from local and foreign institutions for cooperation (including international organizations and NGOs) that strengthen both the parish governments and the citizens and their organizations. This explains why the directorate of international Relations (DGRIC) has also some visible degree of involvement in Cuenca's PB.

Regarding the volume of resources used for PB, since 2001, when the initial process was carried out, the 21 rural parishes of the cantón received more than 100 million dollars (according to the local authorities) for the implementation of around 4,000 projects (Cabannes, 2020). In the first year, the dedicated amount was US\$ 1.2 million and reached US\$ 19.5 million by 2020 due to the success of the program and the added resources linked to the Bicentenaries of the Independence, with an average of US\$ 6 to 8 million per year in the last decade. It is worth noting that a rule gradually introduced in the last decade obliges parishes to allocate at least 10% of PB resources for the planning and execution of social plans and projects that benefit socially vulnerable groups.

The most recent data from 2020 shows that Cuenca—in the last three years—has allocated an average of US\$ 35.9 per inhabitant for rural PB out of an overall executed budget of US\$ 322 per inhabitant (averages for 2017, 2018 and 2019), and a massive US\$ 116 per inhabitant for urban and rural PB in 2018 (Cabannes, 2020).

The main ruling act of PB (Ordinance 281/2008) contains a mathematic formula created to better distribute cantonal resources dedicated to participatory processes, on the basis of some variables that intend to “reduce subjectivity and allow for the strengthening of local technical skills”, while providing a fairer and more equitable distribution of resources of the

cantón government, and a better alignment of community choices with local, national and international priorities.

The formula—although developed by the government along with some academics—has been presented publicly in parish meetings, and is at present being revisited to insert some environmental new variables (see OIDP, 2020), so to be a sort of ‘social algorithm’. It is a complex mix of different parameters, that require careful calculations and updates (which are not always easy).

Framing of Climate Change

The Cuenca’s rural PB is a rare case of a hybrid model between a territorial-based and an actor-based participatory-budgeting. In this perspective, the prevalence of the open territory and its needs made environmental and ecological issues structurally central in the device.

Ecuador is a country characterised by medium vulnerability and low readiness to change, according to the ND-GAIN Country Index and the Global Adaptation Index map (based on data provided by the University of Notre Dame³⁹). In Cuenca, the 21 rural parishes show the highest levels of poverty and migration; their exposure to environmental hazards is “mainly due to the hydrological system and its effects on water resources, and mainly floods. The changes in the rainfall regime lead to runoff and lack of water availability. This has caused rivers or streams to overflow, affecting agricultural areas and some sectors of urban areas” (Cabannes, 2020).

However, the first decade of PB was devoted to compensate for years of socioeconomic marginality of the 21 rural parishes, so it is not surprising that the majority of projects requested related to basic infrastructure of these areas. However, since the beginning, some were able to conjugate environmental and development concerns.

The typologies of projects approved have changed markedly in two decades: from initial basic infrastructures (related to water, street paving and sport/cultural equipment) they moved to more innovative PB initiatives, including some to support local food chains and

³⁹ Vulnerability to climate change is based on indicators from six domains (food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat and infrastructure). Readiness is defined as the country’s political, economic and social capacity to adapt to climate change.

short agro-ecological circuits, such as projects that support the cultivation of native species (Cabannes, 2020).

This ‘natural trend’ of transformations pairs well (especially since 2017) with a new approach of the cantonal government, which highlights the centrality of a shared reflection on the climate change challenges, and especially on adaptation and mitigation measures. To bring attention to this shift, specific new mechanisms of parish participation have been developed: among them, thematic parish assemblies and community meetings, and the policy of empty seats to represent the presence of invisible actors (as nature, future generations, people who died in catastrophes, etc.). Also, a fund of additional resources was established, to allow for rural development linked to a debate on climate emergencies.

Thus, in the years of 2017 to 2019, a growing trend of the municipality (and its plans) has favored a further change in the nature of projects discussed. Evidence on which cause-effect mechanisms determined such change is not totally clear, but the percentage of climate-change-related PB projects approved in relation to the total number of PB projects reached 77% (Cabannes, 2020, p. 39), with a much higher proportion of ‘adaptation’ projects (47%) in relation to ‘mitigation’ ones (23%), which are usually more frequent in European cities (*ibid.*).

The pilot program began in 2017 and has been implemented since 2018. Its specific characteristics are focused on: (1) citizen participation and co-responsibility in the planning, prioritization, execution and management of works and projects related to adaptation and mitigation of climate change; (2) development and land management plans have been generated, mirroring the territorial and biophysical environments, by each of the rural parishes; (3) inter-institutional management is shaped around principles of multilevel forms of co-governance (an example could be the management committee of the Machangara river basin, born in 1998). The latter—respecting the conservation framework—allows the generation of electricity (through ELECAUSTRO enterprise) and the provision of water both for irrigation in the parishes of Ricaurte, Sidcay and Checa, and for human consumption in the city of Cuenca; (4) the decentralised process tries to strengthen – through processes of training and knowledge-transfer coordinated by the cantón government—the autonomy and institutional capacity of Parish Governments, as they are in charge of implementing PB priorities; (5) and lastly, in 2020 an environmental indicator was integrated into the formula to reward parishes that perform better in environmental protection and also to support those that need support the most. This update and complexification of the index are based on the idea that institutionalising transparent

procedures and accountability must take into account community strengths and vulnerabilities.

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness is ambiguously pursued. In fact, on the one side, the rural PB is in itself a tool for redistribution and inclusion of previously marginalized territories, and the distribution formula strengthens this opportunity of generating more fairness and equity. Thus, in the last two decades, Cuenca substantially increased its funds dedicated to rural areas, compensating for many years of marginalization, and improving infrastructure, rural equipment and social programs to a huge extent. Citizens are active in follow-up and monitoring, as in ‘community mingas’ (horizontal spaces of collaboration for the planning and execution of works and projects), where women prove to be particularly active. Thanks to the PB ordinance, they must contribute with labor, materials and participation in at least 10% of the project. This aspect refers to what Cabannes (2004) has called as the institutionalization of the consideration of ‘avoided costs’, i.e., the savings in maintenance budgets/current expenditures which made possible thanks to the willingness of the communities to maintain the infrastructure projects that result from the participatory budget.

The gradual enrichment of the distribution formula–taking care of environmental vulnerabilities–helps to reinforce the consideration of rural groups, and together with training sessions contributes to what Mancero Acosta (2017) called the process of conformation of ‘plebeian citizenship’ that rescue marginalized voices. On the other side, the “open door methodology” used for PB meetings does not guarantee the consideration of intersectionality (i.e., rural inhabitants with other multilayered discriminations). While a lot of attention is given to women (in articulation with the equal opportunity plan), there is little evidence that young and elderly people–as well as other vulnerable social groups–receive special attention, guarantying their presence in central moments of the PB cycle. Some studies indicate that this does happen, but –beyond the rhetoric of local government–it is difficult to find data and descriptions of how inclusiveness is pursued as a central goal of PB.

Popular Control

The presence of citizens at the core of several activities that go from the proposal of policies and projects to their co-implementation and assessment guarantee an advanced level of ‘popular control’. But it must be stressed that there are no formal spaces where the

regulations and the methodologies of the PB format are reviewed and amended ‘with’ the active contribution of citizens.

Considered Judgment and Transparency

The PB’s concerns with ‘considered judgement’ are ambiguous, as the spaces for training and information are limited—and the dialogues with expertise happen mainly with civil servants, not with independent experts—and do not produce much written material. However, a recently structured web-portal⁴⁰, is being linked to the Citizen Observatory. It is a mechanism of social control comprised of citizens and citizen organizations that are interested in developing jointly with the academy and experts, diagnoses, technical and independent follow-up to promote, evaluate, monitor and oversee compliance with public policy (for example, decisions on security policies—see CPCCS, 2020). Such tools have also contributed to improving the democratic good of ‘transparency’, whose main limit has been the reduced systematization of the information produced by the municipality. PB does not display much of the information produced, thus not appearing as an important epistemic space. The Decidim platform ‘Cuenca participa’ is still undervalued, and as a result is only a minimal tool for making the urban PB function. The rural PB appears only in scattered press-releases, which deal with single parishes, and only when they sign the final PB agreement for receiving the municipal resources every year. No comparative tables and no time-series exist for the sake of the general public and interested researchers. Financial data are published but not in a systematic way; no data exists about number of participants, and previous editions of PB. In this perspective, the attention to transparency leaves doubts on its importance, and does not help to generate a ‘virtuous circle’ to contribute to defend and value the other democratic goods.

Challenges

As PHOENIX challenges are not necessarily similar to those imagined in Cuenca (in terms of goals and scale), tracing the contribution of Cuenca’s experience to reach them is not an easy task. It is worth noting that the major explicit challenges envisaged in Cuenca do not specifically refer to environmental and ecological issues, but mainly to the goal of overcoming the socio-territorial exclusions of rural areas, and promoting their self-governing capacity through the strengthening of local social capital and the efficiency and effectiveness of proximity institutions (the parishes).

⁴⁰ ⁴⁰ <https://www.observatoriocuenca2070.com>

Nevertheless, the series of measures created to make PB more effective points out some directions that could help to address some of the challenges posed by EGD.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/ topic at stake

The PB cycle has been structured in order to align with the annual budgetary cycle, and is connected to larger planning/development frameworks, in a way that make it effective for dialoguing with Challenge 1. By being repeated annually (and guaranteed by a local regulation and a constitutional framework that make it almost mandatory) discussions with citizens on complex issues, such as those related to climate change are made possible.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations and Challenge 5 Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the transition pathway

The training and monitoring spaces created to increase the capacities of citizens and administrators offer a contribution to Challenge 2 and Challenge 5.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies and cooperation among stakeholders' responsibilities in a transcalar and interscalar perspective, and Challenge 4 favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership and Challenge 6 Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants involved in the codesign of the transition pathway

The obligation of having at least 10% of co-funding coming through the promoters of local PB proposal can be viewed as a space of 'co-responsibilization' of citizens in relation to their proposal; and the co-management and co-monitoring in the implementation phase represents a useful start for matching with Challenges 4, 3, and 6. The math formula used for the distribution of resources in the parishes (and especially the ongoing discussions of its transformation, adding environmental indicators) is an important tool, and an opportunity for discussing socioenvironmental justice with inhabitants.

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4.2. Mini-publics

4.2.1. Citizens' Convention for the Climate (France)

Because of their success, the Irish citizens' assemblies (see Section 4.2.3.) constitute a point of reference for experiments in other countries. This was the case for the French Citizens Convention for Climate convened by the president Emmanuel Macron in 2020–2021, which was explicitly inspired by its Irish predecessor. However, beyond formal similarities and explicit transfers, the Irish and the French cases embody two different models.

A first major difference is that whereas the first two Irish citizens' assemblies sought mostly to decide between a pair of choices which had already been outlined (legalizing or not the right to same-sex marriage or to abortion), the French Citizens Convention for Climate has been tasked with elaborating a set of proposals in response to the question which represents its official purpose: how to “reduce the French emissions of greenhouse gas by at least 40% compared to 1990, in the spirit of social justice.” In doing so, its members must rely upon various solutions proposed by experts (Tilikete, 2020), choosing between them and sequencing them in a relatively coherent project. The magnitude and complexity of this issue is inherently much bigger than the issues tackled in Ireland (and more resembles the Icelandic National Forum, which had proposed a kind of catch-all program, far less coherent than the final set of proposals of the French Convention) (Cordier, 2021).

The second difference relates to the political dynamics of the respective assemblies (Courant, 2020: 487–207). In Ireland, the aim of those convened by the government is to reach impartial decisions, thus embodying a feature of sortition which has been central throughout history. Although not perfect, the device is carefully conceived with this perspective in mind, using neutral bodies to organize and moderate the assembly, offering public hearings of experts and stakeholders defending pro and contra views, and prohibiting citizens from communicating with activists or lobbyists during or in-between sessions. Convening citizens' assemblies is a way to get out of a deadlock: this Catholic country seems to be mature enough to constitutionalize same-sex marriage or abortion, the government is in favor of this move but needs additional legitimacy to take a step forward, as its opponents are quite virulent and mobilized, and the leading parties remain divided on the issue.

In France in 2019–2020, the process unexpectedly took another path. For a few months in fall 2018, the Gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement—initially protesting against a socially unjust carbon tax—launched a radical although non-partisan protest that paralyzed the country and backed the president into a corner. To find a way out, the president convened a ‘Great Debate’ from January to March 2020 (see section 4.4.3.). In spring, this event was somehow successful, politically speaking: together with a severe crackdown on the Gilets jaunes, it helped to shift the agenda and stabilize the situation. However, the crisis of

representation persists. The main democratic claims of the Gilets jaunes movement were introducing the citizens' initiative to the French political system, and to a lesser extent, creating a permanent citizens' assembly 'to defend the people's interests'. Some ecologist movements also include a citizens' assembly among their objectives. Priscilla Ludosky, one of the most visible figures of the Gilets jaunes, worked with ecological activist Cyril Dion to create a new association, Gilets citoyens (Citizens' Vests). Converging with public intellectuals on the use of sortition, they demanded the creation of a citizens' assembly for the climate.

Without both the Gilets jaunes movement and Emmanuel Macron, the Citizens Convention for Climate would never have taken place: this paradoxical convergence is quite interesting (Cohen, 2020; Pech, 2021). The French president, who had previously been vocal but not very active on environmental issues, seized the opportunity to be on the offensive. Rejecting the institutionalization of the citizens' initiative, he decided to convene a Citizens Convention for the Climate, and promised that its proposals would be submitted 'without filter' either to a referendum, or to a vote in parliament, or to the government for direct regulatory application. The event was combined with a proposal to reform the constitution and transform an old neo-corporatist body, the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE), into a chamber for citizen participation including citizens selected by lot in addition to organized civil society. In this context, supported by the political will of a powerful president and with the backing of an official commitment, a budget of 5 million euros, and a crucial mission to design the future ecological transition of an important European country, the Citizens Convention for Climate appears to be the most influential sortition-based experiment thus far.

Convened quite quickly, with a government administration that had no real idea how to do so, and which thus relied on citizens' associations such as Open Democracy, and a negotiation between the Presidency, the Ministry of Ecology, the Gilets citoyens and the CESE (Fourniau, 2021), the Convention has quite a peculiar organizational structure. It is characterized by a certain level of improvisation, which has positive aspects—it paves the way for innovation, and is not merely the reproduction of ready-made models—but also negative ones: a number of decisions are not the result of informed choice. The two co-presidents of the governance committee are Thierry Pech, CEO of the center-left think-tank Terra Nova who had been involved in Macron's presidential campaign, and Laurence Tubiana, France's former Climate Change Ambassador and Special Representative for the 2015 COP21 in Paris, and a key architect of the resulting Paris Agreement. The governance committee includes some of the citizens of the Convention, academics, NGO representatives, and members of the CESE. The activist Cyril Dion is one of three

guarantors. A group of permanent experts is also crucial for the Convention, which began in October 2019. Due to the complexity of the matter, the 150 citizens were split into five thematic sub-groups, which work in parallel sessions and regularly meet together.

The Convention is viewed with skepticism by traditional business lobbies, a majority of former Gilets jaunes activists, the political opposition, and a number of environmental NGOs, either because they feel that this is a presidential manipulation, or because they refuse the legitimacy of a mini-public selected by lot, or because they have strong doubts as to its potential efficiency. Conversely, a majority of ecologists and sortition activists, a minority of former Gilets jaunes figures, some public intellectuals, and advocates of deliberative democracy have real hopes for a breakthrough in both the fight against global warming and for democracy. The Convention has gained significant visibility in the French public sphere and cannot be compared to previous deliberative mini-publics.

The Convention has rapidly faced unexpected circumstances, however. In the winter of 2019–2020, a huge strike by railway and subway workers against a reform of the pension system made meeting in Paris more difficult. Then came the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown in spring 2020. Consequently, a large part of the work was delayed and had to be conducted online. The stakeholders representing traditional industry did not take the convention seriously, so the balance of the public hearings tilted in favor of ecologists, especially when Nicolas Hulot, a major environmentalist figure, was invited to speak to the Convention. This was reinforced by the active presence of Cyril Dion, and by the fact that contradictory debates are not a priority in the device. Despite the circumstances, work continues apace at a high level of deliberation.

At the beginning of April, the government prepared a stimulus package to address the economic crisis provoked by the pandemic, with little concern for the ecological transition. The Convention thus appeared to run the risk of becoming just a foil with no impact on important decisions. In order to avoid this outcome, part of the governance committee suggested that the Citizens Convention make a series of proposals public before its whole plan was completed. A large majority of the Convention members voted for this proposal, resulting in a deep rift in the governance committee (Pech, 2021). Some believed that the Convention overstepped its role and subverted the political division of labor between a citizens' assembly and the elected authority, with the first fulfilling the mission entrusted to it by the second, which provides the only legal source of legitimacy.

In doing so, the Convention became a new political actor, one with a certain margin of autonomy, a kind of third assembly (Fourniau, 2021) along with the lower chamber and the

upper house; the Convention thus had much more visibility than the CESE (legitimacy of this sortition body somewhat competing with that of organized civil society). This process of politicization was only enhanced by the existence of radical ecological movements, which realized the importance of what was happening and seized the opportunity to get in touch with Convention members, invite them to events, and thus indirectly influence deliberations (Gaborit, 2021)—something which was prohibited in Ireland. Delayed because of the pandemic, the Convention interfered with local elections and a conflict between the president and his prime minister, who opposed the Convention but was sacked at the end of June, 2020, precisely when the Convention came to an end. An overwhelming majority of the Convention adopted 149 of the 150 proposals issued by its subgroups. The global result was quite interesting, although some proposals were ultimately less coherent than others and some issues such as nuclear energy were overlooked by the agenda. In any case, with its goal of reducing French emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 40%, the Convention has proved more ambitious and consequential than any of the policies previously adopted by the French government.

Emmanuel Macron publicly announced that he accepted 146 of the 149 proposals, including a constitutional amendment declaring that preserving the “rights, freedoms, and principles” set out in the constitution “cannot compromise the preservation of the environment, the common heritage of humanity”. Although the president would have liked to place a series of proposals on a referendum, he was forced to renounce this due to the Senate’s hostility, given that the government is minoritarian in this assembly. At the same time, the idea of a referendum was also thwarted by the fact that a majority of the Convention’s members did not believe that the people at large would approve of their recommendations, which seemed too radical to be accepted by citizens who had not experienced the deliberation process, and to find enough partisan allies. In fact, however, polls would later show that a majority supported most of the Convention’s program. After the end of the Convention, some of its members accepted entering into discussion with the parliamentarians who elaborate legislative proposals. They also created an association to follow up on the results, which hosts difficult debates about the necessary political stance to adopt. In addition, a number of former Convention members have taken part in protests or even joined opposition parties. Tensions among mini-publics are a common phenomenon that increases proportionally with the size of the group and the length of the procedure. In the French situation, the politicization process increased tensions remarkably, and a number of citizens abandoned the work. In addition, if sortition recognizes the equality of all citizens, a person who is chosen and who experiences a high visibility because of the media and the crucial importance of the issue, after having been

initially an ‘anybody’, becomes a ‘somebody’. This reinforces the conflicts of personalities and makes more difficult the return to a ‘normal’ life (Pech, 2021: 65ff). The situation was made all the more difficult by the fact that the parliament and the government whittled down the more ambitious recommendations: the promise of proposals being submitted ‘without filtering’ turns out to be illusory. The political majority had not anticipated such a radical plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and consequently did not know what to do with it. Traditional economic sectors had thought the Convention was only a facade, and lobbied against it afterwards. Conversely, the Convention became a touchstone for nearly all environmental NGOs, left-wing parties, and activists during the 2021 Global Climate Strike, with French actors criticizing the government at the same time as its legitimacy was strongly challenged by right-wing parties. The apex was reached on February 28, 2021, during the final semi-official session of the Convention: 96 of its members gave feedback on the translation of their proposals, with an average score of 3.3 out of 10, which revealed a quite negative assessment of parliament and the government. To the question “How closely do the government’s decisions resemble the original CCC proposals?” the average score was even lower (2.5 out of 10).

It is notable that, starting with the Irish model in mind, the French Citizens Convention for Climate ended up more closely resembling a different model. The Convention did not remain an impartial body in charge of making proposals to resolve an impasse, but became a new political actor, a citizens’ assembly claiming a form of legitimacy that could be opposed to the traditional elected powers, and which could be potentially be part of a new system of checks and balances. To put it crudely, it followed the paradigm of an assembly, not of a jury (Pech, 2021; Fourniau, 2021; Sintomer, 2023). Both models can be praised or criticized, and the concrete experiments they led to are far from perfect, but the appearance of a new one is worth noticing. Must sortition necessarily serve to accomplish neutral deliberation thanks to its potential for impartiality? Conversely, should deliberative mini-publics with their specific traits (members have no personal political careers to defend, they are organized interest groups and high-quality deliberation is ensured) become a political actor among others, entering the political conversation in alliance with social movements? Right-wing parties and traditional business associations have criticized the French Citizens Convention for the Climate because of its bias; what would environmentalist and left-wing movements have said if the influence had come from industrial lobbies? Is this scenario even possible, or are there sufficient elective affinities between deliberative mini-publics and the common good to render citizens’ assemblies more or less immune from the bane of particular interests?

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4.2.2. Citizens' Council on 'Climate-Future' (Vorarlberg, Austria)

In July 2019, Vorarlberg became the first regional state in Austria to declare a 'climate emergency'.⁴¹ In September 2019, the Austrian federal government also passed an Austria-wide resolution corresponding to the Vorarlberg proposal. This means that Austria recognizes that anthropocentric global warming is a crisis and that the measures taken so far are not sufficient to limit it. The decision mandates government and administrations to develop measures that are more ambitious than the status quo and try to reach the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Climate Agreement at every scale (Report Vorarlberg, 2021: 1).

The citizens' council was launched on the initiative of three citizens, who collected 1,278 signatures and led to Governor of Vorarlberg, Markus Wallner, commissioning the Office for Voluntary Engagement and Participation to organize a regional citizens' council on the topic of climate. The regional citizens' council on Climate Future Vorarlberg is already the third citizens' council initiated by Vorarlberg citizens with over 1,000 signatures.⁴²

The process for holding the citizens' council in Vorarlberg involves five steps:

(1) A kick-off meeting is held with the relevant stakeholders to create a common starting point for all those involved in the process and to clarify the content-related and organizational issues. The timetable, the different process steps, the remit and organizational aspects were decided on together. The government; politically responsible persons at the regional level, such as representatives of the regional parliament; experts from the administration and NGOs; and institutions affected by the topic take part in the kick-off meetings. If, as in this case, the citizens' council was initiated by citizens, then the citizens who initiated it participate in the kick-off meeting.

(2) The citizens' council convenes. On July 2 and 3 2021, 20 randomly selected citizens (single stage random selection by age, gender and place of residence) spent one-and-a-half-days discussing the remit "How can a joint approach to the great challenge of the climate crisis succeed in Vorarlberg? Where does politics need us? Where do we need

⁴¹ We sincerely thank Michael Lederer, head of the Office for Voluntary Engagement and Participation and responsible for the implementation of citizens' councils in Vorarlberg for the Interview on November 8, 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this interview.

⁴² The right of citizens to initiate a citizens' council exists since the amendment of the state constitution of Vorarlberg in 2013. It is stipulated in § 5 paragraph 6 of the guidelines of the Vorarlberg regional government for the convening and implementation of citizens' councils and Article 1 paragraph 4 of the Vorarlberg regional constitution. Participatory democracy, alongside representative democracy, has since been recognized in the state constitution.

politics?” The remit is formulated in such a way that it is about finding out what is important to citizens, not their expertise on a particular topic area. It is also about emphasizing the common denominator and therefore asking not only what can politics do, but also how citizens can contribute to improving circumstances. The citizens worked as a group to develop jointly shared recommendations to policy makers.

(3) After the citizens’ council has deliberated, a ‘World Café’ is organized where the results of the citizens’ council are publicly presented by participants of the citizens’ council. Around 100 people, including regional governor Markus Wallner, took part in the event, exchanged views on the core topics and enriched the results with further perspectives. The political decision-makers give initial feedback, depending on which topic is dealt with. This can involve the state parliament or government or the municipal level. From the organizers’ perspective, it is very important to involve the stakeholders concerned, such as the chamber of agriculture and to give them the opportunity to comment on the issue. For example, discussion rounds are held in which it is asked what the participants of the World Café can support, what is also important to them and what has been forgotten and needs to be supplemented.

(4) The feedback group is formed, consisting of the stakeholders who have already participated in the kick-off meeting as well as representatives of the citizens’ council. In some cases, new members are included who are identified only as stakeholders through the citizens’ council. The aim is to examine the results in terms of their usefulness and feasibility, as well as to make possible links with existing policies visible.

(5) All results of each step of the process are collected in the final documentation. This documentation is sent to the participants and handed over to the regional state government.

The state government deals with the proposals submitted. Afterwards, the citizens’ councils receive feedback on how the results will be dealt with. This feedback is then publicly available on the state’s website (Report Vorarlberg 2021: 3).

The council uses a specific facilitation method called ‘dynamic facilitation’. According to this facilitation method, citizens are asked to empathize with the decision-makers by asking questions such as ‘If you were a state minister, what would you do? What would be important from your point of view?’ The facilitation method as well as the remit questions are strongly solution-oriented (Interview Lederer, 2022). Whereas classic facilitation follows a linear process and first discusses the problem before moving on to generating ideas, in dynamic facilitation everything happens at the same time. In this method, invented by Jim

Rough, all that people bring to the citizens' council—their own ideas and perceptions—are first taken into account and written down. Central to this is that all points of view are accepted and participants are also protected from being judged by other participants. Dynamic facilitation is meant to create a self-organizing dynamic. It is designed to follow the energy of the group, which is more important than any pre-set agenda, with progress taking place in 'shifts' of insights, feelings and awareness. This process builds confidence and new skills through a creative thinking process called 'choice-creating' (Hellrigl/Lederer, 2014).

The choice-creating process prevails over decision-making. That signifies that, in the citizens' councils there is no voting at any point, but the positions are elaborated collectively according to the 'challenges–solutions–concerns' mode. If at some point in the process no more concerns arise, then a common position has been found. This process is very consensus-oriented. The scientific evaluation on the citizens' council on climate has recommended that a minority report be made possible so that views that differ from the consensus on certain issues can be better represented (Ehs/Toth 2022, 54). Overall, the method of dynamic facilitation and facilitation in general was rated very positively in the evaluation.

Framing of Climate Change

Since the citizens themselves decide which topics they want to discuss, the topic of climate change is being addressed through issues that are reflected in people's everyday lives, as the issue of restricting lifestyles, such as not eating meat or not travelling by planes (Interview Lederer, 2022). A total of six thematic fields were identified: (1) Awareness campaigns to educate people about climate change; (2) reward and incentive structures to encourage climate-friendly behavior; (3) resource management (e.g., promoting renewable energy); (4) mobility (Creating car-free cities and making public transport affordable); (5) addressing the global framework of climate change (stopping the exploitation of developing countries); and (6) the role of politics and participation (Report Vorarlberg, 2021: 8). Concerning the aspect of participation, the citizens emphasize the need for a citizens' council with decision-making power, e.g., a nature conservation ombudsperson and the institutionalization of an independent climate council including citizens and qualified actors with party status.

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

As already mentioned, the citizens' council can be initiated by the citizens themselves with the help of at least 1,000 signatures on an issue that they suggest. Michael Lederer points out that in the first years after the constitutional amendment, this right of initiative was little used by the citizens. He explains that the random lottery procedure used for the constitution of the councils was considered by many citizens to be inappropriate for a direct representation of specific interests, especially since citizens' councils –in contrast to citizens' action groups–are open-ended processes in which no particular concerns can be brought to the table. However, since the first citizens' council was initiated by the people in 2017, the situation has changed and four of the last five citizens' councils were initiated by the citizens themselves (Lederer Interview, 2022). This shows that the citizens' councils, which have existed since 2006, have been gaining in popularity and acceptance in recent years.

A weak point of the citizens' council on climate, according to a central result of the scientific evaluation by Tamara Ehs and Katharina Toth, is the lack of representativeness. The group of participants was very homogeneous in terms of social status, age and educational or migration background and did not represent 'Mini-Vorarlberg'. Both selection procedure and the recruitment process of the participants were mainly responsible for this. In particular, young, socially disaffected people as well as immigrants from Turkey and South-Eastern Europe were missing from this citizens' council process (Ehs/Toth 2022, 52). They recommend having a polling institute help out in recruiting participants and also that the outreach participation method be used. According to this method, the organizers seek out participants at home or at specific recreational facilities to mobilize them to participate in the citizens' council. In this way, people can be reached who are not already politically active.

Another closely related reason for the insufficient heterogeneity of the citizens' council is that participants' attitudes towards climate change are not taken into account as a criterion in the selection process. As participation is voluntary once the sortition is made, it is always the most motivated who participate. This means that the majority of participants are already convinced that climate change is an important public problem (Interview Lederer, 2022). The involvement of climate deniers and other hard-to-reach stakeholders is consequently hardly achieved.

The organizers have taken this criticism seriously and are applying a more complex, two-stage random selection process for the next citizens' council in 2023. They are also considering introducing compensation or a daily allowance to create group-specific incentives for participation.

Popular Control

The fact that citizens themselves decide which topics they want to deal with gives them a certain degree of agenda-setting and decision-making power.

According to the Office for Voluntary Engagement and Participation, for the first time in the history of the Vorarlberg citizens' councils, all administrative units affected by the content were obliged to submit a statement on the results of the citizens' council by mid-January 2022. Feedback from the politicians to the participants and the public is essential in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the entire deliberative process (Ehs/Toth, 2022: 50).

However, since the citizens' council does not produce a catalogue of measures and recommendations, but rather formulates societal guidelines, the results produced by the citizens' council can often only be observed months or even years afterward. This poses a challenge of communication with the participants in the citizens' council but also with the wider public, to make it clear that the policies taken were inspired by the citizens' council—particularly as participants cannot be expected to follow the institutional impact or policy measures for years after the citizens' council (Interview Lederer, 2022).

Considered Judgment

The process is strongly focused on deliberation between the citizens. During the day-and-a-half that the citizens' council meets, no experts are consulted. But this does not mean that the council operates completely without any expertise. Before the council is held, the Office for Voluntary Engagement and Participation prepares the topic for discussion and gathers the various positions of experts. All citizens' council participants receive the information in advance. Sometimes participants receive classic information material, sometimes they are also given online videos of interviews with experts which can be viewed before the council. The main difference with citizens' assemblies is that direct cooperation with the experts is not sought during the council's deliberations. The initiators of the citizens' councils explicitly distance themselves from citizens' assemblies, criticizing that the recommendations formulated by the citizens end up being very similar to the recommendations of the experts who appear as witnesses in the citizens' assemblies. In contrast, in citizens' councils, the interconnection with the expert knowledge is sought

afterwards in the feedback group. This is to strengthen the deliberative moment, i.e., the joint negotiation of the issue. The focus of the deliberation is not directly on measures, but rather on values. Although citizens' councils also suggest some concrete proposals, the decisive goal is rather to find out how the society stands on a problem and what is needed in terms of cultural change and joint cooperation to address this problem (Interview Lederer, 2022).

Transparency

In general, transparency is ensured by the citizens' council. At the beginning of the citizens' council, the members of the steering group introduced themselves and were approachable for the participants. Furthermore, methods and codes of conduct for the process were clarified and not changed during the process. In particular, the final documentation sent to participants at the end of the process helps to ensure a high level of internal transparency. The wider society can also view it free of charge on the website. The evaluation recognized the high level of transparency but recommended that a better explanation of the functioning and objectives of the citizens' council should have been already included in the invitation letter.

There is relatively active media coverage of the citizens' council. Nevertheless, the organizers want to work out a new communication model in order to achieve an even greater and better-quality media coverage (Interview Lederer 2022).

Challenges

Five of the six challenges are met to varying degrees. The challenges the case addresses follow.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

According to the evaluation, many participants had already dealt with the topics of climate and politics beforehand and therefore did not learn much new in the citizens' council. However, some of them became aware of certain complex topics, such as e-mobility, which was discussed intensively in the citizens' council Climate-Future Vorarlberg (cognitive learning). With regard to e-mobility, one citizen says that the reports from developing countries on how lithium is mined have given him second thoughts about whether this is the right way to go. The discussion, he stresses, opens the horizons because one is confronted with other opinions and facts and can question oneself (Ehs/Toth, 2022: 33). Participants reported that the small group discussion gave them a better understanding of different perspectives. Some also realized how difficult it is for politicians to agree on

measures and finally make decisions on such a complex issue as the climate crisis (ibid., 47).

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

The process is centered on the municipal and regional level, namely on Vorarlberg, and contributes to optimizing synergies among stakeholders in an interscalar perspective. The organizers stress the importance of these two scales to ensure that the regional government can respond to the recommendations of the citizens' councils and not argue that decisions on this issue can only be taken at national or EU level. (Interview Lederer, 2022).

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

The evaluation of the citizens' council on climate has shown that a large number of the respondents, after participating in the citizens' council on climate, now want to become more active in climate protection themselves or together with others. It is also evident that participation in the citizens' council on climate facilitates changes in personal attitudes towards the climate crisis. Furthermore, it has been shown that the participants have now developed a better understanding of measures to counteract climate-damaging developments. In contrast to the control group, the participants of the citizens' council are clearly in favor of the increased promotion of vehicles with alternative drive systems (electric, fuel cell, hydrogen, etc.) and against new registrations of fossil-fueled vehicles from the year 2030 (Ehs/Toth, 2022: 52).

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

An important recommendation made by the citizens is to establish more deliberation opportunities and also permanent deliberative bodies for the climate crisis where they can engage in nature protection and the fight against climate change (Report Vorarlberg, 2021).

Participation in the citizens' council fulfilled the need for cross-party dialogue and action. Many participants remarked that although they want to get involved, this opportunity is blocked by party politics. According to most participants, the climate crisis in particular can no longer be tackled with mere party politics. Several participants expressed the need for more instruments of non-partisan or cross-party deliberation. In this respect, the citizens' council is perceived as a positive exception and a break from party politics (Ehs/Toth, 2022: 32).

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

In the evaluation, Ehs and Toth indicate that trust in democratic institutions as well as in Vorarlberg state politics has not increased much by participation in the citizens' council, but it has not been negatively influenced either (Ehs/Toth 2022: 3).

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4.2.3. Citizens' assembly on climate change (Ireland)

Ireland gained significant experience in deliberative democracy in the decade of the 2010s: first with the constitutional convention (2012-14), which addressed gay marriage and the end of the ban on blasphemy, among other issues, and then with the citizens' assembly (2016-18). The citizens' assembly covered five issues over eleven weekends, including abortion rights, aging populations, climate change, and the manner in which referenda are held as well as fixed-term parliaments. The distinctive feature of Ireland's experience with deliberative democracy is that four proposals developed by the citizens' assemblies were put to a national referendum, and three were accepted by the people. The following text deals mainly with the two weekend sessions of the citizens' assembly on climate change in October and November 2017 (which was not submitted to a referendum).

The government launched the citizens' assembly based on a parliamentary resolution passed by both houses of the Irish Parliament, the Oireachtas, which established the citizens' assembly and charged it with examining a number of issues and reporting back to the Oireachtas. The expert advisory group assisted the chair and the secretariat in developing a comprehensive work program for the assembly on each of the topics and in advising on the criteria for the selection of experts to appear before the assembly. The secretariat, composed of civil servants and state officials (who are appointed by the Prime Minister) managed logistics. The steering group consisted of the independent chair, the secretariat, and a representative group of assembly members elected by the citizens' assembly. The group contributed to planning and operational issues related to the work program (KNOCA, 2022).

The themes and the agenda are determined by the secretariat, the chair and the expert advisory group. However, participants can make requests to discuss the functioning of the assembly. For instance, they have changed the order of the five topics discussed and extended the duration of the deliberations. Thus, citizens have been given an additional weekend for the climate issue—originally scheduled to be discussed in one weekend only (Ireland Citizens' Assembly, 2018; Harris, 2021: 223).

The assembly consisted of 99 citizens, randomly selected in terms of age, gender, social class and regional distribution, and the chair, Justice Mary Laffo (a retired supreme judge), who presided over the debates. The remit that the citizens were asked to discuss was widely defined: "How the state can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change". During the first weekend, citizens addressed climate science, climate change impacts, and energy policy. The second weekend focused on energy, transport and agriculture sectors and developed the assembly's final recommendations. These sectors have been identified as the largest sources of emissions in Ireland (KNOCA, 2022). The assembly received 1,205 public submissions on the topic (of which 1,180 were received online and 1,185 were

published on the assembly's website) coming from nongovernmental organizations, representative groups, advocacy groups, political parties, business enterprises, academics, and individuals (Harris, 2021: 224). They submitted messages or written reports to participate in the deliberations on the climate. According to the assembly's website, the public submissions played a key role in assisting the secretariat and the expert advisory group in developing the work program on climate change and may ultimately influence the recommendations of members to the Oireachtas Chambers (Ireland Citizens' Assembly, 2018). Devaney and colleagues (2020) note that the majority of submissions included a call to action (63%). Interestingly, 69% felt that the government was responsible for addressing climate change (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 11), since Ireland is lagging behind other European countries in the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions—although it was one of the first states to declare a climate crisis. The urge to call on the state to act is also reflected in the recommendations, as nine of the thirteen recommendations directly address the state.

According to Harris (2021: 223), one of the truly unique aspects of the constitutional convention and the citizens' assembly was the involvement of civil society and stakeholder panels. These sessions acknowledged various forms of knowledge and sometimes even included personal testimonies and stories.

After the first weekend, members were asked to suggest issues they would like to vote on or see on the ballot paper. Based on these suggestions, the chair and the secretariat, with the assistance of the expert advisory group and the steering group, prepared the questions, which were then submitted for deliberation to serve as the draft ballot paper. The original draft of the ballot paper was then sent out to the entire citizens' assembly before the second weekend session. During the week before the second session, comments, suggestions, changes and remarks were solicited from the participants. Participants contributed by email, in writing, orally and through feedback from the roundtable discussions on the second weekend (Report Ireland Citizens' Assembly, 2018: 17). When the ballot was accepted each of the 13 recommendations was voted on by secret ballot (majority vote). As Devaney and colleagues point out, climate change deliberations received the highest score of all the issues examined, with 80% or more citizens voting for each recommendation (Devaney et. al., 2020b: 142).

Framing of Climate Change

The citizens' assembly framed climate change in four categories: (1) it decided to put climate change at the center of policymaking; (2) it addressed energy policy; (3) transportation; and (4) agriculture and land use policy. In addition, the citizens' assembly

made four complementary recommendations that addressed issues such as packaging, waste reduction, and information campaigns.

Devaney and colleagues find that the participants of the citizens' assembly would also have wanted to deliberate about non-humans: "the impact of climate change on biodiversity loss, including on bees, coral reefs and fish stocks, is an important framing. Moving away from cost-orientated framings was also seen as important" (Devaney et. al., 2020: 15). This is an important lesson for future citizens' assemblies.

In conclusion, the influence of the Irish citizens' assembly on climate policy is considerable. It has undoubtedly contributed to the new governance and accountability structures sketched out in the Climate Action Plan, and the mitigation and adaptation measures it proposed have been widely adopted (Harris, 2021: 230).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

The polling agency successfully met the gender and age targets, but was less successful in recruiting citizens with regard to the socio-economic and regional targets. Farrell and colleagues (2020) note that lower socio-economic groups and farmers are significantly under-represented in the citizens' assembly, while middle and upper middle classes are significantly overrepresented. Harris cautions that it is very concerning from a climate policy perspective that lower socio-economic groups and farmers are under-represented since Irish farmers have a fundamental role to play in meeting the challenge of climate change, particularly as their direct contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions is essential (2021: 227). This social representation of the assembly is also reflected in the recommendations. For example, the recommendations of the citizens' assembly do not address climate justice, just transitions and energy poverty—apart from the third recommendation, which specifies that the poorest households should not pay the carbon tax (Report Ireland Citizens' Assembly, 2018: 30). Harris suspects that the fact that the citizens' assembly did not pay its members fees for their participation, combined with the increasing casual and precarious nature of the work, may have made participation at weekends impossible for some.

Another criticism relates to the conditions of participation. In order to participate in the assembly, participants must be registered in the electoral roll and be allowed to participate in a referendum. This means that only people who have citizenship and are at least 18 years old may participate in the citizens' assembly. Making participation in the assembly

conditional on holding Irish citizenship is restrictive and inevitably excludes people affected by the issue, such as foreigners who have lived in the country for years.

This criticism aside, however, it should be pointed out that Irish citizens' assemblies have a participatory basis, incorporating perspectives and knowledge through public submissions and discussion sessions with leaders or representatives on the relevant discussion topic.

Popular Control

As most citizens' assemblies, the participants advised the government on the policy area in question, but had no final decision-making power. A special parliamentary committee, Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action (JOCCA) was established in July 2018, which influenced the government's Climate Action Plan 2019 and subsequent Climate Action Bill 2020, to evaluate and respond to the assembly's recommendations. It has considered the 13 recommendations over seven months and provided a considered response to each one (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 7). The JOCCA developed the citizens' recommendations into 42 priority recommendations and 39 supplementary recommendations, such as a comprehensive revision of the state Framework Climate law of 2015 (Harris, 2021: 226). While the committee widely accepted the citizens' recommendations, it rejected the central proposal for a general carbon tax and a greenhouse gas tax on the agricultural sector.

Yet, it is important to note that, according to Devaney and colleagues' findings, participants wanted their recommendations to be supplemented by further expertise, cost estimates, and evidence-based input so as not to overemphasize, or rely exclusively, on their input (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 21). One of the most important lessons of the citizens' assembly relates to the need expressed by citizens for coherent and consistent government leadership on climate change (ibid., 15).

Considered Judgment

Deliberation in the Irish citizens' assembly worked as follows: In one room there are 14 tables with 7 citizens each. The experts all have the same speaking time of 20 minutes. All tables hear the same experts and deliberate at the same time (at each table). Unlike the French citizens' assembly, the composition of the tables changes every weekend, consequently citizens mingle and always engage in discussions with other citizens (Courant, 2020: 323). This helps to unleash the 'collective intelligence'. Table moderators ensure that all citizens have the same opportunity to speak publicly, regardless of differences in social background, age, gender, etc. The survey conducted by Farrell and colleagues (2020) shows that the overwhelming majority of assembly participants were satisfied with the quality of the deliberative process over the eleven weekends. Participants

indicated that they felt they could express their opinions freely and that they had sufficient opportunity to express themselves. Devaney and colleagues state in their study that participants particularly praised the organization of the roundtable discussions and “the range of speakers who addressed the Assembly, with particular appeal associated with the international experts who could speak of climate action successes in their own countries” (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 13).

Transparency

The citizens’ assembly plenary sessions are broadcast live on the website and all assembly-related documents are available free of charge online. Additionally, the fact that parliamentary committees had a special role in responding made it transparent, accountable and legitimate. The concern for transparency is thus truly present in the Irish citizens’ assembly. However, as Devaney and colleagues note, participants were not aware of the JOCCA, which was set up to take the recommendations forward in the policy process. This suggests the need for better transparency and feedback to citizens after the assembly has concluded (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 1).

Challenges

Five of the six challenges are met to varying degrees.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/topic at stake

The challenge of establishing an adequate time frame horizon for climate change was met by following up citizens’ recommendations through a series of action plans and draft laws.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

Participants highly lauded the learning experience of taking part in the citizens’ assembly on climate change (Devaney et. al., 2020a: 13). This suggests that, despite the complexity of the issue, they now better understand climate change.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

The interlinking of the citizens’ assembly with stakeholders at the national level (especially through the JOCCA parliamentary committee) contributes to synergy optimization in an interscalar perspective.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

The fact that the general public was able to contribute to the citizens' assembly through the public submissions helps to strengthen the deliberative dialogue on the European Green Deal.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

There is hardly any data available to indicate the trust relations among different participants. However, it can be assumed that the high satisfaction of the participants with the citizens' assembly process also strengthens trust.

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4.2.4. Climate Assembly (Budapest, Hungary)

The first local citizens' assembly was held in the city of Budapest in 2020.⁴³ The city, led by Mayor Gregely Karácsony, leader of the ecological party "Dialogue for Hungary", declared a climate emergency in November 2019 and has since began to review the city's climate strategy (Oross/Mátyás/Gherghina, 2021: 2). At the same time, the municipality decided to hold a citizens' assembly and has sent requests to different non-governmental organizations (NGO) to let them decide on which topic the assembly should be held. The British Sortition Foundation, who had won an international competition to organize a citizens' assembly in Hungary, contacted the European Climate Foundation, and agreed with other local NGOs on the issue of climate change. The Hungarian NGO DemNet Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights organized and facilitated the assembly while the Sortition Foundation advised the municipality on institutional and procedural issues and facilitated the lottery process. Before convening the assembly, the city administration promised to incorporate the recommendations developed by the citizens' assembly into the city's new climate strategy, which will be voted on by the Budapest city council in early 2021.

The citizens' assembly consisted of 50 randomly selected citizens, who spent two weekends in September 2020 discussing how Budapest should tackle the climate emergency. Participants were invited to discuss with politicians, experts and representatives of NGOs to give general guidelines for the new climate strategy for Budapest.

During the first weekend, 11 experts presented important topics, which were then discussed by the citizens in small groups with the help of moderators. The participants formed seven working groups and made a combined total of 21 proposals on the challenges and consequences of climate change for city residents. At the end of the first day of the second weekend, the proposals were discussed and evaluated in plenary. After the evaluation the 11 most supported proposals were edited by leading experts from the municipality and similar proposals were brought together to form eight coherent proposals. At the end, the participants ranked the eight recommendations by priority (Oross, 2021: 3). According to Oross, the ranking of recommendations is an interesting and specific feature of this case, as it allows citizens to indicate not only what goals the city should set for tackling climate change and how to implement them, but also in what order of priority they should be addressed (Interview Oross, 2022). As promised at the beginning

⁴³ We sincerely thank Daniel Oross, political scientist at the Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Political Sciences, Budapest (Hungary), for the Interview on November 3, 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this Interview. Oross and three scientists were asked to participate as observers, but not to form an official scientific supervisory body.

of the process, the city administration integrated the citizens' recommendations into the city's new climate strategy. However, it did change the order of priorities.

The strength of this citizens' assembly lies in the fact that it could serve as a role model for other municipalities in Hungary. It has also helped to further develop and enrich civil servants' views on civic participation. Since 2020, Budapest has had three citizens' assemblies and two Citizens' Juries and other cities such as Miskolc have begun holding either citizen's assemblies or participatory budgeting (ibid.). A second citizens' assembly for the climate was held in Budapest in September 2022. The report on this has not yet been published (as of November 2022).

Framing of Climate Change

Due to the way in which the citizens' assembly has been established and the novelty of the process in Budapest, as described above, the topic of climate change came up only secondarily. The municipality's focus was primarily on holding the first citizens' assembly, especially since Karácsony's promise to strengthen the participatory rights of citizens was already included in his electoral program (Oross/Mátyás/Gherghina, 2021: 2). Here, the encounter between the democratic innovation and the topic of climate change is more or less contingent.

It was a very challenging task to make the participants understand this broad and abstract remit of tackling climate change and at the same time, to create a link between the broad remit and the concrete policy proposals (Interview Oross, 2022). Another challenge in this context concerns the responsibility of the municipality, as citizens should think only about measures that are actually within the city's competence. This was not easy for the citizens to grasp, since climate change is a global problem.

The topic of climate change was very broadly defined and focused on issues of relevance to citizens and present in their everyday lives such as traffic management and mobility, residential energy use, rainwater usage and green spaces.

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

The participants were selected according to the two-stage random selection procedure. They were selected to reflect the Budapest population over 18 years of age as to sex, education and place of residence.

In order to attract participants from marginalized social backgrounds that tend to be underrepresented, the organizers have provided compensation (10.000 Forint equivalent to 27 Euro) for participation. In the written survey conducted at the end of the process, some participants from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds indicated that compensation was a motivating factor for them to participate in the citizens' assembly. Unemployed participants, stated that the perspective of contributing something meaningful to society as an unemployed person motivated them to participate in the citizens' assembly (Interview Oross, 2022).

Nevertheless, the well-educated participants were in the majority, especially as several participants, who happened to be the economically less advantaged participants, cancelled their participation at the last minute. The lottery procedure was repeated several times to redress this imbalance, but it could not be completely remedied (ibid.). In addition, some participants also stated that they did not have access to the internet at home. Accordingly, they could not view PowerPoint presentations or other materials provided by the experts before, or after, the assembly.

Popular Control

As already indicated, the task of the citizens' assembly was elaborated by the NGOs. The citizens have adapted it to the competences of the municipality and have decided on policy proposals as well as their implementation.

However, the current political context in Hungary makes the direct participation of citizens difficult. Even if the mayor, who is part of the opposition, is in favor of direct citizen participation, his political position is marginal in the political system dominated by Orbán's Fidesz. The question of participation is controversial both on the side of the citizens and on the side of public servants and the administration. The issue of participation is even more contentious than the question of climate change already controversial in Hungary. Some participants make it clear that they do not see it as their task to develop public policies and think that by electing their delegates, they give them the right to shape policy—they do not want to be "bothered". Public servants, who are sometimes more 'gatekeepers', than 'gate openers' (Interview Oross, 2022), often convincing citizens that they, unlike citizens, have a lot of experience, and that it is indeed their responsibility to develop public policies. Accordingly, some citizens feel that they do not understand their role in the citizens' assembly.

Considered Judgment

During the two weekends, the citizens were introduced to the environmental aspects of climate change, so that they could gain an understanding of the issues. However, one controversial topic kept coming up in the deliberation and needed moderation: the punishment of polluters. The city administration and the moderators have made it clear to the citizens that it was not a question of imposing particularly strict penal regulations. But since the idea of punishment was so strong in the assembly and appeared at various points in the deliberation, the facilitators decided to keep it and just rephrase it. Therefore, the eighth recommendation contains the idea of cancelling climate-damaging projects and integrating climate protection into the approval process of projects. In any case, punishing other citizens is not part of the deliberative ideal. This suggests that either the deliberative norms have not been sufficiently communicated to citizens or that these norms are too alien to the political culture that citizens have known so far to be able to implement them.

Transparency

Internal transparency, meaning that participants were informed about the conditions of their participation, was observed.

However, the external communication and transparency are the weakest part of the process, because public involvement was very weak. This also has to do with the wider national context, where polarized public opinion prevails. The public service media mostly ignore the issue, while the far-right media report on it exclusively in a very negative tone. Therefore, the first citizens' assembly in Hungary remains a largely unknown procedure for the general public, who are neither informed about the existence of nor the functioning of this democratic innovation and its role in the decision-making process. According to Oross, only one national channel mentioned the citizens' assembly and very few newspapers covered it (Interview Oross, 2022).

Challenges

Since very little data is available on the case, it is extremely difficult to make firm statements about the challenges. On the basis of the information available, the case merely addresses one challenge.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

Although, as described above, the deliberative process has not been without conflict, the resolution of the conflict can be considered successful. The facilitators managed to take the

edge off the conflict that would have led to the exclusion of certain citizens, as they were still able to redirect the punishment of polluters in a constructive way. The redirection of punishment to polluting projects rather than individuals attenuates the conflict and foreshadows how controversial and opposing perspectives of EGD can coexist.

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4.2.5. Ida-Viru Youth Climate Assembly (Estonia)

The Ida-Viru Youth Climate Assembly, the first climate citizens' assembly ever held in Estonia, was organized by the Estonian Fund for Nature and Rohetiiger. The Estonian Fund for Nature (ELF) is an independent non-governmental organization promoting nature conservation using expertise, innovative solutions and support from a wide range of stakeholders. Rohetiiger (The Green Tiger) is a network and a cross-sectoral cooperation platform that aims to create a sustainable and socially more just economic model.⁴⁴

Ida-Viru is one of fifteen counties in Estonia. The north-eastern part of Estonia has high reserves of oil shale, the main mineral mined in the country. A significant proportion of the population lives from shale oil mining, an environmentally damaging activity and Estonia's largest polluting industry.⁴⁵ The shale oil is used in the power plants and petroleum industry that are also located in this region. The largest proportion of employers registered in Ida-Viru are in the oil-shale sector (40%), which has however been declining since 1990. The population of Ida-Viru is ageing rapidly and declining as young people move away from the region due to high unemployment (twice as high as in the rest of the country) and very low wages (Murula, 2021). Another special feature of the region is that, due to its proximity to Russia, over 80 % of the inhabitants in are Russian-speaking or have Russian citizenship. Another part of the population has no citizenship and is stateless, which limits their political rights to the local level, where they do have the right to vote.⁴⁶ In addition, citizens in this region are less active politically compared to the rest of the country. They are more engaged in cultural activities (dancing, singing or gymnastics), but they have lower voter turnout and higher levels of corruption. Given these social, political and economic conditions of the region, the first objective of the citizens' assembly was to promote the fight against climate change and a just transition process (from the shale oil industry). The second objective was also to create an opportunity for a more active citizenship for the youth (Interview Lauring, 2022).

Moreover, the specific focus of the citizens' assembly on youth and the climate is linked to the process of its emergence. Rohetiiger aimed to organize a climate citizens' assembly.

⁴⁴ We sincerely thank Maiu Lauring, co-organisier for the organisation Rohetiiger of this Youth climate assembly, for the Interview on November 16, 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this Interview.

⁴⁵ The oil shale industry in Ida-Viru accounted for over 50% of Estonia's total greenhouse gas emissions (Sergejev, 2022: 10).

⁴⁶ When the Estonian government attempted to restore Estonian statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it introduced a citizenship policy that required most non-Estonians who were born in Estonia or moved there after 1940 to go through a rigorous naturalization process. This led to an unprecedented level of statelessness. The naturalization procedure discriminates against the Russian minority living in the country in particular (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

While preparing for the assembly, they learned that the European Just Transition Fund will provide funding to the region to support its ecological transition. As the Estonian Fund for Nature was able to mobilize additional funds for the youth of Ida-Viru, Rohetiiger and the Fund for Nature decided to bring these two issues, environment and youth, together in a citizens' assembly. Consequently, they lobbied the Ministry of Finance for a youth climate assembly, which accepted this proposition and officially hosted the assembly (Interview Lauring, 2022).⁴⁷

The information materials for the participants were drafted by the two organizers and only submitted to the lead experts for correction or possible additions (ibid.). Apart from this, the two organizers, despite their advocacy on the environment, have remained as neutral as possible and have asked stakeholders and experts to present different perspectives on the issue (Jõgeva, 2021: 4).

The citizens' assembly held three one-day meetings between November and December 2021, in which a total of 21 participants aged 16–29 took part. The organizers intended to use a two-stage lottery procedure using an algorithm on national registry data to ensure an accurate representation of youth in the region. However, after the first selection round, so few participants came forward that they simply took all those who had registered (Interview Lauring, 2022). In the first two sessions, participants gathered knowledge about climate policies and listened to stakeholders, and in the third session they formulated recommendations.

The participants have studied the remit how to ensure that the transition to a climate-friendly future is fair for young people. They were asked to give feedback on the Just Transition Plan, which has already identified policy instruments and target groups. The young people decided which parts of the plan should be highlighted, which solutions were important to them and what they considered to be missing. They helped to emphasize the important aspects of the fight against climate change from their point of view and to give a detailed idea of the changes they would like to see.

First, they developed eight criteria for a fair and socially just transition after listening to a social science researcher's input on social justice. The criteria must be met for both the just transition plan and the climate assembly proposals to be considered supportive of the

⁴⁷ The assembly was funded by the European Union. It was part of the project "Climate action by European citizens delivers for development" implemented by 20 European NGOs (Jõgeva, 2021: 2).

transition to a climate-friendly and just future. The eight criteria were subsequently used as check-lists in the formulation of the proposals (Report Ida-Viru, 2021): (1) Will people's economic livelihoods be maintained? (2) Are the interests of all groups living in the area taken into account? (3) Have natural resources been conserved? (4) Will the benefits outweigh the harm? (5) Is there a safety cushion for those most affected by the change? (6) Will the education system keep pace with innovation? (7) Will people's well-being and happiness increase? (8) Do solutions favor localism?

On this basis, the plan for a just transition was assessed in the groups and the organizers summarized the discussions. In groups, participants developed a vision for a climate-friendly Ida-Viru county as quick keywords for 2030. Against the background of this vision, the necessary changes to make Ida-Viru more climate-friendly were discussed. From the list of necessary changes, the most important ones were jointly prioritized and groups were formed to look for solutions in the form of 'How can we implement [the desired change]?' Five groups came up with 42 proposed solutions, on which the experts gave feedback. The groups then refined the proposals and summarized the recurring suggestions. Each participant rated the 27 final proposals individually and explained their concerns or opposition to the proposal. As a result of the comments, two proposals were merged into one and the final vote was taken on the 26 proposals as a whole. All proposals were supported with 90% of the votes cast.

Maiu Lauring (Rohetiiger) underlines that the experts and stakeholders have taken different positions. This showed the participants that the issue is controversial and that different perspectives and aspects need to be taken into account in order to formulate a balanced judgement on it. However, on a general level, the experts tend to agree with each other, and it is rather the discussions on details such as policy mechanisms that lead to disagreement. From her experience, in citizens' assemblies, when the remit is narrower, there is more dissent, but at the same time it is more difficult for citizens to work with it. In this citizens' assemblies the remit turned out to be too broad to tackle climate change.

The biggest challenge for this process is that the culture of governance in this region is very hierarchical and not used to citizen participation. The organizers had to advocate for public participation and convince public servants and authorities in the municipalities of the benefits this would have for them. Thus, according to Lauring, the greatest difficulty for further citizens' assemblies is to convince institutional politics and administration to take the results of these assemblies seriously and to build on them. As Lauring sees it, one way of dealing with this, is to involve the politicians from the beginning, even before the citizens' assembly starts, so that they can prepare for it and allow time to deal with the results.

Framing of Climate Change

The recommendations of the youth climate assembly stresses first and foremost the need for a better education on climate change and its impact on the lives of people living in the area. Thus, a large part of the recommendation is aimed at promoting information and awareness-raising campaigns in schools and in the community. Another focus of the recommendations concerns the difficulty of diversifying the economy in the wake of environmental transition, as the decline of the shale oil industry will lead to a significant increase in unemployment in Ida-Viru. Participants suggest, for example, that employees in polluting industries should be better supported in their retraining.

Because the Just Transition Plan is focused on the economy and does not address biodiversity loss or safeguarding the rights of non-humans, for example, these nature-centered topics do not appear in the recommendations. Climate change is generally addressed through its impact on the region's economy.

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

As already mentioned, the organizers had difficulty in generating interest in the assembly. Accordingly, the participants were not selected according to specific criteria, but represented only those who volunteered. Based on this data, it is hardly possible to draw conclusions about the inclusiveness of this citizens' assembly. Laurant emphasizes that although the organizers could not reach an exact representation of the youth population, they nevertheless asked the youth how their family and economic situation would be if the shale oil industry were to be abolished in a year's time. According to their answers, the participants do form a diverse group, especially since they and their families do not all depend on this industry. On the contrary, some are already studying or undergoing other training.

Popular Control

Recommendations are advisory only. However, the Minister of Finance was very reactive and gave oral and written feedback to the youth on their recommendations. It looks like most of the youth recommendations will be implemented. Some of the young people who participated in the climate citizens' assembly have formed an NGO and are campaigning to be involved in decision-making at the local level. The Minister invited this youth NGO to be part of the national just transition fund steering committee. However, it is still unclear when, and if, the municipalities will react to the recommendations as they didn't give any feedback to date.

Ivan Sergejev, just transition process coordinator at the Estonian Ministry of Finance, highlights that the youth climate assembly in Ida-Viru served as a pilot for other assemblies (Sergejev, 2022: 22). In this sense, the importance of the youth climate assembly lies not only in its capacity to actually influence political decisions, but also to serve as a model for further participatory and deliberative devices. It can be argued that it contributes to influencing Estonian political culture.

Considered Judgement

The youth climate citizens' assembly certainly has deliberative elements, especially since the participants themselves elaborated the criteria for a just transition and wrote the recommendations. Nevertheless, there is not enough data to decide what quality the deliberation might have held.

Transparency

While local interest in the climate assembly was initially low, both local and national media began to cover it, including the young participants and their ideas. Local spokespersons emerged who not only reported on their experiences of the youth climate assembly, but also raised issues related to the transition to a carbon-neutral economic model from their own perspective, stimulating discussion on climate issues (Jõgeva, 2021: 6).

Challenges

On the basis of the information available, the case addresses four of the six challenges.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

A study carried out before the assembly found that young people in Ida-Viru do not connect environmental protection with climate goals. They also don't perceive the link between climate change and the county's plans for a just transition. The awareness of climate issues was overall weak. By participating in the climate assembly, the youth have learned considerable about climate change (Jõgeva, 2021: 6).

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

The knowledge and stakeholder consultation phase involved researchers, entrepreneurs, and development organizations from the region. Opportunities to incorporate the climate assembly's proposals into national and local strategies and development plans were

discussed with ministries and the regional decision-making body. This strengthens multi-level governance.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

Since several of the youth have formed NGOs and are now active on their own, it can be argued that the citizens' assembly has led to promoting an active citizenry. This is especially the case as the youth have hardly participated politically before. They are advocating for the continued solicitation of local young people's opinions on educational decisions and on climate change issues (ibid., 7).

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

The youth climate citizens' assembly has helped to convey to young people that the ecological transition is inevitable and that there are solutions to the problems caused by the transition, such as unemployment. Deliberation about it helps to anticipate and address the conflicts.

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4.2.6. Climate Citizens' Assembly (Scotland)

The Scottish Climate Assembly is the second citizens' assembly to be held in Scotland. The Climate Change Act 2019 required Ministers to establish a citizens' assembly on climate change to operate independently of the Scottish Government. The Scottish government, which commissioned the assembly, has chosen to largely adopt the format of the Irish citizens' assembly in the sense that they have adopted the practice of meeting on weekends, trying to represent a cross-section of society, hearing presentations from experts, using moderators to ensure that certain voices do not dominate, live-streaming meetings and publishing all documents on the assembly's website to ensure transparency (Cahillane 2020: 101).

Scotland's Climate Assembly was organized and run by a stewarding group (consisting of stakeholder and participations experts), a secretariat (seconded civil servants), two independent conveners (who had the task of representing the assembly in the media and in public), a design and facilitation team, and an evidence group (KNOCA, 2022; Andrews et. al., 2022: 7; Report Scotland Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 100).

The 106 assembly participants, randomly selected to broadly represent the wider population of Scotland with respect to key demographics and climate attitudes, discussed the remit 'How should Scotland change to tackle the climate emergency in an effective and fair way'. Due to the Covid pandemic, it is the first national citizens' assembly to meet entirely online. On seven weekends between November 2020 and March 2021, citizens deliberated on the information provided by experts to develop a total of 81 recommendations—84% of the 81 recommendations received the agreement of at least 80% of the participants. The recommendations with the most disagreement concerned taxation (Andrews et. al., 2022: 107).

In the run-up to the October 2020 assembly, an online platform allowed the public to make suggestions about what the assembly should discuss, who should speak and how Scotland can achieve net zero targets. During the first and second weekends, the whole assembly learned about the scientific and ethical aspects of climate change, Scotland's contribution to climate change and adaptation, and future scenarios. On the third, fourth and fifth weekends, participants randomly divided into three working and topic streams: food and lifestyle; housing and communities; work and transport. In the workstreams, participants received information from experts and advocates, consulted them and reflected on the main challenges and drafted recommendations. Participants developed recommendations through an ongoing iterative process of discussion, consolidation, review and consideration of fairness suggestions. During the sixth and seventh weekends, the whole assembly shared and reviewed the recommendations of the working groups, drafted and

agreed on a joint statement of ambition, developed endorsing statements for each recommendation and voted on the recommendations (KNOCA, 2022).

The division into different working and topic streams enabled the participants to go deeper into the respective topic, especially as the remit was very broad and participants found it difficult to formulate recommendations on it. However, as there was no time allocated in the meetings to go through the information material, they would have had to go through it on their own time. This leads to inequality as some members would not have the time or skills to do this on their own, and there is a risk that the inequalities in learning that the citizens' assemblies are designed to overcome will persist. The structure of the topic streams led to a situation where not all members of the assembly were dealing with the same facts, and also made it difficult to understand the connections between topics. Accordingly, they had to trust that the participants in the other topic streams had worked well and consequently made the right recommendations (Andrews et. al., 2022: 12). Andrews and colleagues draw attention to the fact that measures were taken to integrate the topic streams and share learning and reflections across them, which allowed for better coordination of recommendations than at other climate assemblies, such as Climate Assembly UK. These measures included mixed groups on the sixth and seventh weekends, which helped members understand the recommendations from other thematic areas and why they were proposed, although not to the same extent as the recommendations from their own topic stream (ibid.). This also explains the high number of recommendations.

As participants in the citizens' climate assembly have to be over 16 years of age, the secretariat has invited the Scottish Children's Parliament to facilitate the participation and engagement of children under 16 to make sure that their views, experiences and ideas are part of the discussions and calls to action for the future (Report Scotland Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 7). This is a particularly innovative measure, since it's the first citizens' assembly to integrate children's views into the assembly process (ibid: 96). Established in 1996, the Children's Parliament is Scotland's center of excellence for children's human rights, participation and engagement. The Children's Parliament engaged with 100 children aged 7 to 14 from ten schools to find out their views and ideas on tackling climate change in Scotland. Twelve children were designated 'investigators' to study the views of their classmates and to further explore the core climate change themes (discussed by the citizens' assembly), often through a drawing or a short audio or film clip. The investigators produced a series of calls to action which were voted on by the wider group. Each survey is complemented by a small group workshop led by an adult from the child's school using materials designed and provided by the Children's Parliament (Children's Parliament, 2021).

The Children's Parliament met separately, but in conjunction with the citizens' assembly, and agreed on 42 calls to action on climate change. The Children's calls to action and their report were jointly submitted with the final report of the citizens' assembly to the Scottish Government.

Framing of Climate Change

As mentioned above, climate change was framed by the demand for how to achieve net zero targets regarding greenhouse gas emissions in the following areas: food and lifestyle; housing and communities; work and transport (Report Scotland's Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 14–89). Andrews and colleagues favorably highlight that the assembly presented members with scenarios of possible futures, showing different worldviews and paths that could be taken to address climate change, and how change can occur at different levels and at different paces (Andrews et. al., 2022: 9).

The theme of fairness of climate change policies was embedded throughout the assembly process by the remit. Evidence presented to the assembly showed that climate change and some policies to address it disproportionately affect some people more than others. From this evidence, assembly members developed 22 'proposals for fairness'. These suggestions completed the statement: "To be fair, the recommendations we make as an assembly to Parliament should...". For example, 60–70% of assembly members agreed with the statement "Act immediately so that future generations are not unfairly burdened with the responsibility of making change" and 50–60% agreed with the statement "spread resources and the costs of change equitably (rather than equally)–so that those who can afford the most pay the most" (Report Scotland's Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 91).

For future climate assemblies, Andrews and colleagues recommend empowering participants to refine the remit to include the areas of climate change that are of greatest importance to them or of highest societal priority in mitigating emissions and adapting to climate impacts. Besides, given the ever-changing state of knowledge on climate change, there is a need to consider for how long the citizens' recommendations will be valid and whether further or ongoing assemblies are needed (Andrews et. al., 2022: 18). The most popular mitigation actions among participants since attending the assembly are: reducing meat and milk consumption, reducing overall consumption and reducing energy consumption in the household (ibid., 97).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

The citizens' assembly was quite inclusive, as any person aged 16 or above living in a household at the time of receiving the invitation (from Sortition Foundation, who ran the civic lottery) could apply, regardless of nationality (Report Scotland's Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 104). In order to create a broadly representative assembly, participants were selected from the applicant pool based on eight different criteria: age, gender, geography, household income, ethnicity, rural origin, disability and attitude towards climate change. The groups with the smallest numbers were rounded up and those with the greatest representation were rounded down. Thanks to the climate attitudes survey, the assembly was made up of a diverse group of the Scottish population with different views and attitudes towards climate change. They range from 6.1% who are still not convinced that climate change is really happening (while 7.1% say they don't know) and 14% who think it is more of a problem for the future, to 69.4% who see it as an immediate and urgent problem (Report Scotland's Citizens' Assembly, 2021: 106).

Unlike the Irish citizens' assembly (until 2018), the Scottish citizens' assembly paid expenses and a stipend of £200 to help participants attend (KNOCA, 2022).

The online format, in addition to the fact that participants could view the experts' presentation in advance or re-watch it later on, also had the advantage of making the experts more available and making it more accessible to those members for whom face-to-face participation would have been problematic (Andrews et. al., 2022: 13).

Popular Control

The assembly's report containing the recommendations was tabled in the Scottish Parliament on 23 June 2021. The Climate Change Act required Scottish ministers to publish a statement outlining how they intend to respond to the recommendations within six months of receiving the report. The Scottish Government published its response on 16 December 2021, addressing all 81 recommendations drafted by the assembly. However, in the evaluation of the process Andrews and colleagues underscore that the government's response is largely unclear on how the change will be implemented because of the "overall lack of specific timescales and measurable objectives in both the assembly recommendations and the government response, comparing recommended to existing or planned action is open to interpretation" (Andrews et. al., 2022: 15). They also highlight that a third of the recommendations match already existing or planned policy, since the assembly did not include a critical assessment of policies of the Scottish Government.

The assembly met for an eighth session in February 2022 to review the government's response to its recommendations and published its response statement. The Secretariat actively promotes the assembly's recommendations to public bodies and other stakeholders (KNOCA, 2022).

Considered Judgement

However, the online format also had its disadvantages. Sessions were shorter (due to concerns about online fatigue), which inevitably translated into less time for evidence and reflection. It was also more difficult to accommodate a range of different learning styles, and it was harder to encourage and monitor facilitator performance.

For the most part, participants felt included and respected and had ample opportunity to express their views, although there were sometimes problems with some members dominating their small group, which affected the participation of others. A key feature of the deliberations is that members present ideas and suggestions for what should be done (called 'demands'). This requires specific facilitation techniques, but in this assembly, techniques were used that were more likely to promote dialogue than deliberation. Andrews and colleagues suggest that this may have contributed to the fact that few demands were made in the sample of group discussions analyzed. When members did make demands, they usually provided a reason. However, only about one-third of the justifications made a clear link between the demand and the reason. According to Andrews and colleagues, such a linkage is indicative of the quality of deliberation (Andrews et. al., 2022: 13).

Transparency

A lot of effort was made to make the citizens' assembly as transparent as possible. The assembly website offers detailed information on the organization, presentations, written briefings and results. All presentations and question-and-answer sessions were posted on the website directly after the session. Observers and media representatives were given access to materials shown to the assembly and the opportunity to attend a one-hour session just after each assembly weekend to learn more about the weekend from speakers and organizers and pose questions about the content and proceedings (KNOCA, 2022).

In total, 151 articles were published by 52 online news media on the climate citizens' assembly. This is less coverage than the citizens' assembly of Scotland (2019), which could be because this was the first citizens' assembly in Scotland and therefore more newsworthy. The coverage was predominantly neutral or positive (41% or 40% of total coverage) (Andrews et. al., 2022: 125).

Challenges

Four of the six challenges are met to varying degrees.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

The study by Andrews and colleagues shows that assembly participants received a range of important information about climate change and its mitigation and, to a lesser extent, information about climate change adaptation. The participants' survey data suggests that participants' overall knowledge of climate change and support for specific climate action increased over the course of the assembly, as did their concern about climate change as a pressing issue (Andrews et. al., 2022: 10).

There was increasing concern among assembly participants about the urgency of climate change, as well as support for specific climate action. The importance of climate change for political views amongst assembly participants also increased. In the beginning, a few members denied the reality of anthropogenic climate change. All but one maintained these views throughout the assembly (Andrews et. al., 2022: 90).

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

According to the evaluation of the assembly conducted by Andrews and colleagues, about two-thirds of respondents in the Weekend 8 survey felt that participating in the assembly made them feel more confident about participating in political decision-making processes. About half agreed that participation in the assembly motivated them to become more involved in other aspects of government decision-making. Two of the respondents said they would run for elected office to influence decisions on climate change (Andrews et. al., 2022: 97).

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

According to the data presented by Andrews and colleagues the Scottish climate assembly shows that the public is in favor of more assemblies that allow the public to contribute to policy issues and debates in a balanced and informed way (Andrews et. al., 2022: 17).

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

Although very little data is available on the trust, it can be assumed from Nadine Andrews' findings that this challenge has partly been met. In relation to the Scottish climate

assembly, a comparison of the results of the participant survey with the (general) population survey shows that, overall, those who attended the assembly had a very different emotional experience to the population of Scotland in general. Andrews suggests that this sense of purpose and agency, together with the fact that members of the climate assembly were confronted with evidence that may have underestimated the scale of the climate crisis, and that was framed in such a way as to reassure members that climate change can be tackled in an effective and fair way, helps to explain the difference between members of the climate assembly and the general population of Scotland (Andrews, 2022: 15).

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4.3. Mixed Councils and Conferences on Public Policies

4.3.1. National Conference on Women's Public Policy (Brazil, 3rd National Conference)

Up to now, four editions of the National Conference on Women's Policy have been held (2004, 2007, 2011, 2015).⁴⁸ The fifth edition was scheduled to take place in 2021, and had been announced at the end of 2018. However, for political and health reasons, it was not held. This process has the particularity of not being a conference convened by a ministry, but by a National Secretariat (although with ministerial rank) and oriented, fundamentally, to the elaboration of guidelines for the National Plan for Women's Policies. Regarding the impact of these conferences, Petinelli (2019) speaks of an incorporation of 60% of the proposals of the first National Conference on Women's Policy in public policies. Pogrebinschi (2013) points out a similar impact on the impact at the municipal level of the Municipal Conference on Women's Policy in Salvador de Bahia. Likewise, Pogrebinschi and Samuels (2014) mention an important impact of the National Conference on Women's Policy on legislative developments such as the 'Maria da Penha' law against gender violence.

The case that we are going to analyze is that of the Third National Conference on Women's Policy (2011), paying attention to the cycle that begins in the municipal phase of Belo Horizonte and goes through the state phase of Minas Gerais. Below one can see the number of conferences and participants in this cycle.

Adopted from Ramos and Faria (2013)

Scale	Number of Conferences	Participants	Dates
District	9	1.092	VIII/ 2011
Municipality	1	317	2-3/IX/ 2011
state	1/43 previous municipal conferences	957	17-19/X/ 2011
National	1/1119 previous municipal conferences; 27 previous state conferences	3.428	12-15/ XII/ 2011

The Third National Conference on Women's Policy followed a scheme similar to the rest of these processes: a national call and the subsequent implementation of state or municipal

⁴⁸ Unless otherwise stated, the analyzes in this subchapter are based on Ramos (2018).

commissions to organize the process at different scales. Each of these organizing commissions (in the analyzed cycle) were joint civil society/government. However, the criteria for the election of delegates for representation from the first phases was 60% civil society, 40% public power.

Since the first edition (2004) the Municipal Conference on Women's Policy begins the process through pre-district conferences. In other words, instead of starting the process at the municipal level, it does so at a closer level (the district) to favor the inclusion of a broader public. These pre-conferences are the moment in which participation is free and open and where the first proposals and delegates for the rest of the process are chosen.

Among the objectives of the process is the preparation of proposals for the three administrative levels (municipal, state and national), so that proposals are prepared separately at each of the levels of the cycle. However, this did not occur in the initial level. This first phase (pre-conferences) is the most open phase (inclusive) but it is also the phase with the worst organization: it lacks internal regulations (with which, there is no debate and there are only a few criteria for the election of delegated). The organization of the deliberation is not at all structured. It is not indicated whether or not the division into working groups is necessary, it is not specified where the proposals have to go, etc.. In other words, we find ourselves with a first phase to which more inclusiveness is followed by more informality.

In the rest of the phases, the internal regulations do exist and are debated. Until the arrival at the national phase, in the municipal and state phases, the most controversial debate is always that of the criteria for the election of delegates. The rules of representation are always the most debated and in general it will mean that there is a greater democratization of said representation, understood as a greater deliberation on who—and for what reasons—will be chosen as a delegate.

In addition to this, the three phases of the cycle shared the following structure: opening, debate on the regulation, working groups, plenary voting and election of delegates (except in the national phase).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

The main tool for promoting inclusiveness in the original design of the conferences is decentralization. Territorial proximity is chosen to increase participation in the first phase of the process. This option is based on the assumption that there will be more participants

than if the conference started directly at the municipal level. It is true that, despite the decentralization effort, this process is not committed to mechanisms such as free or virtual conferences. Free conferences, in particular, have been widely used to mobilize a younger public or groups in a situation of exclusion, such as people with disabilities.

It is worth highlighting that around 99% of the participants in this process are women. During the debates on the internal regulations, in particular, it was criticized that there was no type of aid to encourage participation, such as nurseries, which would have facilitated conciliation and participation for many participants.

With the scaling-up, the process becomes less diverse. In other words, as the process progresses and delegate election processes take place, the participants (especially in the national phase) are more closely linked to the leadership of civil society organizations or those with greater participatory experience. However, and in relation to how the representation becomes more elitist as the process progresses, it is necessary to note that there are elements that, without being linked to the initial design of the process, will allow the representation to be diversified.

We are referring to the possibility of modifying the mechanisms for the election of the delegates as a consequence of the modifications in the internal regulations derived from the discussion on the rules. In the process that we analyzed, the modifications meant that spaces for deliberation on the selection criteria were opened. In these spaces, the discussion meant, for example, favoring those women who did not participate in organizations, who had not participated in other conferences, those with less experience, who were younger or who represented a greater diversity. In addition to opting for methodologies such as the lot to choose delegates.

Popular Control

The most important element of popular control in this process concerns the discussion of internal regulations. On the one hand, because it allows delegates to alter not only the selection criteria, but also the percentages. In the municipal conference, for example, they were able to change the percentages, from 60% civil society, 40% public power to 80% civil society and 20% public power. They were also able to change the number of proposals that were going to be approved in the different lines of work, increasing the total number of proposals finally approved.

Considered Judgement

The first element to consider is the presence of different knowledge and their interactions depending on the scale. What we can see is that as you level up, the diversity of knowledge

present increases and your interaction increases. This can be seen clearly in the national phase, where professional, political or counter-analysis knowledge appears in the deliberations that interact with greater intensity. For example, the first phases of the process are characterized by the presence of knowledge of use or professionals with better interaction. As we increase the scale, the number of participants is greater in each work group or in plenary, the work rules are clearer and there is more time for discussions.

In most of the levels there are some inaugural conferences that present the topics to be discussed. In the national phase, there are also 'rounds of conversation' that address topics such as: socio-economic development; racism and lesbophobia; autonomy; communication, etc., along with a series of specific papers on the perspectives and priorities of the Second National Plan for Women's Policies, central axis of the discussion of the third National Conference on Women's Policy. The panels and discussion groups had a large presence of representatives of public power and civil society.

Except in the first phase, where the distinction regarding the administrative level to which the proposals are directed is not clear, all the phases differentiate the level to which the recommendations are directed, in a way that helps to determine the exact content of the proposal.

Transparency

During the entire process, the most important element related to transparency is once again the possibility of debating the internal regulations. At no time is there a systematic evaluation of the impact of the conference on public policies or a more general evaluation of policies for women, except in the national phase, where this theme has a certain presence in the different training and discussion spaces.

Challenges

The six challenges are met to varying degrees.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/ topic at stake

Regarding this issue, we can consider that given the organizational costs of designing a process of this scale, doing it every three or four years is an adequate periodicity. In addition, its organization corresponds to the thematic structure that the National Secretariat for Women's Policies endows itself within its work. Likewise, this public policy is less structured than others such as social assistance or health, which make up a system and have a greater capacity to respond to citizen demands.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

All the participants, although with different degrees of expertise, are already familiar with the subject matter. It is the possibilities of meeting and deliberation that will generate new learning. Although it is true that professional knowledge is more relevant at the beginning, this relevance (and its consequent hierarchy) gradually disappears with scaling-up when discussions take place more horizontally between different types of knowledge. Likewise, to the extent that there is the possibility of transforming proposals or generating new proposals, the circulation of arguments is greater and with it the ability to face complex problems.

No relevant information is given to the participants, since their relationship with experts is minimal in the early phases (some presentations and no thematic material delivered). Only in the national phase does this dialogue improve.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

One of the most relevant elements of this process is that they work on proposals aimed at the different administrative levels. The participants in the deliberations elaborate recommendations for the level they are in (for example, municipal) as well as for the other levels (for example, state and national). It is true that this interscalar perspective presents deficiencies in the first phase, but it is better designed (the proposals are treated separately) with scaling up. All scales are the subject of democratic debate. This allows different interests and different knowledge, from more local to national, to have expression in the deliberation and translation into proposals addressed to the competent levels.

This process presents problems regarding its relationship with other participatory institutions, especially the women's rights councils, which should be in charge of promoting a participatory evaluation and follow-up of the policies decided during the conference. There is very little relationship with the councils at the different scales (except in what refers to work when designing the conference). But they do not present evaluations or shared work strategies, so the conference does not serve to strengthen the relationship of participatory institutions within the different scales.

Challenge 4. Behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

The conferences are a space for the participation of entities and actors already interested in the subject and who usually have a very established agenda regarding the subject to be

dealt with. The networks and alliances that occur at the National Conference on Women's Policy already exist. What we can find are learning spaces, linked to training or deliberation on some topics, in which the participants have access to issues on which they do not have such relevant training.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

This conference is a space where existing conflicts both within civil society and between civil society and public administrations are present. There are different degrees of conflicts that are dealt with deliberately and the exchange of arguments allows for a better understanding of the proposal by the rest of the actors and favors changes in the proposals. But the most important conflicts are not resolved this way. Issues such as the right to abortion (which represented the most important conflict during this process) are not resolved deliberately. The conference serves to present arguments, which are shown in a very antagonistic way and only through voting (in an aggregative way) are conflicts resolved, e.g., to decide whether or not to improve the conditions of the right to abortion in Brazil.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

The conferences, both in this case and in others—as institutions where the participation not only of civil society, but also of public power is recognized—are spaces where debates take place that (although conflictive) can improve the relationship between actors. In addition, these debates take place with actors present at the different administrative levels and make it possible to recognize the differences that exist not only between civil society entities, but also among public administration actors.

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4.3.2. National Conference on Public Health Policies (Brazil, 14th National Conference)

The National Conferences are participatory institutions that take place at the different levels of government in Brazil. These are processes that are convened at the national level but that have their first phase at the municipal level. It is first an open phase, with free access and which is considered as the participatory phase. In general, there is usually no selection system for this first phase other than self-selection. From then on, the conferences scale up, at the state level, and the process acquires a representative character since those who participate in that phase and in the final (national) phase are delegates elected in the previous phases.

During the administrations of the PT government (2013–2018), the national conferences became the participatory institution most promoted by the national government (which opted for this type of process instead of others such as the participatory budget at the national level). However, the national conferences have an earlier origin, Law No. 378 of 1937, drawn up by the Minister of Education and Public Health, Gustavo Capanema. Then the objective of the conferences was very different from the current one, being to improve the federative articulation for the development of public policies at the different levels of government (Souza et al, 2013: 27). The first conference was on health and it was the only theme that was maintained until the re-democratization of the country. After the approval of the 1988 Constitution, the national conferences began to develop as participatory processes, especially in the areas of health and social policies. But the real momentum began after 2003 with Lula's electoral victory. The thematic agenda was expanded (up from only 12 themes to 48) and its realization increased (115 of the 156 conferences were held before 2018) (Ramos, 2018).

Between 2003 and 2016, approximately 10 million people participated in the conferences. Regarding the typical profile of the participants, "the typical participant is a woman (51.2%), with four years of schooling (26.9%) or complete secondary education (20.3%) and an average income between 1 to 4 minimum wages (52.2%). This supposes a pattern of participation similar to that of the local level, where it is not the poorest who participate, but rather people of average income and, in general, with a higher-than-average level of schooling" (Avritzer/Ramos, 2016).

The conference cycle is as follows. The call is usually the responsibility of the national executive. Subsequently, an organizing commission is set up (with representatives of the public administration and civil society). This commission draws up the regulations for the process, its terms and, usually (depending on the type of public policy) it is replicated at the different levels of government, with the same powers but depending on the standards established at higher levels (Faria/Silva/Lins; 2012; Ramos/Faria, 2013). That is, at the

municipal level, there will be an organizing commission, which will develop the regulations for the municipal phase (and the previous ones, if any), but based on the elements indicated by the national and state commissions. Usually, it is the public policy councils that make up these organizing commissions.

As previously indicated, the first phase is the municipal phase, in which the proposals and delegates who will participate in the next level (the state level) are chosen. In this second phase, the proposals of the previous phase are debated and the proposals and delegates of the last (national) phase are elected. The national phase is the closure of the cycle, in which the final proposals are approved. In general, the national conferences aim to develop public policy recommendations at the national level, but they could also develop these policies at the state or municipal level.

This cycle may present some changes. In the first place, the process can start at a scale lower than the municipal level (district or neighborhood) seeking to increase participation by decentralizing the process. On some occasions, small municipalities come together to hold regional conferences. But the two most significant innovations are: (a) free conferences, where some topics the possibility is enabled that, respecting a set of rules, conferences can be self-convened. If a group decides to call a meeting (in many cases it has been used to mobilize the population with inclusion problems or to have very specific debates on a public policy) they only have to respect a set of indications and their proposals are incorporated into the national phase; (b) the virtual conference, an online debate process whose proposals are also incorporated into the national phase and from which delegates can also be elected for this last phase.

Regarding the internal organization, the conferences usually present the same scheme: (a) accreditation of the delegates where they receive the documents for discussion (program, internal regulations or proposals); (b) opening plenary (with some presentation and discussion of the internal regulations); (c) working groups for the preparation of proposals; (d) election of delegates; (e) final plenary session for the approval of proposals.

We will analyze the process of the 14th national health conference, paying attention to the cycle that starts from the municipal phase in Belo Horizonte and continues in the state of Minas Gerais. First of all, it is important to point out that the health conference is the one that has been held most often. In fact, during the Bolsonaro government it was one of the few conferences that was maintained by constitutional mandate. In 2022, the 16th edition of the national health conference was held.

The process took place in 2011 and shows some innovation within its development. The most important is that for the first time, local conferences are held. These local conferences present a greater degree of decentralization of the process. Instead of doing it at the district level (the municipality has 9 districts) they are done at the level of the neighborhood health centers, the first phase of the process will have 159 local conferences. See table below for numbers of participants and conferences held in this process.

Adopted from Ramos y Faria (2013)

Scale	Number of Conferences	Participants	Dates
Local	159	5.399	IV-V/ 2011
District	9	2.023	VI-VII/ 2011
Municipality	1	1.161	22-24/ VII/ 2011
state	1/ 427 previous municipal conferences	1.802	8-11/VIII/ 2011
National	1/ 4347 previous municipal conferences; 27 previous state conferences	3.428	30/XI-04/XII/ 2011

The debate agenda of the 14th National Health Conference was: “Everyone uses the SUS! SUS in social security, public policy and patrimony of the Brazilian people”. Organized in the following axes: (a) health policy in social security, according to the principles of integrality, universality and equity; (b) financing; (c) management of the work system and health education; (d) pact for health and public-private relationship and; (e) community participation and social control. In the first phase, participation is open, but afterwards the election of delegates responds to a series of criteria established by the (national) organizing commission: 50% user representatives; 25% workers and 25% service managers. Beyond these criteria, there are no others that have to do with positive discrimination, quotas, recognition of diversity etc. It is necessary to highlight that the national conferences follow the model of the Brazilian hybrid institutions, counting on the participation of civil society actors, but also of the public power (Avrizer/Pereira, 2005). Finally, it should be noted that among the objectives of this process was to develop public policy recommendations for the three levels of government (municipal, state, and national).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

One of the fundamental differences between the health conference and most conference processes in other public policy areas is the high degree of decentralization in the field. In the 14th edition of the health conference there is a decisive innovation to broaden the inclusion of the process, which is to decentralize the first phase of the process to the micro-local level. In this edition, the open participation phase is based on the location of the health centers. This implies that the first phase takes place in a closer environment and the inclusiveness of the process is increased.

Regarding inclusion in this process, one of the most relevant elements, unlike other democratic innovations, is the active presence of social movements and civil society organizations. Not only do they make up the fundamental public of the process (in this case together with workers and managers), they also choose to deploy certain repertoires of collective action in some of the phases of the process. Especially relevant are the protest demonstrations in the national phase against the Ministry of Health's proposal to develop public-private partnerships to provide health services.

In the first phases of the process (up to the municipal phase) it is possible to identify more people who participate in the conference for the first time. But the higher up the scale, the more often participants are selected as delegates in this type of process. Another element worth noting is the changes in the gender balance among the participants. In the first phases, the number of women is greater (in some levels up to four times greater) (Faria et al., 2012), but this situation begins to reverse with the change of scale. In the municipal phase, the number of male delegates in the user segment is already higher. Starting with the state conference, the percentage of men in the group of managers will also be higher.

In addition to the gender inequality dynamic that usually occurs in participatory processes, we note that there are quota measures or other measures taken to at least promote gender equality in the process. There are also no measures that can favor the conciliation of participants (when women do most of the caregiving).

Popular Control

The first element to consider at this level is the ability to modify the internal regulations of the process, especially from the moment it becomes a representative process (in the first phase the regulations are not usually discussed). This capacity implies relevant changes regarding the discussion system. The first example occurs in the state phase, where the discussion system is modified and all the proposals are discussed in plenary, reinforcing the

capacity of the delegates to modify them. Secondly, in the national phase the voting system was modified, which goes from being by electronic ballot box to being by show of hands.

The second element has to do with the impact of the conference. One of the proposals that the government wanted to defend was the development of public-private partnerships for the management of health care. In order to stop this proposal, which they considered contrary to the foundations of the public health system, social movements mobilized throughout the process, especially in the last phase and finally managed to stop that proposal.

The third element derives from the relationship with other participatory institutions, especially the health council. Despite the fact that there is no clear system for evaluation, analysis of the impact of the conference proposals on health policies or co-implementation of the proposals, the relationship with the health council allows a certain presence of participatory spaces in these questions. The councils share an agenda with the conferences. Their members participate in them and are responsible for the evaluation of health policies at the different levels of government (Faria/Lins, 2022).

Considered Judgement

As previously pointed out, most of the conferences tend to organize the work of preparing proposals through the following cycle: (a) discussion in working groups; (b) plenary approval of the final proposals. However, this pattern may undergo some alterations. In the first place, as a consequence of the greater informality of the process in the early stages. Not all local conferences (the open and participatory phase) have working groups that can influence the discussion, so most public phases have worse conditions for discussion. Neither did all the 9th District Conferences have working groups, although the majority did (with the number of participants between 15 and 25). (Ramos/Faria, 2013).

With the scaling up (especially in the municipal and national) there is more than one working group per thematic axis. To ensure coordination between these groups when preparing proposals for the same axis, each group chose a rapporteur group that met with the rest of the rapporteurs of the same axis. This allowed the proposals to be selected to be better grouped in plenary.

The process of interaction between the different phases, in addition to the participating delegates, has as its fundamental connection system the proposal document. This document collects the proposals from the previous phases and constitutes the basis for subsequent deliberation. Especially starting from the municipal phase, the elaboration of proposals is more structured according to the levels of government. The proposal

documents to be debated, in addition to the thematic axes, are organized according to the administrative level to which they refer. The same happens with the debate in the working groups, which is done by differentiating the level of government.

The delegates will have different capacities to intervene in these proposals: (a) select only those that are approved, but without discussion of modification; (b) selection with modification; (c) preparation of new proposals. In almost all the phases of the health conference, the delegates have enough intervention capacity (they can modify them), but always starting from the base of the proposals that derive from the previous phases. In the national phase it is where they have less autonomy, they can only select and make few modifications, but they cannot make new proposals.

It is relevant that although the most complex discussion takes place during the working groups, the opening in plenary to the discussion of the proposals selected in the rest of the working groups, allows the participants to broaden the discussion and obtain a better overview of the question treated.

Regarding the argumentative exchanges when preparing the proposals, it is important to point out that the knowledge that is used will change as you go up the scale. The first phase has a relevant presence of personal experiences and knowledge of use, which coexist with professional knowledge of managers and workers. With the scaling up this distribution is altered. The municipal conference shows more references to issues that have to do with municipal policies and professional and political knowledge is more present, many of them coming from their own learning in the process (Ramos/Faria, 2013). This type of presence of knowledge (with technical primacy) is similar in the national phase. It is relevant that, with the rise in scale and the specific attention to the administrative level to which the proposals are directed, the arguments put forward are more specialized with respect to competencies (ibid). The only phase where the debate is altered and, with it, the interaction between knowledge is the state phase. At this level, the internal regulations are modified and it is decided that there are no working groups, all the proposals are read in plenary, with which the selection process becomes more aggregative (there are 553 proposals).

Finally, in most of the cycle there are opening presentations in which experts from different fields present their knowledge on the topic to be discussed. This type of practice is consolidated in the national phase, with the existence of numerous 'thematic dialogues' where university students, workers, experts, social movements, politicians, etc., participate.

Transparency

Regarding transparency, we can point out the following issues:

- The rules of the process are clear and are open to debate, especially those that have to do with the organization of the deliberation.
- During the analyzed process, there are no moments of accountability or evaluation related to the fulfillment of the proposals of the previous conferences. Only in the municipal phase are some documents related to the municipal health policy plan delivered, but without constituting an evaluation or analysis of the impact of the conference.
- In general, this evaluation work corresponds to the health council. Despite the fact that it is widely decentralized and consolidated (much more than what happens in other public policies) it is a less inclusive body than the conferences.

In addition to these elements, it is necessary to consider the debate regarding the voting system in the national phase. Unlike in other phases, where voting was done by show of hands, the proposal contemplated in the internal regulations was for voting by electronic ballot box. However, this system was criticized by the participants who chose to return to the system of voting by show of hands because it allowed them to know what the rest of the participants were doing (Ramos/Faria/Jerez, 2012).

Challenges*Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/ topic at stake*

The health conferences have the best articulation with a general process of elaboration of public policies, since they usually take place every two or three years. However, this periodicity does not correspond to a real effort to monitor public policy or evaluate the impact of the conferences.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

As happens with other conferences, the participating public already has a path of militancy, participation or professional experience in the subject. In fact, the way to approach the problems depends, almost exclusively, on the knowledge and arguments of the participants that appear in the discussion of the proposals (new or coming from previous phases). Only in the national phase is there a significant effort to enable training and learning spaces that go beyond the circulation of arguments between actors.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

One of the virtues of this process is the articulation between different scales. The discussion of the proposals refers to all scales, with which policies are elaborated for all administrative levels from the lower levels, this allows for articulating proposals and distinguishing them by competence. Likewise, the delegates have participated in the previous phases, so they are aware of the issues raised at lower levels, in addition to the approved proposals themselves.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

The conferences are a space for the participation of entities and actors already interested in the subject and who usually have a very established agenda regarding the subject to be dealt with. Only efforts to broaden the inclusiveness of the process, such as the proposal to further decentralize the initial phase, make it possible for audiences less used to discussing these issues to participate.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

Conferences are processes where existing conflicts between different actors become particularly visible. It is not an ideologically homogeneous space, but one that gathers an important diversity of perspectives. This allows, on the one hand, for divergent opinions to have a meeting space and for these divergences to have a framework in which they can be resolved. However, as in other conference processes, it will not be deliberation that will allow conflict resolution to be reached, but rather the use of voting (aggregative method) that will allow final proposals to be reached.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

The conferences, both in this case and in others, are spaces where debates take place that can improve (even if conflictual) the relations between actors, since they are institutions where the participation not only of civil society but also of public power is recognized. In addition, these debates take place with actors present at the different administrative levels and make it possible to recognize the differences that exist not only between civil society entities, but also among public administration actors. In the same way that its nature as a hybrid institution allows for reaching agreements between actors, it is also a space where conflicts are shown by civil society. Its openness to social movements means that the most controversial issues are present.

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4.3.3. Conference on the Future of Europe (European Union)

A participatory and deliberative system cannot just duplicate previous models at a lesser scale. Nor can it be deduced from a mere theoretical reflection. In trying to imagine its main features, drawing lessons from previous experiments at EU scale is crucial, as the imagination of practitioners and the dynamics of real life bring decisive arguments. The first experiment worth of analysis is the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE). Let us discuss it briefly.⁴⁹

The structure of the CoFE

The Conference on the Future of Europe was a proposal of the European Commission and the European Parliament, announced at the end of 2019, with the aim of looking at the medium to long term future of the EU and what reforms should be made to its policies and institutions. It was jointly organized by the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Commission. On April 19, 2021, the multilingual digital platform of the Conference futureu.europa.eu was launched. The Conference itself took place from fall 2021 to spring 2022, with a feedback session in December 2022.

In a first phase, the citizens' panel had to adopt a series of proposals on a large number of issues: 'climate change and the environment'; 'health'; 'a stronger economy, social justice and jobs'; 'EU in the world'; 'values and rights, rule of law, security'; 'digital transformation'; 'European democracy'; 'migration' and 'education, culture, youth and sport'. The topics were discussed by four panels working separately, which had to meet in Strasbourg and in four European cities. The methodology was formally the one followed by all citizens' assemblies: stratified sortition of lay citizens who are modestly reimbursed for their involvement, introduction by experts, discussions in plenaries and small groups moderated by external consultants, writing of the proposal in subgroups, adoption of the proposals in the assemblies. A main difference was that discussions took place in 24 national languages—with the help of numerous translators.

In a second phase, citizens panels had to send 'ambassadors' to the plenary, where they met other ambassadors coming from national panels, national MPs and MEPs, civil society representatives, the whole process being organized by a common secretariat under the responsibility of the three EU institutions. The proposals of the citizens' panels were supposed to be central in this second phase, which ended in the adoption of multiple of proposals by all the participants. In both phases, a qualified majority was required for the proposals to be adopted.

⁴⁹ Thanks to Carsten Berg, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Claudia Chwalisz for their comments, and all the members of the Observatory group which followed the Conference on the Future of Europe during the whole process.

In the third phase, the European Commission integrated part of the proposals in its agenda. The experiment being considered as a success, the organization of citizens panels is becoming part of the decision-making process of the Commission.

The huge complexity of the actors involved in the CoFE—which included EU and national institutions, civil society and hundreds of ordinary citizens from all over the EU speaking 24 different languages—made this conference an enormously challenging exercise in transnational participatory and deliberative democracy. Contrary to the Brazilian model, randomly selected lay citizens were central in the experiment, through citizens panels organized at national level in a series of countries and European citizens panels. Both had to send “ambassadors” to the plenary, where they met with other actors. This was probably the most innovative dimension of the CoFE, as nothing similar had previously been organized at EU level (although some less ambitious experiments had taken place).

A preliminary assessment

Despite various problems in the process, the CoFE presents a significant step in the right direction, and its complexity itself is a key when one tries to imagine a permanent EU system of citizens’ assemblies. The CoFE has proven that it is actually possible and feasible to organize Citizens’ Assemblies at a transnational level, with citizens panels randomly selected at the EU level and other at national level, engaging a multilingual deliberation, and during the plenaries coupled with other types of actors representing national and EU institutions and civil society representatives. It has been a rare and valuable learning exercise. Let us summarize its main lessons.

A system mixing national and EU citizens panels. First, the CoFE has shown the possibility of coupling national and EU panels. On this dimension, the concrete process of the CoFE has had some defects, but its basic idea has to be preserved. It corresponds well to K. Nicolaïdis’ “demoicracy” thesis: as the European people are both one and multiple, its representation has also to be diverse. By the way, this has also been the case for the electoral representatives who participated in the experiment, as some were MPs and other MEPs. Within a national state, it could be that the best deliberation would perhaps result from a group of citizens selected by lot directly at national level, in order to minimize the constituency effects that tends to bind representatives to local interests. Nevertheless, as a multinational union, Europe needs both national and union representatives, and their coupling is the best way to legitimate the best possible deliberation.

The interest of a mixed conference. In addition, the CoFE plenaries, which have mixed ‘ambassadors’ from national panels and EU panels together with MPs, MEPs and civil

society representatives, gives a good example of what should be a convention discussing the nature of the EU (for example with the goal of a proposition to revise treaties) or making a realistic and ambitious plan to implement the European Green Deal. Here again, another possible goal might be the concrete organization of the mix was far from ideal, but in a system of EU citizens' assemblies, a place should be given to such a device.

The possibility of a multilingual deliberation. At the time-being, one could argue that there is no unified European public sphere, or that the EU public sphere is a weak one, consisting mostly of different nations' people discussing separately the same topics at the same time. Language here is a huge obstacle: English is the academic, touristic and to some extent professional *lingua franca* for different nationalities. But politics remain mostly entrenched in national languages, and the less-educated classes do not even use it for their information. Multilingualism remains a challenge, especially when participants switch from formal translated interaction to informal discussions, and because it does not mean the same thing depending on the generation and the education. However, the CoFe has demonstrated that the present state of the technique makes it possible to organize a meaningful, although not perfect, multilingual deliberation among lay citizens. The role of the facilitators has been crucial at this respect. Again, it was far from ideal, and the tools will improve in a next future, but a minimum standard has been achieved.

A real citizen engagement. Most randomly selected citizens in the ECPs felt pleased and honored to be chosen to take part in this deliberative process. Since they expected their voices would be heard and carried weight, they worked together constructively with a sense of shared purpose for a greater goal. Many of them endured long night sessions over many weekends and online evening sessions during the week. It was from this positive experience that a majority of the participants proposed that randomly selected Citizens' Panels should become a permanent institutional feature of governance in the European Union which is codified in the final CoFE proposal 36 (7): "Holding Citizens' assemblies periodically, on the basis of legally binding EU law. Participants must be selected randomly, with representativeness criteria, and participation should be incentivized. If needed, there will be support of experts so that assembly members have enough information for deliberation. If the outcomes are not taken on board by the institutions, this should be duly justified; Participation and prior involvement of citizens and civil society is an important basis for political decisions to be taken by elected representatives."

The need of a clear and manageable agenda—and a multiplicity of a network of citizens' assemblies. However, more critical lessons can also be drawn from this experiment. The first is that citizens panels and assemblies need a clear and manageable agenda. The CoFE's

one has been overloaded, and the price cost has been a low deliberation quality compared with other experiments. The lesson could be that it might be better to have a set of citizens panels or assemblies, each working on a manageable agenda, than to have an all-encompassing one which could only work when transforming lay citizens into professional representatives.

Ensuring the neutrality of the secretariat and the organization committee. The group which organizes the citizens' assemblies influences the process quite a bit when choosing the agenda, in the way participants and experts are selected, and in how to adapt the deliberation when problems or new proposals emerge. This points out the delicate role of those who organize citizens' assemblies, and the potential pitfalls such as built-in bias and conflicts of interest that must be avoided if Citizens' assemblies are to become an integral and legitimate part of democracy alongside elections and referenda. In particular, the choice of experts in the CoFE has been too narrow, and probably too 'EU friendly', as more critical voices have hardly been heard. There was no place for controversies among experts and the presentation of alternative views, and if experts were asked to stay 'neutral', it was hardly a satisfactory solution. This greatly restricted the scope and the deepness of the deliberation. Enabling a more diverse selection of experts is vital, as these figures provide a large part of the knowledge citizens need in order to deliberate in an in-depth manner and come to informed conclusions. Experts should provide a diversity of views and must be able to communicate in a way that they can be understood by lay citizens. For that reason, decision-makers should not independently decide alone about expert recruitment. Instead, there should be an independent committee advising decision-makers with regards to expert selection, ensuring that for each expert position there is a contrary viewpoint. In addition, one should provide citizens with the option of inviting experts themselves.

Enabling an inclusive random selection. The random selection of the citizens for European Citizens' Panels was far from comprehensive and only reflected the EU's diversity regarding the "geographic origin, gender, age, socioeconomic background and level of education." Important variables were not considered. In particular, marginalized and disadvantaged groups were not specifically targeted which, however, is key for the representativeness of the sample and the legitimacy of the process. What about third country residents, refugees, migrants, ethnic minorities such as Roma and travelling people, religious minorities such as Muslims? According to the topic, one should take some of these groups into account. It would therefore be important to develop new outreach methods to tackle this oversight, and to ensure a more comprehensive sample including marginalized and disadvantaged groups. The participants should in any case receive a financial compensation for their time, which could be equivalent with the salaries

(calculated per working day) of the MEPs. Beyond socio-demographic variables, it would be equally important to use sampling criteria related to the topic and attitudes of citizens. The self-selection of citizens answering to an invitation to take part to the CoFE has led to an under-representation of those who are Euro-sceptic. Without a behavioral criterium, self-selection undermines the principle of random-selection and tends to attract those interested in the EU, and who support it, above others. In any case, all statistical approaches can be contested. Since one cannot represent every kind of diversity, one needs to make choices, and make them publicly and explicitly. It is likely to be impossible to always apply the same formula.

Empowering citizens. In the CoFE, citizens had to conform to a frame which was completely out of their reach. In some instances, they have been able to contest the procedure of the behavior of some officials, but this has only marginally influenced the process. In such a situation, the risk is to inhibit citizens' democratic imaginaries and only allow them to exert their power in an overly controlled setting. The participants of the citizens' assemblies should have much more voice in the setting of the agenda and the procedures. By the same token, the mere decision to organize a citizens' assembly and the way to integrate its results was completely dependent on the will of the Commission, or more precisely on the agreement of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. A robustly designed EU system of Citizens' Assembly should require a legal base, ideally on the primary EU law level, with clear and binding rules in order to obtain a real institutional status as representative institutions and to be a strong element in the decision-making process. Last but not least, the CoFE was conceived as protected from the potential disturbing impact of social movements. Together with the absence of a clear impact on future policies, this has contributed to greatly reduce the visibility of the CoFE in the public opinion. This should be changed. An EU system of citizens' assemblies should also be the echo chamber of the elements of grassroots and direct democracy which exist in the EU, namely social movements and the European Citizens' Initiative.

4.3.4. Grenelle of the Environment (France)

The idea of a “Grenelle de l'environnement” originated from a federation of environmental associations under the name of “Alliance for the Planet”. This federation brings together 82 associations, including Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the WWF. During the presidential campaign of 2007, these associations evaluated the presidential candidates on the basis of their environmental programs. At the same time, they proposed to organize a general negotiation on environmental issues with the new government after the 2007 elections. The Nicolas Hulot Foundation for Nature and Mankind has drafted a proposal for an environmental charter called the ecological pact which seeks to open the public debate with concrete proposals on ecological policies. Nicolas Sarkozy took up the idea during his presidential election campaign and signed the ecological pact. After his election on May 21, 2007, he pledged to turn the grenelle Environment Forum into a negotiation on concrete environmental measures (Boy, 2010: 314). The grenelle, officially initiated by Jean-Louis Borloo, Minister of state and at the same time Minister of Ecology under President Nicolas Sarkozy, took place from July to December 2007.

The aim of the grenelle is to have a significant influence on the evolution of French sustainable development policies by providing a ‘roadmap’ for governmental decisions. It should be emphasized that the grenelle can be seen as an institutional consultation process, but that it is not a ‘pure’ form of participatory or deliberative democracy, due to the configuration of actors retained by the mechanism (Lascoumes, 2011: 279). The grenelle is based on a new governance called ‘five-party governance’. It is composed of five groups of stakeholders: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), employee and employer unions, the state (public servants), local authorities (locally elected representatives). The process can be divided into two phases: the first, deliberation and the second, consultation. This is followed by an operational work phase that takes place after the grenelle. The public is involved only in the second phase during regional and local consultations, but the influence of local debates on the final decisions has been minimal (ibid.).

In the first phase of deliberation, during the months of July to September 2007, six thematic working groups met to discuss the following topics: combating climate change and controlling energy demand; preserving biodiversity and natural resources; achieving a healthy environment; adopting sustainable production and consumption patterns; building an ecological democracy; promoting ecological development patterns for employment and competitiveness. In addition, there are two intergroup working groups on ‘genetically modified organisms’ and on ‘waste’ (Boy, 2010: 315).

Each of these groups is made up of some 40 to 60 members, this means a total of around 350 participants. The appointment process is steered by the political authorities in charge of the grenelle process, that is to say essentially by the office of the minister of the environment, who as a minister of state had much broader powers than his predecessors.

In practice, apart from the case of civil servants who are members of the ‘state’ and ‘local authorities’ colleges, the first step is to select trade unions, NGOs and professional organizations that are deemed to be representative, and then to propose that they present candidates for appointment (ibid., Barbet, 2009: 92). For NGOs, inclusion in the *grenelle* is a valuable sign of representativeness and offers the opportunity to make new contacts. However, it also poses a risk to their members if the organization appears to compromise with the authorities too much. Unfortunately, apart from this very general information on designation, very little data is available about the details of this designation procedure on proposal.

Daniel Boy’s research shows that this rule of ‘governance by five’ is however slightly bent: In each group, in addition to the five colleges, a sixth entity emerges, called ‘moral personalities’. The examination of these personalities shows that they are either members of environmental associations who probably did not find a place in the college intended for them, or other associations such as consumer protection associations or representatives of hunters whose classification in the ‘environment’ category was problematic, or finally, persons who seem to be represented more on the basis of their competences than on the basis of their representativeness (experts). Taking these few clarifications into account, the distribution of the colleges is as follows: local authorities: 16%, employers: 18%, state: 19%, environmental non-governmental organizations: 21%, employees: 14%, non-governmental non-environmental organizations: 5%, experts: 7%. The working groups thus formed met during the summer of 2007 and, following a procedure of progressive elaboration of concrete proposals, resulted in the drafting of reports accompanied by summary notes (Boy, 2010: 316).

In the second phase of consultation, a regional consultation was first organized from October 5–19, 2007. These regional consultations consisted of the organization of 18 meetings under the responsibility of the prefects, in medium-sized towns with about 15,000 people attending. A second public consultation was organized on the Internet from September 28 to October 14, 2007 (Barbet, 2009: 88) and, according to the government information service, received almost 110,000 contributions. A general debate took place in Parliament and in other organizations such as the Economic and Social Council, the National Commission for public debate, and the Delegation for Sustainable Development in October 2007 (Lascoumes, 2011: 282). Finally, nine advisory bodies were consulted for their opinions (national air council, national noise council, national waste council, national water council, prevention and precaution committee, national council for nature conservation, national transport council, etc.).

The final public and highly mediatized phase of the grenelle process was a negotiation held on October 24–25, 2007. It was organized in the form of four final roundtables attended by representatives of four colleges (non-governmental organizations, employees, employers and local authorities) and the chairmen and rapporteurs of the working groups with the ministers concerned (including, for the first-roundtable, the Prime Minister, François Fillon). In this phase, the state college disappears as stakeholder from the process. However, in reality, the state is still represented by the ministers concerned and also by the chairmen and reporters of the groups, a significant proportion of whom are from the state (Boy, 2010: 316). Four roundtables are set up: (1) fighting climate change, (2) health and environment, economy of functionality, circular economy, (3) preserving biodiversity and natural resources, agricultural practices, (4) Establishing an ecological democracy. At the end of these meetings, the conclusions of the roundtables are published in the form of statements available on the ministry's website.

Bettina Laville and Gilles Hériard-Dubreuil are critical, stating that the major weakness of the five-party governance is that the role of the state in this roundtable series was not defined in advance. From being a stakeholder like any other, the state suddenly became the editor of the draft record of decisions, the speech distributor, and the master of speech time. This ambivalence makes its usual role as arbiter in this new stakeholder system problematic. According to Laville and Hériard-Dubreuil, the negotiation continued only because of the willingness of non-governmental organizations, determined to make progress and to be recognized as 'equals' of constitutional public decision-makers (Laville/Dubreuil, 2008: 26).

More generally they note with regard to the five-party governance that the modalities of participation in public decision-making by each of these parties are certainly constitutionally established, but when they decide together—or at least propose to decide together—there is no legal basis for this joint governance (Laville/Dubreuil, 2008: 22). They critically wonder why, without taking into account national and international experience on consultation (as the French National Commission for Public Debate for example), the government chose this unprecedented forum and decided to launch a large-scale, informal consultation. No rules of the process were set out in a regulatory text, with circular instructions to the prefects that were sometimes contradictory and in an improvised manner, adjusted as it went along (*ibid.*). Laville and Hériard-Dubreuil have mainly two answers to this question: first of all, the importance that participatory democracy has gained among the general public since Ségolène Royal's presidential campaign in 2005. This interpretation can be supported by the fact that in his mission statement on the transparency of regional debates, Jean-Louis Borloo did mention a 'participatory

democracy phase'. The second answer is more focused on two influential actors of the grenelle. They argue that the grenelle is based on a desire for power (one political, the other ecological) of this unlikely couple formed by Nicolas Sarkozy and Nicolas Hulot (a well-known journalist and environmental activist), two individuals with a strong history in communications.

These public phases are followed by a less public operational work phase in the operational committees (Boy, 2010: 317). The committees usually have 30 to 40 members, with a total number of participants of around 1,300. Their work targets much more specific and narrower issues such as new public and private buildings, social housing and urban renewal, existing buildings, multimodal freight transport, high speed rail, conventional rail, urban and suburban transport, etc. In this operational work phase, it seems that the rule of organization into colleges representing the five parties on an equal basis has not been respected, since the state and the employers are largely over-represented and together account for about 80% of the participants: local authorities: 9%, employers: 25%, state: 45%, environmental non-governmental organizations: 10%, employees: 2%, non-governmental non-environmental organizations: 4%, experts: 6% (Boy, 2010: 317).

The commitments made in October 2007 were translated into legislation in the "Grenelle 1 law" on August 1–3, 2009, which defines the main guidelines and sets out the choices made without always providing for their concrete application or financing. The central objective concerns the climate and aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by four by 2050. The sectors most concerned by this issue are buildings and transport, which together account for 40% of total emissions.

The financing and implementation of the measures provided for in Law grenelle 1 are specified in the so-called "Law Grenelle 2" of July 12, 2010. This second law defines a 'new ecological governance' that allows for consultation upstream of projects, in particular through the renewal of citizens' consultations and the integration of environmental education associations in consultation bodies. Public decisions must be more transparent, based on consultation and participation, with access to information, assessment and pluralistic expertise. The text also provides for public consultations to be held, for the most part, for all draft regulations that have an impact on the environment. The impact assessment and public consultation procedures are to be simplified and harmonized.

The term ecological democracy is also used in the text of the law. The main aim is to develop the right to environmental information by getting public actors and companies to make available the way they take into account the requirements of sustainable development in

their strategy. Regional economic, social and environmental councils should be established along the lines of the national economic, social and environmental council, with a strengthened role for representatives of environmental associations.

The obligation to present a social and environmental report is extended to all companies with more than 500 employees. From 2011, carbon emissions must be displayed for all goods and passenger transport services. An 'environmental display' is to be gradually introduced, after experimentation, for consumer products whose environmental impact, particularly the 'carbon cost', must be explicitly stated. In a more coercive manner, parent companies are required to repair environmental damage caused by defaulting subsidiaries (Vie Publique, 2019a).

Framing of Climate Change

The grenelle decisions on the climate are wide-ranging. Many issues are addressed: biodiversity and natural resources, climate change, the relationship between the environment and public health, production and consumption patterns, the question of 'environmental governance' or 'ecological democracy', the promotion of sustainable development patterns favorable to competitiveness and employment, the issue of GMOs and waste management. These major commitments can be retained: With regard to buildings and dwellings, the general introduction of low energy consumption standards in new dwellings and public buildings is recommended, as well as the introduction of incentives for the thermal renovation of existing dwellings and buildings. In the area of transport, it was decided to build 2000 kilometers of high-speed lines by 2012, to create a tax system that favors the least polluting vehicles, and to introduce a kilometer-based eco-tax for heavy trucks on the road network. In the area of energy, the expansion of renewable energies to achieve a 20% share of energy consumption by 2020, the ban on incandescent light bulbs from 2010 and a study on the introduction of a tax on the energy consumption of goods and services (carbon tax) were adopted. With regard to health, the ban on the sale of building materials and pesticides (for the treatment of plants) likely to contain hazardous substances from 2008, the mandatory declaration of the presence of nanomaterials in products for the general public, and implementation of an air quality plan were approved. With regard to agriculture, it was decided to triple the share of organic farming, which was set to reach 6% of agricultural land in 2010 and 20% in 2020, to halve the use of pesticides, to adopt a law regulating the coexistence of GMOs and other crops. To preserve biodiversity, it was agreed to create a 'green belt' linking natural areas so that fauna and flora can live and circulate throughout the area. This belt should also be able to be used against new development projects (Vie Publique, 2019b).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

As already indicated, the respective participants in the grenelle are appointed by the state—without making transparent on what basis this appointment is made. The grenelle's capacity for inclusion is accordingly limited (Barbet, 2009: 91–97; Lascoumes, 2011: 284).

Popular Control

Given the specific governance method, it is difficult to speak of 'popular control' in the context of grenelle, especially since citizens were only consulted but could not influence the process or the decisions. However, it must be stressed that the leeway given to members of organized civil society varies according to the stage of the grenelle mechanism. In the working groups, the consultative body, the representatives of civil society (NGOs, workers, employers) alone make up 58% of the seats. In the roundtables, the place of negotiations, the same members of organized civil society still make up 52% of the participants. However, in the operational committees, the instruments for practical implementation, their share is only 41% (Boy, 2010: 321). Although the grenelle is undeniably open to organized civil society, it is largely run by representatives of the state, as 66% of those who hold positions of responsibility belong to the state college. Non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, hold only 5% of the positions of responsibility (Boy, 2010: 322).

Considered Judgement

The grenelle has a deliberative phase, but no information is available that would allow us to assess the quality of this deliberation retrospectively.

Transparency

As mentioned above, grenelle received a lot of media attention, especially in the final phase, and is still seen today as the beginning of environmental policy cooperation (Barbet, 2009: 47).

Challenges

Four of the six challenges are met by varying degrees by the case.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizons for the policy/topic at stake

The fact that the grenelle deliberation and consultation phase was followed by legislative work has made it possible to set a reasonable time frame for the broad policy of climate

change and nature conservation. The grenelle has become the framework for the following ecological decisions in France.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

The issue of the climate was addressed in a complex way. The decisions of the discussions were made public, which made it easier to follow and understand the complexity of the issue. The ecological awareness undoubtedly benefited from the grenelle (Laville/Dubreuil 2008: 25).

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

The grenelle has brought together many different actors and stakeholders who had not previously communicated and cooperated with each other. A regional public sphere emerged that overcame local conflicts, and the participants showed a previously unknown ability to listen to each other and a real discussion competence in the debates (Laville/Dubreuil 2008: 25). This contributes to optimize synergies among stakeholders on a local, regional and national level.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

The inclusion of different stakeholders with quite different positions makes it possible to promote a more deliberative dialogue on climate issues.

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4.3.5. Local Agenda 21 (Berlin-Köpernick, Germany)

Local Agendas 21 give concrete expression on the ground to the international principles of the UN action plan 'Agenda 21', a global program resulting from the World Conference on the Environment and Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992 and institutionalizing the reference framework for sustainable development. With the UN conference, the international community committed itself to reconciling economic growth and environmental protection (Diaz-Sarachaga, 2019: 1). A Local Agenda 21 is a territorial project and local development approach that aims to promote a public policy of sustainable development planning 'tailored' to local territories. Among the axes of the Local Agenda 21 approach are the promotion of education, public awareness and training, and the sharing of information and data for decision-making. A 'decision-making' methodology is structured around a participatory process seeking to develop human capacities in the territory concerned. Local Agenda 21 seeks to diversify the uses of the territory with a view to a better quality of life and the development of local resources involving ecosystems (Lafitte, 2021:3).

The implementation of Agenda 21 should include actions at international, national, regional and local scales (Brandt/Svendsen, 2013: 266). Therefore, the participation of local communities is the pillar of Agenda 21. National and state governments have enacted legislation or advised local authorities to take action to implement the plan at the local level (UN, 2009). Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 designated local authorities (municipalities, provinces, and regions) as promoters in the processes involving all representatives of civil society, strengthening their role and participation and leading to the creation of a sustainable development action plan at the local level. It states that local officials should consult citizens and community, business and industry organizations to gather information and build consensus on strategies for sustainable development. This consensus would help them to redesign local programs, policies, laws and regulations to achieve the goals of Agenda 21. The process of consultation would raise people's awareness of sustainable development issues (Brandt/Svendsen, 2013: 267).

The signing of the Aalborg Charter in 1994, under the auspices of the European Commission and the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), served as the launching pad for the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign, which is inspired by the Local Agenda 21 plan to strengthen urban sustainability. To formulate the charter, knowledge was gathered from citizens, local authorities, academics and organizations at national and international levels. ICLEI introduced the Local Agenda 21 planning guide in 1996 to help municipalities manage human settlements towards sustainability, taking into account the Agenda 21 action plan. To this end, sustainable development strategies should be developed to address systemic problems in the long term by involving all relevant stakeholders and giving equal weight to economic, social and environmental aspects. The

planning guide consists of five elements: Partnerships, community-based issue analysis, action planning, implementation and monitoring, and evaluation and feedback. In June 2004, the 4th European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns published a framework of 50 qualitative objectives divided into 10 broad themes known as the Aalborg Commitments to promote local sustainability efforts and revitalize Local Agenda 21. Sustainable development was thus considered as a holistic approach to solving humanity's problems and preventing the destruction of the planet, incorporating various European policies such as the Lisbon Strategy, the Sixth Environmental Action Program and the forthcoming Urban Environment Strategy, as well as the Millennium Development Goals and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (Diaz-Sarachaga, 2019: 2).

In more than 10,000 cities and municipalities worldwide, citizens, groups, associations and initiatives have joined forces with administrations and representatives from the business community to implement Agenda 21 at the local level. However, there are strong disparities between continents and countries. Municipalities in Europe carry out the highest number of local agendas (5292 municipalities in 36 countries), followed by Asia with 674 local agendas in 17 countries. Germany (2042), the UK (425), Italy (429) and Spain (359) are the leading countries in the ranking list (Diaz-Sarachaga, 2019: 2). Since most local agenda s have been undertaken in Germany and the literature on this topic is more extensive than on southern European countries, the focus in this text will be on Germany or more precisely, on Berlin.

In Germany, actors from politics, administration, business, trade unions, churches, associations, environmental and north-south groups and above all from 'non-organized' citizens have been involved in the Local Agenda 21 process. Local Agenda 21 thus represented an interesting offer for civic engagement. It is precisely the activation of civic engagement, voluntary work and citizen participation in urban planning projects that can provide essential impulses for the Local Agenda 21 process. (Hermanns, 2002).

The Berlin House of Representatives adopted the Local Agenda 21 Berlin on June 8, 2006. With this resolution, the House of Representatives committed itself to the guiding idea of sustainable urban development. The Berlin Agenda 21 and its successful implementation is based on the work of four groups of actors. These are the civil society actors, the districts, the senate administration and the parliament. The interface between civil society, business and politics is the association 'Berlin 21 e.V.'. This is seen as the umbrella for all projects and initiatives that are active in Berlin on the topic of sustainable development. The Local Agenda 21 Berlin was oriented towards seven cross-sectional fields of action in which sustainable development is to be implemented: shaping social life in the city, civic

engagement and participation, transport/mobility, Berlin in the Marche landscape, energy and climate protection policy, economy and work, and education for the future. Two thematic areas have been identified as cross-cutting tasks which have an impact on all seven fields of action. The topics of gender justice and global responsibility are considered to be the topics that should be more strongly anchored in all fields of action. The Agenda 21 initiatives in Berlin's districts sometimes differ greatly in their forms of work and the development of their content. The spectrum of topics ranges from local discussion groups on topics such as the future of work or sustainable management, activities for district greening, the introduction of eco-audit systems in municipal administration to the establishment of partnerships with initiatives in developing countries (Schophaus, 2001: 11).

The district of Köpenick became known for having the first Local Agenda 21 initiative in Berlin. Köpenick is one of Berlin's districts with the highest proportion of green spaces and water areas (three-quarters of the area is forest and water). This results in a special responsibility for drinking water protection and fresh air supply in the city. At the same time, the district also includes some of the traditional industrial centers of East Berlin. At the end of the 1990s, however, it was estimated that no more than 5,000 of the former 25,000 industrial jobs still existed (Paetzold, 1998: 77). In the development of a guiding principle for Köpenick, an attempt was made to closely link the goals of social responsibility, a sustainable economy and the sustainable use of the natural environment. The novelty of the Köpenick initiatives for a Local Agenda 21 was that for the first time in Berlin a number of important local actors such as authorities, citizens' associations and initiatives, churches, party representatives, entrepreneurs could be won over for cooperation in a public 'Forum Environment & Development Köpenick'.

In Berlin-Köpenick, the starting point for initiatives and finally for cooperation with the aim of a Local Agenda 21 were, in addition to the recommendations of Agenda 21, the resolutions of the 'Ecumenical Assemblies of the Churches on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation'. This cross-denominational movement had gained particular importance in the former East German Democratic Republic in the 1980s. Independent peace, human rights, environmental and 'one-world-groups' found a space under the 'umbrella of the churches' ('Dach der Kirchen') and a broad discussion about future issues broke out there. In Köpenick there was also an ecumenical discussion group ('Monday evening for all'), for which the principle of 'think globally-act locally' gained new relevance after the fall of communism.

The 'Köpenick Initiative Group One World' (Köpenicker Initiativgruppe Eine Welt), which emerged in 1993, in its search for a political counterpart to the integrative approach of the ecumenical meetings found that the Agenda 21 could be an impetus to transcend the inner-church framework. The idea from Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 to strengthen the role of local communities matched the experience in the churches that even in the ecumenical space it is essential to have the local community as a level of possible action (Paetzold, 1998: 78). In the ecumenical forums the following topics and projects were primarily discussed: (1) an 'Energy Saving' action (after the call of the Protestant Academy Bad Boll and a corresponding synod resolution of the Protestant Church in Berlin-Brandenburg), from which, among other things, a joint project for energy analysis in the 19 parishes in Köpenick emerged (supported by the Independent Institute for Environmental Issues); (2) a partnership with young people in Swaziland and with White Russia; (3) the preparation of ecumenical services and exhibitions for the Köpenick churches (on the occasion of the Climate Summit and the European Ecumenical European Assembly); (4) socially and ecologically exemplary church building projects; (5) contributions to and discussions on the draft of Local Agenda 21 Köpenick.

At the level of the district administration, after the first surveys of CO₂ emissions in the district of Köpenick were presented by the environmental office in mid-1994, and the subject of energy counselling was given an important role, a mayor's declaration was signed in September 1994 by the head of the environmental office on behalf of the district mayor on the occasion of the Heidelberg Conference on Climate Protection, in which the district committed itself step by step to substantial CO₂ reductions. The district office and the Köpenick One World Initiative Group jointly presented the 'Köpenick Model' in a poster exhibition on the fringes of the conference. In September 1996, a first working draft of Local Agenda 21 was presented by the environmental office from a collection of different contributions from the offices, public interest groups and parishes. The first working draft of Local Agenda 21 was discussed in the course of 1997 with the support of the German Institute of Urban Affairs in an inter-agency working group of the district office, so that coordinated models could be presented to the public for discussion in the summer of 1997 (Paetzold, 1998: 80). At the Berlin state level, NGOs such as the environmental and development policy balance sheet Berlin 21, the public working group LA21 at the Green League and the roundtable on sustainable development in Berlin-Brandenburg at the 'Haus der Demokratie' have put pressure on the public in the districts to initiate a broad consultation process.

The successor to Agenda 21, Agenda 2030, was adopted in 2015 by the 193 member countries of the UN. It consists of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). More precise

than the five goals of Agenda 21, the 17 SDGs highlight all the challenges of sustainable development and their interdependence. They constitute a common language at the international, national and local levels.

Framing of Climate Change

Since there is little data on the framing of climate change in Berlin-Köpenick, this subsection will focus on the framing of climate change in Agenda 21 processes in Germany in general. Climate protection, nature conservation, energy and water saving are high on the agenda. According to Born and Kreuzer, it is undisputed that great successes have been achieved in these fields of action. It is therefore not surprising that in many municipalities the coordination of Local Agenda 21 is located in the environmental offices. Despite the focus on nature conservation and environmental protection, the Local Agenda 21 processes have nevertheless opened up the view of an integrative consideration of municipal fields of action and thus led to a turning away from the isolated, often competing consideration of ecological sustainability, social justice and economic efficiency.

A more horizontal and interdepartmental coordination and integration of sustainability has been confronted with the well-known autonomy claims of important policy areas, departments or divisions, as well as competition, multiple responsibilities, lack of coordination or conflicting policies within the public administration. This is especially true for instruments of cross-sectional policy (e.g., interdepartmental working groups, participation-oriented planning procedures, new governance model, city marketing, municipal environmental management, linkage with administrative reform and a binding integration of sustainable development into the ongoing execution of administrative tasks). It is striking that in many places Local Agenda 21 processes and these modernization concepts barely recognize better each other (Born/Kreuzer, 2002: 10).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

Given the diversity of Agenda 21 initiatives and the scarcity of evaluations of the processes, it is difficult to make statements about their inclusiveness. Schophaus distinguishes between two ideal-typical Agenda 21-models: a 'grassroots' and a 'hierarchical' Agenda model. The grassroots democratic model is characterized by an organization with flat hierarchies and by the strategy of involving as many citizens and interest groups as possible. The model faces the challenge of combining the democratic ideals of self-determination and solidarity-based forms of work with the feasibility and effectiveness of the initiative. The hierarchical model is characterized by management by professional

actors—it does not include the broad involvement of citizens and activities are often steered by district administrations. Other stakeholders are brought in for support, but not for equal dialogue about goals, perspectives and activities of the agenda process (Schophaus, 2011: 12).

In structural terms, three main groups of actors can be identified: The citizens, various offices of the district administrations, and associations. According to Schophaus, the participation of citizens in the agenda process in Berlin is quite low. Those who are involved are those who have been involved previously in other initiatives. Those active in the administration are usually the head of the environmental office and more rarely, city councilors are also involved. In general, the initiative rarely comes from an office, but rather from committed individuals who hold an office. If this person changes office, for example, Local Agenda 21 activities stagnate. There was therefore a need for action regarding the structural anchoring of Local Agenda 21's in the offices of the district administrations. With regard to associations, it is mainly people who are traditionally active in environmental protection within NGOs who get involved. This may be a Berlin-specific phenomenon, as this city has had a high proportion of such initiatives since the 1960s. As a result, environmental issues dominate over social and economic issues in Local Agenda 21's. Other associations, such as those of the business community, trade unions, welfare organizations, are generally hardly involved in the district's agenda work. Political parties have so far only been involved in the eastern part of Berlin (ibid., 14).

Popular Control

Schophaus points out that the Agenda 21 processes in Berlin, apart from the ratification of the Aalborg Charter in 1994, did not take enough steps to make the processes politically binding. On the one hand, a lack of commitment on the part of policy-makers hinders the implementation of measures developed in forums. On the other hand, there is the danger that non-bindingness had a negative effect on trust in politics and personal commitment and destroys the social capital built up in the process (Schophaus, 2011: 18). With new forms of citizen participation, the involvement of citizens in future issues was significantly increased, but open planning with a new culture of participation did not prevail. According to Kreuzer and Born, many initially interested citizens realized after a certain time that their great commitment was not much appreciated and that the results, often achieved by consensus, rarely found their way into political decision-making processes. The absence of the local business community from agenda processes must be seen as a major deficit. Although there are a large number of ambitious and competent concepts for the integration of business enterprises in Agenda 21 and sustainability processes, only a few have been realized (Born/Kreuzer, 2002: 11).

Considered Judgment

There is no data available to evaluate how deliberative the Agenda 21 processes in Berlin-Köpenick or in Germany are.

Transparency

Representative surveys indicate that by the year 2000 only 13 % of the population in Germany had heard of the concept of sustainable development. The survey conducted by de Haan et al. in Berlin comes to similarly sobering results regarding the awareness of Local Agenda 21 initiatives. In a survey in the districts of Berlin-Köpenick, -Lichtenberg, -Steglitz and -Tiergarten, only 16 % of the citizens had heard of the Local Agenda 21 initiative in their district (Schophaus, 2011: 16). Born and Kreuzer point out that one reason for the lack of awareness of Agenda 21 processes is the difficulty in communicating the abstract concept of sustainability. With more active public relations work, many municipalities are making greater efforts to increase the visibility of the agenda process. For this purpose, popular people from society and attractive showcase projects ('good examples') are sought (Born/Kreuzer, 2002: 10).

Challenges

Two of the six challenges are met by the case.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

The discussion and consultation processes within the framework of Agenda 21 have brought complex issues such as climate protection, nature conservation, energy and water saving to the forefront.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

The linkage of different actors from citizens to churches and business to the local district administration contributes to synergy optimization in an interscalar perspective.

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4.3.6. Food and Agriculture Organization Regional Conferences (United Nations)

Civil society participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) dates back to the 1970s. The World Food Conference, in 1974, granted observer status for 161 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 1996 the World Food Summit was part of the UN Conference cycle and a parallel forum was held by Europe-based NGOs. Peasant movements were invited, but resented not having enough voice and so created the International Planning Committee (IPC), a global network of small-scale food producers, rural workers, grass roots movements and allies. Since then, the IPC supports grassroots connections to the FAO.

The 1996 Rome Declaration affirmed the right to food. The IPC, led by La Via Campesina, criticized the focus on food production and supply, defending the food sovereignty agenda, pushing the discussion towards the role of peasants and small farmers on food production, knowledge transmission and biodiversity protection. The IPC guaranteed the presence of grassroots movements in global food and agriculture debates, fostering their connections to FAO, with special focus on the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) (McKeon, 2015).

While civil society organizations (CSOs) had been demanding FAO for more participatory channels, the 2008 economic crisis and its impacts on food prices endorsed the need both for FAO reforms and for strengthening global mechanisms for regulating food and agriculture policies. This would balance the previous shift of food and agriculture decisions to economic actors such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization (McKeon, 2015, p. 84). In the crisis scenario, FAO opened venues for civil society participation and expected the committee to be “the foremost inclusive international policy body for food and agriculture within the UN system” (Action Aid et al, 2010, p.1).

In 2008 the reformed Food Security Committee included 192 government representatives and 41 civil society members from 11 sectors and 17 regions. Moreover, civil society was granted the right to speak during official meetings⁵⁰. In 2009, FAO created two independent mechanisms for the relations with the UN Committee on World Food Security: one for the private sector and another one for the civil society and indigenous peoples (CSIPM). Each mechanism holds periodic meetings, is consulted about specific issues, and selects its representatives on the CFS. The CSIPM is open to any interested organization as long as it fits the criteria thematically or regionally. There are 11 constituencies: smallholder farmers,

⁵⁰ Only state members can vote. FAO is clear on the principle that state representatives are the ones that make the decisions, remain the main interlocutors for FAO and its member governments, and are held accountable for the decisions (FAO, 2013).

pastoralists/herders, fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, agricultural and food workers, landless, women, youth, consumers, urban food insecure and NGOs. Also, there are 17 sub-regions, which allow the inclusion of local organizations from each area.

The CSIPM encompassed ‘several hundred’ organizations so far, according to information available at the website (csm4cfs.org). There is an elected coordination committee of 35 people, selected from the 11 constituencies and 17 sub-regions. The coordination committee is responsible for facilitating the work of the CSOs, sharing information and ensuring that organizing principles are followed. It also promotes dialogues, supporting analysis and advocacy. Within the committee, there is an advisory group of eight people, elected every two years, who become members of the CFS advisory group. Finally, there are policy working groups that focus on specific issues.⁵¹ The civil society mechanism is relevant for this case study because it is the entry point for the civil society organizations that participate in FAO’s regional conferences.

Regional Conferences

Regional conferences are bi-annual official forums held at each of FAO’s five regions: Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, Africa and the Near East. Member states, usually represented by its ministers/secretaries of agriculture, discuss regional agendas for food and agriculture. Following the guidelines for the CSIPM, the CSOs are invited to contribute in annual CFS activities as well as in inter-sessional activities at all levels (national, regional, global). The ‘mechanism’ remains the coordinating body for CS participation at each level. There are several observers, but also civil society spokespersons who may engage in official debates.

Prior to the regional conferences the civil society consultations takes place. This is a two-day civil society preparatory meeting supported by FAO, in which activists discuss the official agenda and prepare their participation, which includes a formal statement and oral interventions. The meeting is an open space for drawing collective strategies and may also lead to public letters on specific issues. Additionally, it allows activists to discuss civil society work in the region, including its cooperation with FAO (FAO, 2018). Technical officers from FAO’s regional office may assist with the presentation of the agenda items, but they may not interfere with civil society definitions.

⁵¹ <https://www.csm4cfs.org/what-is-the-csm/#what-is-the-csm>

Preparatory meetings are not a unique feature for CSIPM—there were, for instance, preparatory meetings at the Mercosur Specialized Meeting for Family Farming since the mid-2000s (von Bülow e Carvalho, 2012). They resemble the ‘parallel forums’ that took place during the conference cycles, only now they are part of the institutional structure. In FAOs context, it is part of the strategy of granting autonomy to the CSO organization, allowing internal consultations and sufficient time for CSOs to gather information and consolidate its positions (FAO, 2013, p.15). The outcomes of civil society consultations don't directly interfere in the agenda, but the meeting outcomes may be channeled into the regional conference's agenda by FAO officials (FAO, 2022).

At every regional conference there is one joint civil society statement read during the official program and later published as part of the conference documents. Eventually, during the preparatory meetings CS may also prepare public letters and trace its media and publicity strategies.

In 2012 the regional conference of Europe and Central Asia allowed—for the first time—the participation of three CS spokespersons with equal rights to speak and interact as government participants, both at the senior officers and the ministerial section of the regional conference (FAO, 2012). Until 2012, all CS observers could speak only at the end of the session, after all member states. Currently, in addition to the spokespersons, observers continue to be allowed at meetings, but can speak only after the member-states. The purpose of these participatory channels is “ensuring that [government] decisions were taken in cognizance of the views of civil society stakeholders in their regions.” (FAO, 2012, p.6).

At every meeting one spokesperson reads the CS statement. This person is selected during the civil society consultation prior to the regional conference. In Europe, the spokesperson has been speaking on behalf of the Nyéléni Europe and Central Asia Food Sovereignty Network. In 2012, for instance, the statement included general remarks, recommendations to member states and recommendations to FAO. The CS is allowed to indicate several spokespersons, which rotate three at a time, depending on the agenda item (FAO, 2012).

In 2018, another innovation took place and a spokesperson from the CSO delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Europe and Central Asia Regional Conference as a result of previous years of partnership between the FAO and CSO constituencies. The 2018 CSO Consultation took place in Budapest and gathered 53 participants from several countries of the region. The civil society activists selected who would speak on their behalf during the official meeting. Travel and accommodation for around 30 people were covered

by FAO. The Regional Conference for Europe took place a few days later in Voronezh, Russian Federation.

The 2020 statement focused on the role of women and began presenting a woman's perspective on the food and farming systems. In this meeting the civil society presented suggestions and demands for FAO, but also talked about their own plans for regional action (which shows the relevance of the meetings for civil society networking and planning). The statement also indicates that there were tensions regarding how FAO handled its preparation. It is a sign of independence of civil society when they feel free to criticize the hosting institution. The 2022 statement had a different tone and addressed the war in Ukraine questioning the Russian attacks. The chosen spokesperson was an activist from Kyiv, Ukraine, and suggests that the civil society participants are also able to engage in pressing contemporary issues.

Framing of Climate Change

World food security governance entails a debate on whether ensuring food for all humans is a technical matter of productivity or a political matter of guaranteeing food for all, for those who can and cannot afford it. This dispute is at the FAO's core and continuously re-emerges in different forms. In the 1970s it was about improving mechanization, in the 2000s it focused on GMOs and pesticides. Hence, food governance and climate governance both face the dispute between a market-led or an inclusion-led model. Their connections, however, are wider, as "the food crisis does not travel unaccompanied" (McKeon, 2011, p. 2).

Food production and distribution is a key element of the environmental crisis, hence democratic innovations capable of producing impacts on the food and agriculture agenda are directly related to the environmental agenda. On the one hand, agriculture is one of the main sources of greenhouse gas emissions, responsible for around 14% of global rates. Food producers of all sizes and political tendencies are affected by climate change and the energy crisis. The growing demand for food commodities increases land prices and land-grabbing expels traditional producers, pastoralists, fishermen. The capitalist food system depends on chemicals, fertilizers and on petrol for the global trade of goods and products. On the other hand, agriculture may be part of the environmental solution, since "the agricultural sector could be largely carbon neutral by 2030 and produce enough food for a growing population if localized agro-ecologic systems proven to reduce emissions were widely adopted." (McKeon, 2011, p.3).

In terms of the encounter between participatory innovations, food and agriculture, FAO has made it clear that the inclusion of different sectors of the civil society in the discussions is not perfunctory. Civil society offers information about the problems that need to be faced by the international system, provides feedback on local needs, shortens the links to grassroots communities and helps formulate better-targeted projects and programs. Because they offer “technical expertise, prevalence in the field and proximity to the hungry and poor, civil society organizations are critical partners in the fight against hunger.” (FAO, 2018).

Democratic goods

Inclusiveness

The case contributes to all democratic goods to varying degrees.

By allowing civil society organizations to engage in food governance it increases inclusivity and there is no doubt there are efforts for guaranteeing that the voices of civil society activists are heard to during the official meetings. Their presence also contributes to increasing the transparency of processes, procedures and decision-making. The way FAO organizes the participation of civil society in three branches (social movements, NGOs and member-based organizations) provides an interesting solution to the problem of civil society heterogeneity and the inequalities caused by the economic, technical and political differences between NGOs and other branches, which has generated fierce disputes in the food and agriculture governance area.

Popular Control

There are important limits to popular control since the multilateral organization did not advance its participatory channels to voting. FAO restricted voting to member states claiming that governments are the ones in charge of the decisions and of its consequences. The statement is not uncorrect, but the challenge of including non-state actors in actual transnational decision-making remains unresolved.

Considered Judgment and Transparency

The mechanisms for improving CS participation such as the civil society mechanism of the CFS and meetings prior to the regional conferences also contribute to the quality of the deliberation and to the circulation of information among the activists, fostering both transparency and their informed judgment.

Challenges

Five of the six challenges are met by varying degrees by the case.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

The inclusion of non-state actors in food governance debates contributes to the understandability of complex issues. Methodologically, the preparatory civil society meetings for the regional FAO conferences may be an interesting contribution to the toolkit that aims at overcoming this challenge. It provides time and resources for the CSOs to discuss complex issues in depth and to build common positions around them.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

FAO's reformed Committee and its 2013 strategy for relating with CSOs are inherently transcalar. There are two levels of engagement between the UN agency and CSOs: global-headquarters and decentralized (regional, national, local). At the global level, it aims at guaranteeing that 'the poor and marginalized' points of view reach the global-level debates, mediated by different CSOs. At the national level, FAO's role is to foster and support relations between member states and CSOs. FAO has been highlighting the relevance of the decentralized level (FAO, 2013).

The case presents an interesting solution to the transcalar challenge. It is based on the perception that global debates are rooted on regional issues that need to be discussed with the presence of local stakeholders. Additionally, it is well known that participation in regional and global UN activities, especially when there are economic resources for supporting participation, contributes to the formation of civil society networks and alliances.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

Behavioral changes are difficult to measure, but exposing national governments to civil society arguments during international meetings may favor behavioral changes in at least two directions. First, it may create a trust environment where connections between government officials and civil society organizations may increase. Second, governments may be more prone to listening to substantive arguments at an international level than they would be in domestic environments.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

At least three features of the CFS are worth noting for methodological purposes. First, the private sector and the civil society mechanisms are separated, to guarantee that different non-state actors are taken into account and that conflicting visions among the CSOs may be expressed freely. Second, civil society is divided into three different categories: (a) non-governmental organizations including formally constituted, legally registered, free from commercial interests, non-profit organizations that provide services, information and advocacy activities for social movements, or grassroots organizations, (b) member-based organizations which include trade unions, and locally-based associations of stakeholders, and (c) social movements—a category for groups that defend specific constituencies interests (fishers, forest dwellers, indigenous peoples, rural workers, etc.) and includes platforms, committees, mechanisms, federations and networks of advocacy-based and policy-oriented organizations, according to FAO. Under the civil society umbrella are small-scale producers, whereas large-scale producers, commercial food organizations and foundations are considered under the FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector (FAO, 2013). This is not a clear-cut differentiation, but it guarantees that small farmers, and peasants will not be silenced by better structured and funded farmers associations. The attention to the specificities of civil society may be an institutional sign that the power and economic differences within civil society, and the strength of civil society in the area, given the historic tensions between NGOs and SMOs in the food and agriculture agenda.

Finally, the decision-making is intended to occur during plenary sessions, with the purpose of allowing all participants to engage in the deliberative debates—even though voting is restricted to governments.

Since civil society organizations do not vote on the FAO regional conferences, deliberation as decision-making is not improved by the case. However, the quality of argument exchange may be enhanced to the extent that currently civil society participants are allowed to engage in official debates and present their own positions, which must at least be heard by the government officials and may influence their vote.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

The whole participatory system designed for the reformed CFS relies on the understanding that CSOs are not only key stakeholders but that they also play a role in food security and poverty reduction by suggesting issues, designing, executing and implementing projects and initiatives in these areas. This sets an environment that is prone to the creation of relations among CSOs, state actors and UN bureaucrats. Yet, it is the promotion of

situations where civil society and officials engage in public debates that may contribute to mutual trust relations.

Additionally, there is the possibility of increasing mutual trust within the civil society organizations that meet and network during FAOs regional and global activities. Finally, trust among civil society and international staff may be increased as they engage in mutual efforts for organizing the two-day preparatory meetings and discussing shared agendas.

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4.4. Public Debate

4.4.1. Local public Debate (Saint-Denis, Réunion Island, France)

The ‘Nouvelle Entrée Ouest de Saint-Denis’ (NEO) project is located on the Barachois, the seafront of Saint-Denis, an emblematic place marked by the island’s history and culture. The NEO project, which is supported by three project owners, consisting of the Réunion Region, the City of Saint-Denis and the Community of Cities (CINOR) proposes to redevelop a large coastal strip of between 5 and 16 hectares with recreational facilities, sports areas, a natural swimming pool, bars and restaurants, esplanades and public squares. It will requalify the national road, which has been erased underground, into a 2x2-lane road according to five solutions proposed to the public.⁵² The local public debate on the NEO project, which took place from September 15 to December 31, 2020 and was organized by the CNDP, aimed to ascertain the public’s attitude not only towards the five different solutions for road construction, but also towards the possible alternatives to the project and its impacts on the environment.

The particularity of this public debate is to have set up—for the first time in the history of the CNDP—a citizens’ conference prior to the public debate in order to define how the subject should be posed, which main themes and controversies should be addressed in priority and who are the most concerned audiences. The citizens also decided on the channels of mobilization and communication to be used for the debate. Letting the citizens co-construct the modalities of the debate was a way to enhance its legitimacy and acceptance, as the last public debate in 2018 in Réunion Island was highly politicized and risked being cancelled before the end (Interview Augagneur, 2022).⁵³ On the first day, the project owners, the CNDP and the special Commission for Public Debate (CPDP) presented the project, the purpose of the debate and its challenges to the 60 participants of the citizens’ conference. Other stakeholders and experts, such as environmental associations, academics, the Architects of the Buildings of France, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of Réunion (CESER), the Council for Culture, Education and the Environment (CCEE) intervened to give their point of view on the issues related to the NEO project. On the second day, the participants examined the different tools and modalities available for the construction of public debate. A number of modalities already tested in other debates were

⁵² The five different solutions are classified into two families: The first consists of three routes via open trenches and covered trenches with varying sea access. The second comprises two routes with a tunnel crossing of the Barachois, thus freeing up a vast car-free zone of almost 1.5 km in length. The cost of the project is estimated at between 217 and 618 million € depending on the solution (excluding taxes).

⁵³ We sincerely thank Floran Augagneur, one of the two current vice-presidents of the CNDP and the president of this local public debate, for the Interview on November 3 2022, that serves as the basis for the following subchapter. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses in this subchapter, are based on this Interview.

adjusted to the local context, such as ‘mobile debates’ consisting of stands at markets and debate events. Other more innovative initiatives, such as the initiation of ‘local initiative picnics’, the installation of a ‘House of Debate’ at the project site and the mobilization through ‘debate ambassadors’⁵⁴, were designed by the participants specifically for this public debate. All the recommendations of the participants were implemented without any modification as they did not exceed the budget of 905,000 €.

The local initiative picnics (later called "Neo an kamarad") are inspired by the local customs of Sunday gatherings as well as the sociability of picnics in Réunion Island. The aim was to use everyday exchanges and to allow as many people as possible to participate by allowing anyone to involve those around them, since to participate only required (a minimum of) two people to meet and answer a few questions on the NEO project electronically.⁵⁵ The ‘House of Debate’ was a place on the Barachois open to the public almost every afternoon to allow them to access complete information on the project and on the debate, and to participate in it. Models of the Barachois, built by a young graduate of the school of architecture, offered a projection of the possible future of this place. A virtual reality table allowed visitors to visualize the different routes studied, but also to design the future spaces of the Barachois themselves, starting from one of the proposed routes, and to better understand the issues related to the development of the space. Once a week, a technician employed by the project owners was present at the virtual reality table to answer the public’s questions. Due to the pandemic, a maximum of seven people could visit and debate in the House of Debate at the same time. At the end of their visit, they were asked to fill out a qualitative questionnaire asking their position on the project.⁵⁶

In addition, three participatory thematic workshops in the form of ‘mini-publics’ were organized. The workshops dealt with the topics identified by the citizens’ conference: redevelopment, public space and mobility. The idea was to bring together the views of various stakeholders in social and environmental democracy (environmental associations, representatives of the disabled, professionals, representatives of the institutions, transporters, etc.) and experts of the given topics (notably academics). These participatory thematic workshops aimed to formulate proposals on specific issues that would then be

⁵⁴ The ‘debate ambassadors’ were set up to further involve the participants of the citizens’ conference who wished to continue their investment. Their role is to make sure that everyone in their immediate environment knows about the debate and how to participate in it.

⁵⁵ 5,752 persons contributed in a local initiative picnic.

⁵⁶ 1,200 persons visited the House of Debate and stayed for 40 minutes on average.

discussed with the public towards the end of the public debate at a dedicated public meeting. In this context, 22 other actors from the civil society or the political sphere, such as Extinction Rebellion, ATTAC or the local The France Insoumise party, have also contributed to the workshops by publishing their written positions on the project in an ‘actor’s notebook’ (Report NEO: 43).

At the end of the procedure, the CNDP analyzed all the arguments expressed by the public during the debate.⁵⁷ Three-and-half months of debate revealed a deep discrepancy between the public’s main concern, which is to find a solution to traffic congestions and the lack of public transport in this part of the Island and beyond, and the project owners, whose concern is to create an economically and touristic attractive place on the seafront. It is not a particular road that is criticized, but the objective of restructuring the western entrance in general, because it does not address the more pressing need of the public for better mobility (Interview Augagneur, 2022). Furthermore, the public bemoans a lack of coherent governance, as several road and mobility projects are being carried out in the area at the same time without these projects being coordinated (Report NEO: 100).

After the CNDP asked the project owners to respond to the public’s queries and criticisms and they could not respond sufficiently and satisfactorily, the NEO project is today suspended until further notice.

Framing of Climate Change

Although the project is not directly related to climate change, it has addressed this topic at some points. For example, the public pointed to the lack of information on the project’s impact in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. The NEO project is presented as facilitating traffic in the area with a traffic increase that the project owners roughly estimate at 3%. However, the public raises the question how the increase in road traffic is compatible with the general policies for reducing the consumption of fossil fuels set out in Réunion’s regional climate and energy plan (SRCAE). The CNDP recommended that the project owners

⁵⁷ The corpus includes all the written contributions published on the debate website or on the platform, as well as the reports of the workshops and transcriptions of the seven radio broadcast public events. The analysis of arguments has been complemented by a lexicometry analysis. The method of argumentative analysis covers the entire scope of a public debate as defined by the Environmental Code (project opportunity, alternatives, objectives, characteristics, impacts on the environment and regional planning, lack of implementation and methods of public participation after the debate has ended). Moreover, the public can raise other issues and topics of the debate that are important to them and place them at the level they consider important.

publish a study on the greenhouse gas emission consequences of the traffic projections on which the project is based. The public also complained that the use of cars is once again being encouraged by this project, as is the infrastructure that goes with it, instead of promoting other, more environmentally friendly forms of mobility (Report NEO: 175).

Issues that address biodiversity were also discussed. Some participants highlighted the need to reduce light pollution and to respect the regulations concerning lighting (orientation, color, power) in order to reduce the impact on avifauna and in particular on a local bird, the petrel, which is particularly sensitive to light (Interview Augagneur, 2022). Others stressed the impact of roadworks on vegetation, marine wildlife and the importance of maintaining trees and green spaces (Report NEO: 65).

Democratic Goods

Inclusiveness

In total, 8,000 people actively participated in the debate, whether through a written contribution, a public event, a visit to the house of debate or an online contribution. According to Augagneur's statements, the debate achieved one of the highest participation rates for a local debate (Interview Augagneur, 2022).

The introduction of the citizens' conference and the (voluntary) involvement of citizens in the dissemination of the debate through 'debate ambassadors' makes the debate rather inclusive.

For the citizens' conference the commission proposed that the members of the three local participatory bodies made up of citizens drawn by lot (Observatoire des Prix et des Marges de La Réunion, the citizens' council of the city's priority neighborhoods, the Citizens' Consultative Council) take part in this citizens' conference. Three other colleges made up of concerned citizens completed the conference: shopkeepers and residents of the Barachois, road users, and users of the Barachois (selected by drawing lots based on expressions of interest). A seventh college of students and young people in training completed the recruitment of this citizens' conference. In this way, disadvantaged young people were also explicitly included in the debate.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, some oral forms of debate that would have gathered many people had to be cancelled. Accordingly, much reliance was placed on written questionnaires, which has a distinct disadvantage in terms of inclusion of less educated, foreign or young people. For example, Augagneur reports that some school children spoke enthusiastically and gave their opinions as they looked at the virtual reality table with the

headphones on. But afterwards, when the CNDP asked them to fill out the questionnaire, they were no longer motivated. He concludes that they should have filmed the participants at the virtual reality table so that their arguments could be transcribed and included in the debate (Interview Augagneur, 2022).

Popular Control

The public debate is usually only consultative in character. It can, however, have the consequence that projects that meet with too much criticism from the public are not implemented.

In the NEO Debate, Extinction Rebellion and other stakeholders initiated the discussion that they do not only want to be consulted only on individual road construction projects, but that the public should have their say on the overall philosophy on mobility and road construction on the island. They want to co-develop an overarching policy on how to tackle the transport problem from all points of view, including ecological and social (Interview Augagneur, 2022). Following the public's request to hold a public consultation on mobility and public transport on the scale of the entire island, the CNDP recommended that the project owners set up a general assembly ('état généraux'). The Region Réunion has accepted this recommendation and will start the general assembly in January 2023. In the meantime, the different projects have been put on hold. Here, the debate has revealed a deeper and more complex problem that needs to be addressed again in a deliberative and participatory way.

Considered Judgement

The public debate has deliberated at various points, as already mentioned. However, the formats (except for the mini-publics), which due to the pandemic were often aimed at informing the public or on identifying their opinions, may lack somewhat in deliberative quality, because they didn't sufficiently encourage the participants to reflect on other perspectives.

Transparency

Internal transparency, meaning that participants were informed about the conditions of their participation, was observed.

The debate enjoyed a relatively high level of attention through its partnerships with the local media, in particular radio RTL Réunion and the public TV channel Réunion La 1ère. Both mainstream media outlets have carried out several campaigns to encourage participation in the debate.

The idea of the public broadcast events was to hold events in the presence of the public and to broadcast them in order to be followed more widely. In the end, the pandemic did not allow these events to be held in public, but the television and radio programs (seven in total) were essential in allowing the public to exchange views publicly with representatives of the project owners, members of the CPDP and experts (historians and archaeologists).

Floran Augagneur, as Vice-President of the CNDP and as President of the NEO debate, wished to debate even the preliminary results of the debate with the audience again to see if new arguments would be brought forward and to present the first lessons learned from this debate. This is also a novelty that was tried out in this debate in order to keep the debate as close as possible to the audience.

Two weeks before the public debate actually ended, a final public event was broadcast on Radio RTL Réunion. This exercise allowed the public to publicly give feedback on the debate while allowing the CNDP to respond (since the debate continued online until December 31, 2020) and for the project owners to provide additional insights. However, the event did not have the desired effect and closed the debate rather than taking it into a final feedback loop or re-launching it, as Augagneur self-critically admits (Interview Augagneur, 2022). But it did have the merit of informing and involving the public until the end of the debate.

Challenges

Three of the six challenges are met by the case.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

In addition to the central issue of sustainable mobility, complex topics such as the preservation of greenhouse gas emissions, green spaces and biodiversity were discussed and made accessible to citizens through the debate. The fact that the debate does not ultimately focus solely on the various road construction options, but addresses these broader and deeper issues, demonstrates the complexity of the topic alone and its interrelated relations with other climate-related topics.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue to face conflictual visions and expectations for the EGD

The possibility of submitting written comments on the project in the 'actors' notebook' has made it possible to conduct a broad deliberative dialogue on mobility and, in the widest sense, the fight against climate change. It has also made it possible to at least identify and

consult different perspectives on this fight as well as on the deliberative process itself. This indirectly promotes deliberative solution finding.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

It is difficult to say whether the public debate has actually led to confidence-building among different participants. But it can be assumed that the fact that—at the request of the public—the project was suspended and a new, more extensive consultation commissioned, has had a positive effect on trust relations among the participants of the debate and public authorities.

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4.4.2. Regional Public Debate (Puglia, Italy)

The following subchapter analyzes the public debate process on the construction of an alternative corridor to the section of Highway 16 (called the 'Adriatica' because it follows the Adriatic coastline) that passes through the municipalities of Bari, Triggiano, Noicàttaro and Mola di Bari in the region Puglia. The debate was convened by the project proponent: the listed company ANAS Spa, which builds and manages roads and highways. The procedures started on February 10, 2022, when the proponent presented their project dossier, and concluded in July 2022, when they submitted their final dossier to the National Commission for Public Debate (NCPD).

The public debate on the Highway 16 alternative route between Bari and Mola was held according to the provisions of Prime Ministerial Decree no. 76 of August 24, 2018 (Decree 76/2018). In Italy, public debate was introduced by the Code for Tenders and Public Contracts under art. 22, par. 2 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016 (Decree 50/2016) and enacted by Decree 76/2018. According to this regulatory framework, the process involves providing information, promoting engagement and conducting public discussion on the need for and design of large-scale projects (art. 2 of Decree 76/2018), the purpose of which is to improve the development of an infrastructure project in its preliminary phase through community contributions. This process is not a decision-making tool, as the proponent is responsible for all decisions regarding the need for and implementation of the project.

According to the law, the obligation to put infrastructure projects up for public debate at the planning phase depends on the two criteria of type and cost, a detailed list of these is published in Annex 1 of Decree 76/2018. Any project that exceeds the legal limits must be subject to a public debate. Moreover, Article 3 of Decree 76/2018 specifies the conditions under which a public debate may also be convened for projects that cost from approximately 66% to 100% of the legal limits.

Public debate processes can involve the following participants:

- National Commission for Public Debate (NCPD). As provided for by article 4 of Decree 76/2018, this commission was established by the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport through Decree no. 627 of December 30, 2020. Its functions are to monitor the correct execution of public debates, promote public engagement and ensure that all related information is thorough and correct. Every two years, the commission must submit a report to the government and parliament summarizing its activities of that period and proposing improvements to legislation.
- Contracting entity or authority. In accordance with article 7 of Decree 76/2018, this subject, also known as the proponent, convenes and manages the debate and bears all costs.

- **Public debate coordinator (PDC).** This actor designs and manages all aspects of a public debate (duration, location, public involvement, etc.). He or she facilitates and ensures dialogue among all subjects as a third and independent party. At the request of the contracting entity, the PDC will be selected from among managers within the competent ministry. In the absence of public managers with proven experience in conducting participatory and conflict-resolution processes, the role will be assigned to an expert through a public procedure. The PDC also prepares a final report, which must include a description of all activities performed, a transparent and objective summary of all topics and positions that emerged during the debate and a list of any remaining issues that the proponent must resolve in their final dossier.
- **Interested parties.** A public debate may be attended by any person in the community wishing to obtain information regarding a project or propose changes or improvements to it through their questions, opinions or contributions. Other participants include stakeholders, local authorities and institutions, trade unions and professional associations and other types (cultural, environmental, etc.) of organizations and interest groups.

A public debate is based on one or two types of documents written by the proponent: a technical and economic feasibility study and/or a feasibility paper on design alternatives. Prior to the debate, the contents of the study or studies in question are translated into non-technical language and become the project dossier. A public debate has a maximum duration of four months from publication of the project dossier; however, in case of proven need, the PDC may ask the NCPD for an extension of up to two months, which will follow the timetable outlined in the debate program. During the public debate process, all interested parties (individuals, authorities, organizations, etc.) may send position papers (i.e., written statements containing opinions and suggestions regarding the project and debate) to the PDC.

When the public discussions have concluded, the PDC has thirty days to draft their final report, which must include the findings from all meetings and position papers. Upon conclusion of the public debate process, the proponent has sixty days to present their Final dossier in response to the final report, which will explain publicly if and how they intend to continue with designing and implementing the project.

Framing of Climate Change

Infrastructures that are subject by law to public debate (i.e., roads, railways, ports, airports, power lines, energy production plants, etc.) are extremely complex projects due to their construction issues and environmental impacts. This includes the Bari-Mola section of the Highway 16 Alternative Route, as this is a new corridor that will have significant impact on

the environment due to consumption of agricultural land. Moreover, the area chosen for the infrastructure coincides with several ecosystems that are extremely valuable and environmentally vulnerable, such as Lama San Giorgio and Lama Giotta.

These issues and others concerning the acoustic, atmospheric and light impacts of the project were repeatedly raised by the community during the public debate. In reality, the environmental impacts of the project only emerged as a result of the nature of the project itself and the sensitivity of the community involved.

This was due to the fact that Decree 76/2018 contains no provisions for protection of the environment. While the decree aims to facilitate and guarantee the right of individuals to access information and participate in a public debate, it makes no reference to finding an appropriate balance between defending these rights and protecting the environment. In summary, according to Italian law, public debate is only a useful tool for increasing general knowledge about a project, soliciting design alternatives and guaranteeing that all points of view are recognised and respected. While this type of decision-making process is democratic, it has no regard for the concept of environmental protection, therefore excluding it from being a substantial element of a debate process. These considerations are further reinforced by the following issues:

- the Code for Tenders and Public Contracts was implemented by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and, thus, was not developed to address issues of environmental protection;
- the National Commission for Public Debate, which was established by the same ministry, does not take the natural environment into consideration;
- the Commission of Environmental Impact Assessment, which was asked to evaluate the project only after the public debate had concluded, merely acknowledged the issues that emerged during the procedures.

Therefore, as regulated by Decree 76/2018, the public debate process has very limited ability and power to protect the environment.

Democratic Goods

The public debate regarding the Bari-Mola section of the Highway 16 Alternative Route put into practice the following four democratic goods.

Inclusiveness

The public debate used specific methods of community engagement to ensure access to the procedures and give a voice to all point of views regarding the project in question. The PDC, who was tasked by law to design the public debate, selected and implemented various engagement tools throughout the process to ensure that the procedures could be modified in response to any needs emerging from either the context or interaction between the subjects involved.

The debate program was organized into five closely interconnected steps:

1. Conflict analysis study: conducted through confidential interviews with several key subjects in the area (i.e., trade associations, unions, environmental groups, etc.) to explain the public debate process to them, understand their concerns regarding the project, solicit questions and contributions from them to encourage them to write position papers.
2. Onsite inspections: conducted by representatives from local communities and citizen committees in the areas affected by construction of the infrastructure. The inspections aimed to better understand the archaeological, historical, environmental and production specifics of these areas, as well as the point of view of local communities, particularly the most vulnerable, with respect to the proposed project.
3. Community open houses: presented the project and its potential for and impact on local communities to the four municipalities involved. These meetings were open-door and allowed all interested parties to participate in person or remotely and address any questions or concerns regarding the project directly to its designer.
4. Online thematic forums: focused on the effects of the project on the entire area. The first meeting presented the archaeological, environmental and landscape issues; the second examined the impact of the corridor on the economic and production system; the third dealt with the timeline and implementation of the project. These meetings were also open-door and the public focused on specific issues through virtual roundtables that were facilitated by experts who helped them to express their point of views, concerns or feedback.
5. Technical roundtables: in-depth discussions between the project proponent and local authorities and agencies involved in subsequent approval phases. This step was not open to the public.

To incentivize community engagement, an information campaign was carried out using print (posters and leaflets) and digital (dedicated website and Facebook page) advertising.

These communication mechanisms were able to involve 700 individuals, attract 2,810 website visitors and generate 12 position papers. All questions and input received from the public were summarized in a table organized by category and included in the final report.

Popular Control

The public debate, which took place during the development of the project, was preceded by a series of procedural steps that both differentiated it from other debates previously held in Italy and had a profound effect on popular control and the conditions under which it was executed. The proposed corridor had already been a contentious issue with the local administrations involved, as a result of which a preliminary Conference of Services (held in accordance with art. 27, par. 3 of Decree 50/2016) was conducted and concluded with a written agreement signed by the region and municipalities on December 19, 2019. The conference listened to the concerns of the municipalities and selected Alternative 3 from the various proposals that had been presented and analyzed.

Therefore, the public debate did not take place in reference to a feasibility paper on design alternatives but rather to a technical and economic feasibility study, which had first compared all the alternatives and then focused specifically on the corridor preferred by the proponent. The fact that the debate took place in reference to a document stating that the selection of the technically preferred corridor had been the result of a prior, long-term political discussion had a detrimental effect on the debate process. In fact, it caused the public to have very little confidence in the ability of the procedures to ensure open discussion on the real reasons for and opportunities created by the project.

The detailed design of the technically preferred corridor led to the perception that ‘the game is over’ and, thus, the only purpose of the public debate was to make improvements to a ‘done deal’. This belief on the part of the public stifled widespread engagement in the process and monopolized the dynamics of the discussion, diminishing its deliberative power and causing the public to actually doubt its legitimacy. Moreover, local authorities were dismayed by the potential ability of the public debate to reopen ‘les jeux’ regarding the alternatives, call the results of the conference into question and raise doubts about the decision that had been taken.

Considered Judgement

As explained above, to ensure informed community engagement, the third step of the public debate was a series of community open houses (COH) to present the project to the public.

The four meetings, one for each city the corridor would pass through, were open to everyone, with the possibility of participating both in person and online. The events were held in local offices agreed upon by with the municipalities and the speakers were the project proponent and designer, and the mayors of the four towns involved.

Each COH was divided into two sessions of equal duration: in the first, the project was presented by the proponent and designer; in the second, the public asked questions and gave feedback. All the materials presented had been reviewed by the PDC in long preparatory meetings with the designer to ensure that the contents and graphic representations were both thorough and understandable to the public. In view of the large number of participants and to ensure equal time for all, questions were solicited in advance via chat and email for people who would be participating online and on paper for those who would be present at the venue. The PDC then grouped the questions by topic and submitted them to experts, so that all issues could be thoroughly addressed at the COH. Prior to the conclusion of each meeting, all participants, whether online or present in the room, were given the opportunity to ask questions or give feedback. In addition to direct participation in these events, the public was also invited to submit questions and contributions via a dedicated telephone number and email address. The PDC and their team, who liaised between the community and proponent, responded individually to all of the calls and emails received. After each COH, a summary report was published containing all the questions and contributions from the public and all the responses from the proponent.

The deliberative phase included three in-depth study meetings to further examine key issues. Each online forum was divided into three sessions:

1. the proponent and designer examined the key issues in detail;
2. the public was divided into virtual discussion tables moderated by expert facilitators to deliberate on the project and formulate questions or contributions, which were transcribed by the facilitator and organized by topic in a shared document;
3. the shared document was sent to the proponent and designer who responded to the merits of the issues raised by the public.

The purpose of these discussions was to give all interested citizens the opportunity to express their positions and concerns regarding the issues analyzed and to avoid having the discussion dominated by the most active participants.

Transparency

The following actions were undertaken to inform the community about the existence of DI rules and standards and their role in the decision-making process:

- a media campaign that included one press conference, seven press releases, fourteen press articles and one appearance by the PDC on a talk show on a local television network;
- informal talks between the PDC and key local stakeholders carried out prior to the four COH;
- onsite inspections by the PDC, their staff and citizens of the areas that would be affected by construction of the infrastructure.

Challenges

At least three of the six challenges are met by the case.

Challenge 1. Setting adequate time frame horizon for the policy/topic at stake

The public debate accelerates the public discussion and summarizes the issues and positions in a very short time period. In this way, it helped to reduce the overall time of the procedure, making it possible to arrive at a more consensual decision in a shorter time.

Challenge 2. Improving the understandability and tractability of complex issues and their interrelated relations

Public debate procedures, particularly thanks to onsite inspections that were based on the knowledge and competences of local actors, definitely improved understanding of the complexity of environmental issues related to the infrastructure project. The debate highlighted characteristics and assessments of the area that the project had not focused on and, consequently, had not adopted. For example, the extensive biodiversity of the lamas and vulnerability of the water network in the agricultural areas traversed by the infrastructure.

Challenge 3. Optimizing synergies among stakeholders in a transcalar and interscalar perspective

Regarding optimization of synergy between the subjects involved, on a transcalar level, it must be said that the public debate certainly favored discussion between the subjects involved, which included the region of Puglia, the Metropolitan City of Bari, municipalities of Bari, Triggiano, Noicàttaro and Mola di Bari, and various citizen committees. That

dialogue both accelerated public discussion and summarized the issues and positions in a very short time period. It also channeled existing synergies and conflicts regarding the project into a single process that was recognized by all parties involved. Hence, its function was that of a catalyst rather than an optimizer of synergies.

Challenge 4. Favoring behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership

While the public debate process concerning the Highway 16 Alternative Route raised the awareness and strengthened the position of all subjects involved regarding environmental protection, it did not succeed in reducing the polarization of opposing interests on all sides. To summarize, it has therefore failed to encourage behavioral changes of actors to increase their active partnership.

Challenge 5. Promoting a more deliberative dialogue among different partners

The public debate, through the meetings and methods proposed fostered deliberative dialogue, ensured that the discussion was based on mutual listening and open to all common interests, and helped the public acquire the tools needed to build a shared opinion.

Challenge 6. Increasing mutual trust relations among different participants

The results regarding increased cooperation and mutual trust among citizens were ambiguous. On the one hand, they can be seen as positive for having intensified collaborative networks between environmental activist groups and residents of the areas involved. On the other hand, they can be seen as negative for not having produced innovative or shared solutions.

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4.4.3. Great national debate (France)

The Great National Debate was a French public debate launched on January 15, 2019 by the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, in the context of the Yellow Vests movement. It has radically differed from the usual methodology adopted by the Public Debate National Commission (CNDP), as explained in the introduction of the section 4.4. In fact, the CNDP, which should have been the logical institution to organize such a debate, was set aside in favor of an ad hoc body, due to a disagreement between the government and the CNDP about the methodology, and about the guarantees of independence, neutrality and impartiality on the holding of the debate.

The structure of the French political system is highly centralized, with weak checks and balances and a president who wields most of the power. Without a strong political party, Emmanuel Macron pushed this paternalistic feature to the limit after his election, shutting down dialogue with unions, local governments, parliament, or even members of parliament individually. The backlash was strong. In fall 2018, and for a couple of months, initially protesting against a socially unjust carbon tax, the *Gilets jaunes* (Yellow Vests) movement launched a radical although non-partisan protest that paralyzed the country and backed the president into a corner. To find a way out, the president convened a Great Debate from January to March, which included open meetings across the whole country, an online participatory platform, and randomly selected citizens' assemblies during one weekend in each of the 18 French regions.

Four topics were proposed for discussion: 'ecological transition'; 'taxation'; 'democracy and citizenship'; 'organization of the state and public services'. The consultation took place in several phases:

- Reporting of complaints and exchanges between citizens and mayors (from mid-December 2018 to mid-January 2019);
- Local debates organized by mayors, associations, individuals, etc., around questions raised by the four themes chosen by the government (from mid-January to mid-March 2019);
- In parallel, from January 21, 2019, each citizen could give their opinion and make proposals on a dedicated website;
- National thematic conferences bringing together various associations, unions and institutions (March 11–14, 2019);
- Regional citizens' conferences bringing together citizens drawn by lot (March 15–16 and March 23–24, 2019).

The Great Debate officially ended on March 15, 2019. More than 10,000 local meetings had been organized, with an average number of participants of 70 people per debate and nearly 2 million contributions on the website. Prime Minister Édouard Philippe made a first summary on April 8, 2019, indicating: "This success of the great debate is not that of the government, it is that of all French people". He noted in particular a 'huge fiscal exasperation' (which, by the way, was part of his program much before the Great Debate). On April 25, 2019, Emmanuel Macron concluded the debate with a press conference, during which he notably announced a reduction in income tax and the re-indexation of small pensions to inflation. The government estimates the cost of organizing the debate at twelve million euros.

The researcher Jean-Michel Fourniau (2019) has summarized the collective research he has coordinated on the Great Debate as follow:

Geographically, the Great Debate was primarily attended in big cities: for half of the population living in small towns (of less than 10,000 inhabitants) or in rural areas, there was little opportunities to attend public meetings and they contributed to a much lesser extent on the internet.

Sociologically, the Great Debate brought together a more male than female participants, with a very high level of education; citizens rather satisfied with their living conditions (income and housing; older and owner. These features are often found in participatory devices, and can even accentuate the social differences in participation in political life rather than helping to reduce them. Unfortunately, the 'Great national debate' seems not to have escaped this rule.

Politically, the composition of the public and the geography of the debate confirm the hypothesis of a population with political attitudes structurally close to those of the electorate of E. Macron, responding to the strong mobilization of the elected representatives of the presidential majority. The persistent social and political conflict during the "Great national debate" led the executive and the highly mobilized elected representatives of the presidential majority, to present it as the image of a peaceful France, in contrast "rioters"—i.e. The Yellow Vests. Taking part in the debate therefore meant becoming part of the conflict. This tended to rule out or marginalized (especially for local meetings) the public who only wanted to be informed, and even more the majority of French men and women who continued to support the Yellow Vests.

On all these socio-economic and political characteristics, the audiences of the "great national debate" were opposed point-by-point to the Yellow Vests (Fourniau, 2019). One

can add that the great debate was only consultative, and organized in a way which made any scaling-up or procedural synthesis impossible, with conversations going on parallelly with little attention paid to the output of deliberations. The prime minister and the president were thus able to claim that they were the only legitimate persons who could formulate conclusions: which happened to be nothing more than their previous electoral program. In spring 2019, this so-called “deliberative” event was somehow successful, politically speaking: together with a severe crackdown on the Yellow Vests, it helped to shift the agenda and stabilize the situation, although the crisis of representation has persisted ever since.

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4.5. Excursus: Refood Project (Portugal)

There has been a growing concern about food waste and food loss reduction especially as the number of food insecure families in the European Union has increased resulting in an increasing number of households depending on food assistance programs. The practice of up-cycling food to improve the diet of low-income households not only tackles food wastage and food insecurity, but also has the potential to contribute to the fulfillment of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), such as SDG 2 and SDG 12, as well as the potential to contribute to the fulfillment of other SDGs, such as SDGs 1, 3, 10, and 13). During the past decades, the poverty situation of the Portuguese population has been partially tackled by the public welfare system, and more recently also by non-governmental organizations such as the Food Bank, and the Refood project.

The functioning of the project

The Portuguese Refood project, is a bottom-up organization, developed initially in Lisbon in 2011. Refood collects food surplus and redistributes it to low-income families, even though each operation center has micro-local recovery and redistribution activity (Nogueira/Alves/Vaz-Fernandes, 2021a). In other terms, the project can also be categorized as a grassroots initiative considering it is a collaborative social initiative organized at the local community level, with a high degree of the participatory decision-making process (Grabs/Langen/Maschkowski/Schäpke, 2016).

The Refood organization is a 100% voluntary micro-local project that rescues food, from large or small distribution (groceries, supermarkets, fruit, and vegetable minimarkets), as well as from the HORECA channel (hotels, restaurants, and cafes), barbecue takeaway, and canteens (food sources of the project) and redistributes food surpluses to needy families and social support institutions at a micro-local level (Refood Movimento).

By 2020, Refood grew to involve around 10,000 volunteers at the national level and serve more than 2,000,000 meals a year, at a cost of 10–15 cents per meal, to around 6,500 beneficiaries. In Portugal, it has more than 60 operations centers across the country with plans to open other centers in Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Each operation center benefits and replicates the organization's know-how, operating at the micro-local level. The rescued food redistribution takes place once a day in the form of hampers containing at least the amount of food required for each family to be provided with one full meal. Traditionally, in Portugal, one full meal involves vegetable soup, a main course with fish or meat plus a starch source (e.g., potatoes, pasta or rice), a vegetable side dish (e.g., a salad), and finally one sweet or fruit dessert. Moreover, all hampers also contain breakfast and mid-afternoon snacks like bread, cakes, dairy products, and fruit (ibid.).

Because the Refood project food sources' surpluses are unpredictable, every day there is a surplus of rescued food that does not represent a balanced meal. To avoid food waste, by the end of the day all foods that haven't been served to direct beneficiary families are forwarded to the other five charitable institutions. This is often the case of rescued fresh bread, cakes, fruits, and vegetables or large amounts of cooked meals collected from inconstant social events like weddings or corporate dinners. It should be noted that when bottles of wine, whether already open or not, are collected from social events, they are forwarded to charitable institutions to be used in cooking.

Environmental Impacts

When assessing the environmental cost-benefit ratio of food recovery, the balance is heavily skewed towards the benefits side. On the costs side, material and energetic resources consumed to rescue food, and GHG produced in the rescue process, must be taken into consideration (Nogueira/Alves/Vaz-Fernandes 2021b). These costs are minimized by the fact that the Refood organization model was projected to operate at a micro-local level, to minimize the environmental impacts of the food rescue and redistribution process, on air quality and global warming. On the benefits side, since 2011, more than 1,000 Tons of fresh or freshly cooked food per month was diverted from landfills, avoiding environmental burdens such as land use, material and energy resources that would be needed to produce food equivalent to what was rescued, resulting, as well, in the production of more pollutants. Furthermore, pollutants, either solids, liquids, gases, or GHG are not produced as an effluent of food as waste treatment.

Economic Impacts

The economic impact of food recovery and redistribution activity concerns the organization involved in the process, general society, food sources, and beneficiaries. A food aid organization' operation center does have expenses (electricity, water, internet, cleaning product) and fuel costs to pay for. At the national level, the organization calculated the economic cost of each meal is 10–15 cents. On the benefits side, there are avoided costs of the production, distribution, and transportation of more food that would have replaced the non-rescued food. By donating food surpluses, most of the Refood food sources have tax benefits and avoid waste management costs, which represents a considerable benefit when large amounts are donated.

Social Impacts

In terms of social outcomes, beneficiary families, voluntaries, food sources, and other supported institutions must be considered. Beneficiary families with a lesser degree of food

insecurity may still benefit in terms of health, opportunities to find or keep a job, school results, and changes in nutritional patterns. Since 2011, ReFood organization has involved more than 7,500 volunteers who have benefited from socialization while supporting community members and contributing to food up-cycling. For the food sources, forwarding food surpluses to support low-income households is a sign of corporate social and environmental responsibility, often mentioned in their sustainability reports (Aldi, 2022). As a result, communities around each ReFood operation center witnessed the possibility of a circular and solidary economy driving change in their own local neighborhood.

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Conclusion

The deliverable “Sound practices of Democratic Innovations” has provided a critical analysis of four main participatory and deliberative methodologies which had been already developed by practitioners (initially mostly in isolation from one another). A methodology is understood as a set of methods, protocols and rules, which means a particular procedure with a specific sequence of steps, or a set of procedures. Participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, public debate, mixed councils and assemblies are defined as consolidated methodologies. Each of them has its own efficiency, particular limits, but also a specific legitimacy which to some extent is in tension with the legitimacy of the others (and with the one of electoral democracy), especially for the realization of the EGD. Our research has studied how to deal with these conflicts and how to maximize citizens’ and institutional involvement for a Green Deal (see the general analysis in Part 2 and the cases studies in Part 4).

To a lesser extent, **this deliverable presents some of the tools that will constitute basic elements of the Tangrams**. A tool refers to different devices within a consolidated methodology or a participatory experience. Three of these tools are presented more in-depth in Part 3: Trust, ICT, and Mapping, that can improve participatory and deliberative innovation in different ways. Trust is a key tool and must be involved in the exploration of democratic innovations, as it is crucial for citizens to accept and support environmental policies. ICT have gained significant importance in recent years and are used in democratic innovations to enhance participation, access and understanding of deliberative and participatory models. Participatory mapping is an important and increasingly popular process of mapmaking that seeks to make visible the connection between different communities by using the commonly recognized language of cartography. These three tools can make democratic innovation more accessible, participatory, and efficient. In Part 4, the analysis of the cases studies also tackles a number of tools, in specific contexts.

In order to evaluate normatively the four methodologies and the tools, and to provide a critical standpoint for designing the Tangrams, the deliverable **has also provided a critical analysis of six challenges which were at the core of our proposal in the grant agreement** (see Section 1). The first set of challenges, which concerns the organizational of democratic innovation, includes the issues of **(1) Time frame; (2) Complexity; and (3) Scale**. The second set of challenges, which concerns the communication among actors and the negotiations among their expectation and interests for improved cooperation, includes the issues of **(4) Cooperation between stakeholders; (5) Conflict and deliberation; and (6) Trust**. Two of these challenges have been analyzed more at length: Scale (Section 1.1.2.) and Complexity (Section 1.1.3.). During the first year dedicated to the theoretical/methodological research and the productive discussions that were leveraged

by several events organized or co-organized by PHOENIX's Team, some dimensions appeared as missing in the set of original challenges. Particularly, the second cluster of challenges, would benefit of a future reshaping, for complementing its vision (too much shaped by a mainly top-down and institutionally-driven perspective) with the consideration of conflicts and power asymmetries. In fact, the latter proved too often to represent serious obstacles to any democratic innovation that aims to tackle the EGD.

As repeatedly explained in different parts of this documents, the consortium supported the choice of not changing the original framing of the 6 challenges underway, but to clearly report what missing dimensions were highlighted during the research year and through public discussions and selected case studies. We are aware of the fact that maintaining the original challenges and testing their heuristic interest represented a realistic choice to reduce possible delays of the research task and to avoid affecting the already initiated work of other tasks. But we consider important to remark the limits emerged requires to future tasks to endorse a partial rethinking of part of the PHOENIX theoretical framework in order to take into account the new dimensions that emerged as more significant.

Actually, the need to confront the visions of different partners (and of external actors) on the central backbone of PHOENIX (the EGD's main challenges to participatory and deliberative methodologies, and the input of the latter for the EGD) represented the central mission of the Task 2.1. In this perspective, the outputs of this deliverable contribute to enrich the initial vision and suggest new alignments for next phases of the project. This can be read as a proof of success in conducting the task being open to self-critics and incremental partners' awareness.

The normative criteria for the evaluation of the methodologies and the tools, and for designing the Tangrams, also imply **a critical analysis of four democratic goods that were at the core of PHOENIX: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency** (see Section 1.2.). These democratic goods had been inspired by a typology of Graham Smith. Our research has analyzed the discussions in the literature about the definition of a democratic good. It has also tackled the reasons why to select these four democratic goods, which can be viewed in line with the perspective of deliberative democracy more than with the perspective of radical democracy. Here again, the consortium accepted the original definitions of democratic goods, and decided to test their heuristic interest in the following phases of the research. However, the year dedicated to research and the theoretical/methodological debates offered substantial contribution to broaden the spectrum of the democratic goods that the next phases of Phoenix will hap to put in their epicenter. In addition, the very concept of democratic goods emerged as

questionable, for two main reasons: on the one hand, in relation to the crisis of democracy and representation; and on the other hand, in relation to the risk of marginalization.

A specific development has tackled the issue of societies and nature(s) interdependencies in democratic innovations that aim to foster the ecological transition (see Section 1.4.). The interdependencies among all species, including humans, are undeniable. Therefore, democratic innovation towards an ecological transition should not restrict the participation to humans. New participatory processes should be grounded on the moral recognition of the entire web of life. Non-humans may not directly participate in deliberative processes, but this does not mean that their needs and interests cannot be represented. Humans' citizens are responsible for representing non-humans' rights. This can be one of the cores of the democratic innovations that ecological transition needs.

Another specific development has tackled the issue of RRIs (See Section 15.). The research was done using the Cordis website, searching for keywords aligned with PHOENIX objectives and topics. We identified seven projects whose objectives are relevant to PHOENIX research and methodologies. The outputs of these projects are highlighted in the chapter and are mainly related to the energy transition, gender issues, societal engagement, and co-creation. The considerations will be in the design of methodologies and tools for PHOENIX pilots, as well as in the Gender Equality Plan discussed in the consortium.

An important part of the research has been to analyze in-depth a number of case studies, mainly fitting within the four cornerstone methodologies (see Part 4.). Our methodology in order to select and analyze them has been mostly qualitative. The short-list we have constituted included around 70 cases. On this basis, we decided to choose around 20 of them for a deeper analysis, each being presented in Part 4, and to list the further 50 ones (see Annex IV). The criteria to constitute these two lists have been: Mostly cases related to the four cornerstone typologies; Mostly cases which have taken place in Europe; A reasonable balance between the different regions and countries in Europe; At least two thirds of the cases including a strong dimension on ecological issues, at most one third chosen because of their procedural importance; Cases which can at least to a certain extent been considered as best-practices; Cases for which we could get enough trustful information, knowledge, and expertise in order the analyze to be serious. For each case study, we have underlined how the practices are able (or not) to face our six challenges; how they incorporate (or not) the four democratic goods; to what extent they cross-fertilize, and to what extent they can enter in a deliberative and participatory system—in brief, what

are their strengths and limitations. The different elements that have been assessed in these case studies will later on be important in the construction of the Tangram.

We have also clarified the idea of a Tangram as a participatory and deliberative system, that is a system in which different methodologies and tools are coordinated in order to improve participation in a specific context with the EGD in mind (see Section 1.3.). A participatory and deliberative system has to be understood as a kind of checks and balances: tensions between the different methodologies and tools, as well as between the different actors, are inevitable and must be dealt with, but the deliberative and participatory system aims at fostering cooperation and a kind of division of labor between participants. Nevertheless, a Tangram always functions in the context of a political system which has to be analyzed as a kind of ecosystem: In fragile equilibrium, with predators and preys, and invasive species. DIs can be conceived as invasive species which face strong adversaries, especially when the ecological challenge is at stake. They enter in agonistic relationships in which deliberation and institutional participation are only part of the story. All stakeholders are not (or cannot be) equal and cooperative. Conflicts cannot melt into deliberation. A Tangram, when institutionalized, aims to make governance more participatory. The objective is also to reduce the asymmetrical relations of power within governance, and to force the lobbies which oppose the ecological transition to accept it, one way or another.

Last but not least, this deliverable provides two main crucial inputs for the future work of the WP3 (mainly the task 3.2) for designing the methodology for each territory and creating a portfolio, which will be used by the Territorial Commissions for Co-Design (TCCD). On the one hand, especially with the detailed panorama of the case studies, it will make easier to better think about the potential methodologies and tools at their disposal. On the other hand, the more theoretical reflections (especially concerning the challenges that the four methodologies that could maximize citizen participation to the European Green Deal have to face, the democratic good at stake and the concept of the Tangram) will help the TCCD to take a critical standpoint and better define what sound practices in their territory could be.

For the future steps: We have decided to retain the six challenges and the four democratic goods that were mentioned in the grant agreement, as well as our initial theoretical framing, in order to test their heuristic interest. Nevertheless, this first step of the research and the debates that it leveraged leads us to recommend that the further phases of PHOENIX keep in mind the agonistic dimensions and the power relations that condition the democratic innovations which aim at fostering the EGD; and to take this into account when designing tangrams and trying to implement them

Annexes

I. Seminar ‘Participation, Deliberation, and the European Green Deal’

In order to best fulfill task 2.1, to write the deliverable and to involve all cooperation partners of the task, we decided to hold a weekly webinar from the beginning of September to the end of November 2022 with the theme ‘Participation, Deliberation and the European Green Deal’. Each session aimed to deepen the understanding of the topic and to allow the selection of case studies on each methodology or tool. PHOENIX partners proposed and presented case studies that they could write about in the deliverable or which they considered worth analyzing. Although CNRS conducted most of the case studies, the introductory parts, and the more theoretical parts, all compelling contributions and modifications were welcome.

The CNRS hosted the conference ‘Citizens’ assemblies for the climate’ for PHOENIX in cooperation with Maison française d’Oxford, Paris-Lumières University, Paris 8 University, KNOCA, Nuffield College (University of Oxford), Paris Est University and Oxpo (Oxford-Sciences Po Paris Program) from September 8–9, 2022 in Oxford. Some PHOENIX partners, such as CES, CSIC and SOTON took an active role in the conference. In addition, the CNRS participated in the congress ‘Démocratie par temps sombre: autoritarismes, participations, expérimentations’ from November 23–25, 2022 in Paris with a presentation on democratic innovations on climate change on November 25, 2022. The two conferences in Oxford and Paris helped to select the relevant case studies more accurately and to define and prioritize the key topics related to the task and deliverable 2.1.

The program of the seminar
‘Participation, Deliberation and the European Green Deal’

Session	Introduction to the session	Intervention
Workshop (1), 22.07.2022 Brainstorming Session	CNRS	
Workshop (2), 05.09.2022 Session to set the base of the work for the fall semester and the structure of the deliverable	CNRS	
1. Session, 14.09.2022 Seminar on Methodologies (1): Participatory budgeting	CNRS	CES, SOTON
2. Session, 21.09.2022 Seminar on Methodologies (2): Mini-publics (Citizens’ assemblies)	CNRS	TGL, Res Publica
3. Session, 28. 09.2022 Seminar on Methodologies (3): Public debate	CNDP (Floran Augagneur)	CNRS, UNIFI
4. Session, 5.10.2022 Seminar on Methodologies (4): System of Councils and Forum/Conferences on Public Policies and other joint bodies associating elected representatives, civil society organizations and/or randomly selected citizens	CSIC	CNRS
5. Session, 12.10.2022 Seminar on challenges (inclusiveness and partnership, deliberation and trust)	CNRS (Yves)	UNIFI
6. Session, 19.10.2022 Conceptual seminar (1): To what extent can the different participatory/ deliberative methodologies constitute a system, between them and with the multi-level governance, and what relation with the Tangram and the Portfolio?	CNRS, CSIC & CES	
7. Session, 26.12.2022 Seminar on the Democratic Goods and RRI projects	CNRS	CES, TGL
8. Session, 02.11.2022 Seminar on challenges (time, complexity and scale)	CNRS	CES, CSIC, UNIFI

Session	Introduction to the session	Intervention
9. Session, 04.11.2022 Seminar on Environment, Nature Advocacy and Democratic Innovations	UC	Uol
10. Session, 16.11.2022 Seminar on Tools: the role of ICT and AI	ONESOURCE	eGA, CSIC
11. Session, 30.11.2022 Conceptual seminar (2): According to what democratic goods is it possible to balance the power struggles and asymmetries on the one hand, cooperation and trust on the other hand?	Uol	CNRS TGL

II. Oxford Conference ‘Citizens’ assemblies for the climate: a political or technocratic response to the ecological challenge?’

The Program of the Oxford Conference

Citizens’ assemblies for the climate: a political or technocratic response to the ecological challenge?

Oxford, September 8–9, 2022

EU-PHOENIX research project, Maison française d’Oxford,
Paris-Lumières University, Paris 8 university, KNOCA, Nuffield College

In cooperation with Paris Est University, Oxpo (Oxford–Sciences Po Paris Programme),
CRESPPA-CSU

Conveners: Yves Sintomer (CRESPPA/Nuffield College/DPIR), Graham Smith (University of
Westminster/KNOCA)

Scientific coordination: Selma Tilikete (Paris 8 University/MFO), Eve Boulanger (CRESPPA)

September 8, NUFFIELD COLLEGE

8:45: Welcoming participants

9:00: Welcome: Giovanni Allegretti (PHOENIX); Jamie Draper (Nuffield College); Susan Brown (Oxford City Council); Emilie Frenkiel (Paris Est University); Pascal Marty (MFO)

9:15: Panel 1. Introduction to themes of conference.

Chair: Jamie Draper (Nuffield College)

Speakers: Graham Smith (University of Westminster/KNOCA); Yves Sintomer (CRESPPA/Nuffield College/DPIR)

Discussant: Claudia Chwalisz (DemocracyNext)

11:00: Panel 2. Lessons from the French Citizens Convention for the Climate

Chair: Giovanni Allegretti (CES Coimbra/PHOENIX)

Speakers: Judith Ferrando (Missions publiques); Lise Deshautel (Consultant on climate policies and citizen participation, Advisor to the governance committee of the French Citizen’s Assembly for Climate); Laurent Jeanpierre (Panthéon-Sorbonne University)

Discussant: Manuel Cervera-Marzal (Liège University)

14:30: Panel 3. Lessons from other climate assemblies

Chair: Marie-Hélène Bacqué (Université Paris Nanterre University, LAVUE)

Speakers: Rebecca Willis (Lancaster University); Oliver Escobar (The University of Edinburgh); Clodagh Harris (Cork University); Eva Rovers (Bureau Burgerberaad)

Discussant: Naoyuki Mikami (Hokkaido University)

16:45: Panel 4. Lessons from European and transnational climate assemblies/panels

Chair: Kalypso Nicolaïdis (School of Transnational Governance, EUI, Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford)

Speakers: Claire Mellier-Wilson (Global Climate Assembly); Ernesto Ganuza (CSIC Madrid); Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul (Common Secretariat of The Conference On the Future of Europe at European Commission); Azucena Moran (IASS Potsdam)

Discussant: Amy Dahan (Centre Alexandre Koyré, Paris)

September 9, MAISON FRANÇAISE D'OXFORD

8:45: Welcoming participants

9:00: Panel 5. Bringing in future generations and non-humans

Chair: Cécile Laborde (Nuffield College)

Speakers: Roman Krznaric (Long Now Foundation); Emilie Gaillard (Science Po Rennes); Mathijs van de Sande (Radboud University Nijmegen Netherlands)

Discussants: Nabila Abbas (CRESPA-CNRS/PHOENIX), Samuel Hayat (CNRS-affiliated Research Fellow at CEVIPOF-Sciences Po)

11:15: Panel 6. Sortition and climate: elective affinities?

Chair: Florence Faucher (Science Po Paris/Oxpo)

Speakers: Maxime Gaborit (Saint Louis University/ Brussels-Crespo/Science Po Paris); Selma Tilikete (Paris 8 University/MFO) ; Stephen Elstub (Newcastle University)

Discussants: Stuart White (Jesus College, University of Oxford), Fee Helen Kirsch (European University Institute)

14:00: Panel 7. Climate assemblies and politics

Chair: David Miller (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

Speakers: Carsten Berg (Citizens Initiative/European University Institute); Justin Kenrick (Grassroots2Global.org, Anthropologist, XR); Colin Scicluna (EU commission, Co-Head of the CoFE's Common Secretariat, Vice President Suica's Chief of Staff);

Discussant: Lionel Cordier (Paris 8 University)

15:30: General conclusion.

Chair: Emilie Frenkiel (Paris Est University)

David Owen (University of Southampton); Zeynep Pamuk (LSE); Claudia Chwalisz (DemocracyNext)

16:00: End of the conference

III. Advanced Tools for E-Participation

Advanced tools for e-participation have the ability, on digital participation platforms, to improve the user experience, the performance of websites and even the promotion of participatory processes based on the availability of data from both users and the processes themselves.

A platform such as the Empatia Platform, for example, that aggregates different participatory processes can use from user tracking tools to obtain user data and their actions within participatory processes to predictive search tools that can realize a dialogue between the different processes, improving the user's search resources for certain participatory processes.

For this report, six types of advanced e-participation tools were selected: user tracking; content classification; recommendation and predictive search; data clustering; chatbots; and accessibility. The selected tools were listed below.

User Tracking

User tracking tools allow developers to collect information about the behavior of online users. The main data collected by user tracking tools can be from knowing how long a user stays on a page, to whether they click a link or watch a video.

Most companies that operate online use user tracking tools, mainly as support for digital advertising. User tracking tools allow developers to better understand the interaction between users with the digital platform, to identify possible problems on the platforms, as well as analyze the performance of the platform.

User tracking can be implemented for statistical, marketing or commercial purposes. User tracking tools can collaborate with participatory processes by allowing improvement and investment in marketing and promotion of the participatory process. These tools can also help to define and improve the target audience reach of the participatory process.

User tracking can also contribute to participatory processes by allowing access to data that enables the analysis of how users are reacting to the e-participation platform. User tracking tools make it possible to identify, for example, if users are having difficulty at some specific stage of a participatory process.

The main user tracking tools are: Microsoft Clarity; Yandex Metrica; and MixPanel.

Microsoft Clarity⁵⁸ is a free and open-source tool. Among the main functions of this tool are:

- Session recordings: take screenshots that allow observation of what the user has done; where they clicked; which pages were accessed; when users were frustrated; when users clicked many times in a row on the same site, allowing developers to identify a possible error; or even excessive scrolling
- Scroll maps: allows developers to see that on certain areas of the page users have spent more time;

The developer also has the ability to:

- view how long users were active and how long they were inactive.
- Allow integration with Google Analytics;
- Via an extension to see in real time which users stayed longer

Yandex Metrica⁵⁹ is a tool that emerges as an alternative to Microsoft Clarity:

- Heatmap, scroll map, click map, link map;
- Screen recordings;
- Ad blocking;
- Form analysis: allows to analysis of the time the user spent interacting with each field on the form; the fields that the user left empty on the form; the fields from which users leave the page without submitting the form (that is, fields that cause difficulties when filling them out).

Finally, **MixPanel**⁶⁰ is a tool with free and paid plan options and features the following functions allowing the developer to:

- Build funnels and workflows (break them by user attribute or behavior).
- See all user flows to detect what are the top flows and where people get stuck;

⁵⁸ [Microsoft Clarity](#)

⁵⁹ [Yandex.Metrica](#)

⁶⁰ [Mixpanel](#)

- See which users stick around, and for how long.
- Group your users based on actions they did or didn't take;
- Measure which A/B test variants succeed (compare new features to original ones to identify which ones have the best overall impact on your user).

Content Classification

Content classification in machine learning refers to identifying a data item in one or more predefined classes. The data can be in text, audio, or image format for example. Thus, content classification tools can be used for: sentiment analysis; image analysis; video analysis; toxic text analysis.

On digital platforms, people are free to express themselves. There are several spaces on the internet where users can post their comments. However, it is essential to filter out these comments, especially in the event that someone uses abusive language. The toxic text analysis tools classify the toxicity of a text between 0% and 100% and can be used in three cases:

- Administrators can quickly prioritize and review comments that have been reported.
- They give feedback to users who try to post toxic comments.
- They give the user the chance to control which comments they see, such as hiding comments

In participatory processes that allow participants to insert comments or be active in discussion forums, toxic text analysis tools are important to detect, for example, offensive comments; comments containing hate speech; false information; and/or comments that violate the terms and conditions of the e-participation platform.

An example of a toxic text analysis tool is the Perspective API.

Sentiment analysis tools are an automated process of understanding the underlying feelings and emotions in opinions, classifying them as negative, neutral, or positive. This analysis can be done on a sentence or a document. These tools, on the other hand, present disadvantages such as: automated process of understanding the underlying feelings and emotions in opinions, classifying them as negative, neutral, or positive.

Sentiment analysis is able to determine the author's attitude towards a given topic and allow the backend team to assess the underlying attitude in a comment and can address participant dissatisfaction or actively capitalize on positive trends.

These tools can collaborate with participatory processes by allowing the identification of the participants' attitudes towards certain proposals. In addition, it allows backend teams to obtain better insights into certain phases of the participatory process or certain proposals.

Examples of sentiment analysis tools are: Google Cloud Sentiment Analysis; AssemblyAI; Eden AI; Twinword Sentiment Analysis API; Amazon Comprehend; Spacy.

Finally, **image analysis tools** and **video analysis** tools are able to identify what is in the image or video (objects, people, etc.); what are the feelings of the person considering their expression; texts present in the image or video; safe search (presence of adult, racist, violent content, etc). Examples of these tools are: Google Cloud Vision AI; Amazon Recognition; Clarify; Google Cloud Video AI and Amazon Recognition.

The analysis of images or videos can collaborate with participatory processes, as well as the analysis of toxic texts, by allowing the creation of a filter and identification of users who have submitted images with adult, racist, violent content, etc.

Image or video analysis tools also have two functions that can contribute to participatory processes: suitability analysis and alteration detection.

In the suitability analysis function, AI uses geospatial criteria to determine the ideal location for a project. In participatory processes with the environmental theme, for example, this type of analysis can contribute to the identification and definition of strategic areas in environmental preservation and protection.

The change detection function uses artificial intelligence to detect changes in images before and after versions. In participatory processes where there is a proposal of a project to revitalize green spaces, for example, the use of tools with this function allows citizens to compare in detail the space before and after the proposed changes.

Recommendation and predictive search

Recommendation tools use algorithms, data analysis, and artificial intelligence to make online recommendations of content and/or other elements. Recommendations can be customized or not, depending on the purpose of each platform. The possibility of customizing the recommendations, through the data referring to the user's browsing

profile (clicks, evaluations, searches) enables the recommendation of items that have greater relevance to the user.

In e-participation platforms such as EMPATIA platform, which aggregate several participatory processes, recommendation tools can collaborate by recommending those that are interesting to the user according to their profile of interest. Another example of how a recommendation tool can contribute to participatory processes is in case where the user wants to present an idea/comment on a particular topic. The recommendation system acts by presenting only participatory processes in which there is no identical or similar idea/comment as the one that the user wishes to contribute.

Predictive search is an approach that aims to anticipate a user's search by making suggestions that are related to their queries as they type in the search bar. The main purpose of predictive search is to save the user time– by clicking on suggestions rather than being forced to complete typing the writing. The main features of predictive search are: search bar with instant search, search suggestions, spell check, search filters, autocomplete. Predictive search tools can realize a dialogue between the different participatory processes, improving the user's search resources for certain participatory processes, for example.

Examples of recommendation and predictive search tools: Apache; Solr Search.io; and Algolia.

Data Clustering

Clustering is a machine learning technique that involves the grouping of data points. Given a set of data points, a clustering algorithm can be used to classify each data point into a specific group. In theory, data points that are in the same group should have similar properties and/or features, while data points in different groups should have highly dissimilar properties and/or features. This is a common technique for statistical data analysis.

This tool can collaborate with participatory processes by giving statistics related to the voting process and those who voted. By grouping people and their characteristics it helps to infer ways to improve the platform.

Main features:

- Flexible and intuitive
- Identify Patterns between data elements

- No limitation on the size and number of datasets

Examples:

- NCSS 2022 - Data Analysis & Graphics
- Cluster analysis tool
- IBM SPSS software
- The Unscrambler® X

Chatbots

Chatbot is a computer program designed to conduct conversations with humans. This uses AI to find answers and perform simple tasks in an automated way. And the advantages of chatbot are: simple and quick answers can be given to the user to clarify doubts or solve problems; and are constantly available to users.

Examples of chatbot tools are: ChatBot; Intercom; RoboMatic; Mr. Botpress.

The ChatBot tool has the following features:

- No-code chatbot builder (drag and drop conversation blocks to easier built)
- Chatbot testing tool (test while building)
- Customizable Chat aspect
- ChatBot academy (tutorials created and available)
- Prebuilt templates
- Reports (measure your chatbots' performance using real-time analytics.)
- User data (automatically collect user data while chatting)
- Good customer support

Accessibility

By focusing on the platform level of accessibility, user experience (UX) can be enhanced for every visitor, including those with disabilities or limitations. This is particularly important since according to the World Health Organization, one billion people—approximately 15% of the world's population—live with some form of disability. Given the fact that participatory processes seek to reach all citizens, it is important to study how to help these

people to gain easier access to the platform. Below are some examples that can be implemented to the platforms:

Offer text alternatives: All non-text items on the page (images, videos, and audio content) must have a text alternative so that non-sighted individuals can understand them.

Make the content easy to see and hear: For sighted individuals, it's important to utilize color contrast so that everyone, including those with color blindness, can read the content and understand any visual information the site wants to convey.

Provide ample time to engage with the website: Allow users to read, watch, and use the various content types within a reasonable time constraint.

Avoid blinking/flashing content: According to W3C, content that blinks or flashes more than three times in a second can trigger seizures. Avoid this when possible or provide a warning beforehand.

Write HTML that can be parsed: Assistive technologies often make use of a web page's HTML file in order to translate its contents into a different format.

Among the tools that allow the accessibility of the platform, we highlight some: tools that convert text to audio; tools that convert audio into text; change captchas to facial recognition; and website accessibility standards.

Among the tools that convert text to audio are Google Cloud Text-to-Speech; TTSTFree.com; AWS Polly; RSS Voice; Rev AI; Narakeet. The main purpose of this type of tool is to improve the accessibility of the website by converting text to audio.

Tools that convert audio to text aim to improve website accessibility by converting audio to text. Among these tools stand out: Amazon Transcribe; AssemblyAI; Google Cloud Speech to Text; DeepSpeech project.⁶¹

Some deficiencies can make it difficult to insert passwords or patterns. So, tools that change captchas to facial recognition can make the website more accessible. Facial recognition is removing the need for CAPTCHAs as a way of authenticating web users and preventing attacks by bots. Even for those with perfect vision, CAPTCHAs can be hard to

⁶¹ [Amazon Transcribe](#); [AssemblyAI](#); [Speech-to-Text: Automatic Speech Recognition | Google Cloud](#); [Project DeepSpeech](#)

solve at times, so it can be very difficult for someone visually impaired to access the website. Examples of tools that change captchas to facial recognition are: Kairos face recognition; Animetrics face recognition; Inferdo face detection.

In addition, you can use tools to evaluate and test website accessibility. Web accessibility testing is a subgroup of usability testing to determine if the website or app is usable by people with disabilities that affect the use of the internet such as hearing, visual, physical, cognitive.

IV. List of 50 potential case studies of democratic innovations

Since the Excel spreadsheet is too large to paste here, please view at the following address:

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1s2rkPa8PerWbJWEVMYfhIASxeNwJKbacuJjFiDTXHfo/edit#gid=0>